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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IN KUWAIT 
 
BADER M N ALOTAIBI 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Failure of high profile companies such as Enron, World.com had initiated a call for 
an investigation to analyse the reason for such radical consequence to prevent further 
similar financial crises. One of the common factors identified by the researchers is 
the poor disclosure, transparency and Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms. 
Similar to the UK, the compliance towards CG codes are voluntary for the majority 
of the countries around the globe including Kuwait. CG codes aimed to improve the 
governance of a company including transparency. Thus, voluntary disclosure had 
been examined by numerous academics to emphasise the importance of 
accountability, transparency that in turn increase the confidence of investors and 
creditors in the financial markets of emerging economies. This thesis is based on 
Kuwait, as it is a resource rich country and attracts foreign investments. The Central 
Bank of Kuwait (CBK) issued instructions for CG mechanism especially to the 
financial sector in 2004. From the research in hand, there was no longitudinal study 
in Kuwait concerning the impact of GC mechanism to voluntary disclosure. 
The sample in this thesis consists of 155 Kuwaiti listed companies from 2007 to 
2010, 620 firm-year observations. A self-constructed index was developed to 
evaluate the level of voluntary disclosure and how it developed over time. Both 
univariate analysis and multivariate analysis were used. Most of the thesis results 
were consistent with previous studies; there was a gradual increase in the level of 
voluntary disclosure and its categories over the observed period. All CG mechanisms 
findings revealed significant associations with voluntary disclosure, except board 
size and role duality, have a negative significant association. Ownership structure 
indicates insignificant association with voluntary disclosure. Firm characteristics 
have a significant positive association with voluntary disclosure, except profitability, 
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has a significant negative association, while gearing is found an insignificant 
association. Furthermore, the level of voluntary disclosure in the financial sector is 
higher than the non-financial sector. 
The contributions to knowledge in this thesis are; 1) It is the first empirical 
longitudinal study in Kuwait concerning voluntary disclosure, and its relationship 
with GC mechanism, ownership structure and firm characteristics, as far as the 
researcher is aware. 2) It provided evidence of the importance of CG to enhancing 
the level of voluntary disclosure in Kuwait business environment, especially that the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the financial sector is higher than the non-financial 
sector. 3) Employed many quantitative methods, such as OSL regression, Normal 
score, GLS regression, Tobit regression and Quantile regression (divided into 25%, 
50% and 75%). 4) A self-constructed index, which was developed in this thesis, 
could be suitable for other Arab Gulf countries that are similar in the business 
environment and experiencing the same economic changes. 5) Provides evidence of 
the possibility of employing the disclosure theories derived from developed countries 
in emerging countries. 6) It is possible to generalise the results of the disclosure 
index to other companies not investigated in this thesis. Moreover, this thesis implies 
that the legislative and regulatory authorities, in particular, the capital markets 
authority Kuwaiti, need to increase efforts to enhance the role of corporate 
governance practices in Kuwaiti listed companies 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis investigates the effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms, 
ownership structure and firm characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure 
(LVD) of financial reporting companies listed on the Kuwait stock market. This 
chapter highlights the background to the study, the importance of voluntary 
disclosure and its determinants in Kuwait, the research objectives, significance of the 
study, and the research method chosen. The rest of the chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 1.1 presents the background to the study, section 1.2 justifies why 
the study is necessary in Kuwait; the research aims, objectives and questions are 
presented in section 1.3; section 1.4 highlights the significance of the study; section 
1.5 summarises the key study variables, while section 1.6 presents the research 
method and process. Finally, sections 1.7 and 1.8 present the organisation of the 
thesis and conclusion of the chapter respectively. 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Accounting information includes both financial and non-financial information, which 
is useful for decision makers, investors and other users in order to make proper 
decisions in their investment. Therefore, any investor seeks to invest his funds in the 
markets that provide disclosure and transparency. In other words, investors prefer 
markets that ask all listed companies to provide comprehensive disclosure in order to 
ensure accessibility of information to all investors at the same time. Claessens et al. 
(1993) and Mutawaa and Hewaidy (2010) indicated that market inefficiencies in 
emerging economies may frustrate foreign and local investors because of unfair 
access to information. In addition, market inefficiencies will weaken the confidence 
of investors. Since financial disclosure is an important reason to attract investors to 
invest in emerging markets. 
Recently, there is increasing attention to disclosure and transparency by accounting 
organisations as result of many factors, such as globalization and changes in business 
environments (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Furthermore, there have been major 
scandals in several developed markets: such as Adelphia, Tyco International, 
WorldCom, Enron and Communications (USA), Nortel and Saffron (Canada), and 
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Parmalat and Royal Ahold (EU) (Claessens, 2006). That enhances many institutions 
and accounting organisations’ interest in disclosure and transparency to avoid the 
expected negative effects of shortage of or weakness in disclosure and transparency, 
as any investment decision depends, without doubt, on the quality and quantity of 
information disclosure by companies. Information is necessary for both domestic and 
foreign investors and other users in order to reach suitable decisions. Mendelson 
(1978) indicated that any decision-making for investment involves an evaluation of 
the possibility allocation of future returns and the selections of stock exchange that 
offer investors protection of their interests. 
There are many ways for companies to release information to the public, e.g. annual 
reports, conferences, analyst lists, investor relations, interim reports, prospectuses, 
press releases, the Internet, and others. The annual report is a very important official 
disclosure for stakeholders, but it is not enough (Hope, 2003), although that form of 
financial reporting is still the main source of valuable information about firms 
(Meyer, 2007). Disclosure can be divided into mandatory disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is undertaken in the fulfilment of disclosure 
requirements of statutes in the form of laws, regulations in the form of standards, and 
the listing rules of the stock market; voluntary disclosure is where data is revealed in 
addition to mandatory disclosure (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Voluntary disclosure 
is considered one of methods to achieve completeness in information, provided by 
any company to the public. 
The importance of voluntary disclosure and its determinants has gained much 
attention from both scholars and practitioners, recently. Many empirical studies have 
shown that increasing voluntary disclosure is a major cause of achieving a high level 
of accountability and transparency, which contributes to increasing the confidence of 
investors to invest in the financial markets of emerging economies (Sutton, 1997). 
There are numerous studies that investigate the relationship between LVD and each 
of CG mechanism, ownership structure and firm characteristics in developed 
countries (Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009), but there are few studies conducted in 
developing countries and transition economies like Kuwait.  
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As indicated by Salter (1998), the average level of corporate financial disclosure for 
companies in developed markets continues to be significantly higher compared to 
that of emerging markets; in Kuwait, as an emerging market needing to attract 
investors, that will not happen unless there is an increase to incentives for LVD (Al-
Qenae, 2000). Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) argue that there are many advantages for 
increasing disclosure in the markets in emerging economies, such as reducing market 
risks, increasing confidence of local investors and attracting direct foreign 
investment. There are great hopes that increasing LVD will enhance confidence, 
bring benefits to the Kuwaiti economy by increasing the number of investors, either 
domestic or foreign to the Kuwaiti market, decrease the information asymmetry and 
reduce companies’ cost of capital. 
1.2 Why Kuwait? 
Kuwait belongs to the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
(originally, and still, known as the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC) countries; 
compared to the other GCC countries, it is an open economy (Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan, 2010). As previously mentioned, investors prefer markets that ask all listed 
companies to provide comprehensive disclosure in order to ensure accessibility of 
information to all investors at the same time. Therefore, Kuwaiti companies should 
give due care to voluntary disclosure to enhance their market’s value, in addition to 
increasing inward investment. Chau and Gray (2010) asserted the importance of CG 
and disclosure to the economy of any country which intending to attract foreign 
investors and reduce the cost of capital. Accordingly, in 2004, the Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK) issued instructions for CG to banks and investment companies only
1
.  
Emerging markets suffer from the matter of ownership structure, tending to have 
higher ownership concentration and control by families or the government; 
ownership structure affects disclosures, whether mandatory or voluntary, which 
affects transparency negatively; ownership especially affects financial reporting 
aspects. According to Jalila and Devi (2012), this is the reason for the presence of the 
agency problem in this case. Concentrated ownership is a characteristic of Kuwaiti 
                                                 
1
 In 2004 the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) issued a comprehensive instruction to banks and 
investment companies (conventional and Islamic). 
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companies, where there is concentration of ownership in families or the government 
and their agencies. Numerous studies have investigated the effect of concentrated or 
dispersed ownership in developed or developing countries: e.g. Booth et al. (2002) 
discussed the effect on monitoring mechanisms; Chau and Gray (2010) discussed the 
effect on voluntary disclosure; and Setia-Atmaja (2009) examined the affect of 
ownership concentration on the board and audit committee independence. 
In disclosure prior literature, there has been extensive research investigating the 
relationship between LVD and firm characteristics. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) 
investigated the impact of firm-specific characteristics (size of firm, liquidity, 
profitability, capitalisation ratio and industry type) on disclosure adequacy. Hossain 
et al. (1995) investigated the effect of firm-specific characteristics (e.g. firm size, 
gearing, type of auditors and assets-in-place) on voluntary disclosure. Raffournier 
(1995) examined the extent of disclosure with firm characteristics (company size, 
gearing, profitability and industry type). Uyar et al. (2013) examined the association 
between firm characteristics (firm size, listing age, profitability and gearing) and 
corporate voluntary disclosure.  
This study examines the impact of CG mechanisms, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics together as factors that affect LVD in Kuwait-listed companies. 
Simply, the idea here for choosing these factors is based on three reasons; first, in 
2004, the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) issued instructions for corporate 
governance (CG) to banks and investment companies only. It is useful to examine 
the impact of CG principles after three years of commitment to it, during the period 
of the study (2007-2010)
2
, on LVD to indicate whether there is an increase in LVD 
overall and shed light on the differences between the financial sector and the non-
financial sector. Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) investigated the relationship 
between the four major CG characteristics and voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of 170 Kuwaiti companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange in 2007. The 
current study uses a longitudinal approach (2007-2010), to investigate the effect of 
study factors that may contribute to the change of LVD over time, as recommended 
by Huafang and Jianguo (2007). Buck (1990) stated that the rationale for studying 
                                                 
2
 Corporate Governance Code – Kuwait, April 2013 Principles & Recommended Best Practices for 
Public Companies http://www.kuwaitcma.org/templates/pdf/decisions/decisions_27_6_2013.pdf  
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any factors over time is either to investigate causal relationship from sequential 
ordering (time), or to show the effects of events. 
Second, the predominant ownership pattern is concentration of ownership in Kuwaiti 
listed companies. According to previous studies, there is variance in the effect of 
concentrated ownership on voluntary disclosure. Hasan et al. (2013) found 
concentrated ownership has the power to influence LVD, while Woodcock and 
Whiting (2009) failed to find any proof of ownership concentration affecting LVD. 
Although Al-Shammari (2008) examined the effect of ownership on voluntary 
disclosure for Kuwaiti listed companies in 2005 from the view of the proportion of 
shares held by outsiders, this study only covered one year, and in addition excluded 
the food sector from his study sample. The current study covers all Kuwaiti sectors in 
the Kuwait stock market. 
Third, previous studies found that firm characteristics affect LVD in many countries, 
whether developed or developing. Kuwait still has no CG code for all Kuwaiti 
companies up to the study time, but there are CG principles, issued by the Central 
Bank of Kuwait (CBK) to the financial sector. The majority of previous studies 
focused on the degree of compliance with the CG code when investigating the effect 
of firm characteristics on disclosure. The current study examines the effect of firm 
characteristics in case there are some sectors, which adhere to CG unlike other 
sectors. These characteristics are firm size, firm age, liquidity, gearing, and 
profitability. 
1.3 The Research Aim, Objectives and Research Questions 
This study focuses on the Kuwaiti companies listed in the Kuwait stock market as an 
emerging capital market. First, this study aims to measure and evaluate voluntary 
disclosure practices in the annual reports that were issued by Kuwaiti listed 
companies over four years (2007-2010), after three years of existence of the CG 
principles for banks and financial companies issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait in 
2004. Second, this study aims to investigate the effect of CG mechanisms, ownership 
structure and firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure of financial reporting, and 
improve LVD in Kuwait based on the results of this study.  
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1.3.1 The specific objectives 
In order to reach this overall aim, the following specific objectives are addressed. 
1.  Provide a full explanation of what voluntary disclosure means to Kuwaiti 
customers and to the firms’ managers. 
2. To evaluate voluntary disclosure through overall disclosure and its categories 
during the study period. 
3. To find whether there are statistically significant relationships between LVD 
and its categories with the CG mechanisms, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics.  
4. To compare the extent of LVD in both sectors (the financial sector and the 
non-financial sector). 
5. To link the empirical results with the different theories to provide a clear 
meaning to results.  
1.3.2 Research questions 
1. What is the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Kuwaiti listed 
companies? 
2. To what extent did voluntary disclosures of Kuwaiti listed companies and its 
categories change over the period 2007-2010? 
3. What are the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti listed companies? 
4. Is there any difference between the financial sector and non-financial sector? 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
This study is significant for the following reasons. First, the Kuwaiti context is 
suitable for study, because there is minimal legislation and law for disclosure 
requirements for listed companies in Kuwait. The main resource is Commercial 
Company Law No. 6 of 1960, issued to organise the accounting profession and 
amended by Law No. 3 of 1965, which requires listed companies to provide end of 
year financial reports that include comparative financial statement, the profit and loss 
statement and the cash flow statement. Law No. 32 of 1970 organises the private 
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trading of securities of Listed companies, and the other resource is the practice of the 
auditing profession covered by Law No. 5 of 1981 (Shuaib, 1998)
3
.  
Second, the study adds value to the knowledge in the disclosure literature and the CG 
literature by evaluating voluntary disclosure through overall disclosure and its 
categories. The study further investigates significant differences among LVD and CG 
characteristics, ownership structure and firm characteristics in Kuwait as an 
emerging capital market. In addition, Kuwaiti companies are exempt from taxes (see 
section 4.8). To the researcher’s knowledge, there is no previous empirical 
longitudinal study in Kuwait concerning LVD and its relationship with the factors 
mentioned.  
Third, the precept underlying this study: it was conducted in Kuwait’s business 
context, which is different from other environments due to a lack of CG codes for all 
companies listed in Kuwait. It investigates whether ownership structure affects LVD 
practices in corporate annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies following the 
approach of (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Fourth, the current study is considered a longitudinal study (2007-2010), since the 
most previous studies investigated LVD only covering a single year period. The 
longitudinal nature enriches the voluntary disclosure literature by investigating the 
implications and impact of the changing disclosure environment on LVD in the 
context of a rapidly developing Kuwaiti stock market. Longitudinal studies allow the 
researcher to examine trends for factors by looking for their contribution to the 
change of voluntary disclosure over time (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). 
 Fifth, in this study, voluntary disclosure is analysed based on narrow groups of items 
rather than wider groups. It examines overall voluntary disclosure and the different 
categories of voluntary disclosure. These categories are general corporate 
information (GCI), board of directors and management (BDM), specific corporate 
strategy (SCS), employee information (EI), corporate social disclosure (CSD) and 
others (O) in order to provide a full explanation of trends of the voluntary disclosure 
                                                 
3
 In 2010, Law No. 7 was issued for the establishment of the Capital Markets Authority and regulation 
of the activity of securities. 
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categories (Meek et al., 1995; Ferguson et al., 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; 
Al-Shammari, 2008; Murcia and Santos, 2012). 
Sixth, this study used more advanced statistical analysis techniques compared to 
prior disclosure studies, which used correlation (parametric and non-parametric) and 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to investigate the relationships. In this 
study, a number of statistical techniques are used, namely, the Generalised Linear 
Model, the Tobit model and quantile regression. Generalised Linear Model (GLS) 
estimation is employed to correct the serial or auto-correlation in panel regression. 
Bassett et al. (2007) employed Tobit regression investigate the association between 
employee stock option disclosure and corporate governance. The Tobit model
4
 
assumes that there is a latent variable (unobservable) and this variable linearly 
depends on an independent variable via a parameter (beta), and this beta determines 
the relationship between the independent variable and the latent variable. Tobin 
(1958), therefore, is used in this study. The quantile regression is used to estimate the 
relationship of explanatory variables at different points. Koenker and Hallock (2001) 
stated that this test is useful to use in this type of study. In addition, this study uses 
multi-theories such as agency theory, stewardship theory, signalling theory, 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and political cost theory in order to offer a full 
explanation of the study results. 
Finally, this study is important in enhancing knowledge and understanding of 
corporate disclosure in annual reporting in Kuwait. It explores and determines the 
factors, which affect voluntary disclosure in Kuwait listed companies, in order to 
improve the legislation and rules of disclosure in Kuwait’s business environment. 
Although the Kuwait market hosts the oldest stock exchange in the GCC region, 
there is weak legislation and rules that organise accounting and auditing profession 
in Kuwait. 
 
                                                 
4
 The Tobit model is a statistical model suggested by James Tobin (1958). 
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1.5 Key Study Variables 
According to previous disclosure studies, there are several factors, which affect the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. It is important to investigate these factors in the 
Kuwaiti environment; thus, the following section discusses the importance of 
voluntary disclosure and factors that are expected to have an impact on voluntary 
disclosure policies and practices in Kuwait. 
1.5.1 Importance of voluntary disclosure 
Gibbins et al. (1990) defined financial disclosure as “any deliberate release of 
financial information, whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via 
formal or informal channels” (p.122), such as annual reports, conferences, analyst 
lists, investor relations, interim reports, prospectuses, press releases, or the Internet 
(Hope, 2003). According to Cooke (1989), the aim of corporate financial reporting is 
to provide economic information to stakeholders so they can make investment 
decisions, through laws and regulations for investment to reduce restrictions on 
investors’ knowledge such as mandatory corporate disclosure. Hence, the annual 
report is a very important official disclosure for stakeholders and a main source of 
valuable information (Hope, 2003; Meyer, 2007). Most information included in the 
annual report is mandatory, required by accounting standards and regulations. 
Therefore, the users of financial reports seek more information about the corporate 
financial position, and hence, voluntary disclosure is considered one of the important 
disclosure channels that provides more information. Hence, this study evaluates 
categories of voluntary disclosure in annual reports in listed companies in Kuwait 
between 2007 and 2010.  
1.5.2 Corporate governance 
Sir Adrian Cadbury of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of CG in the UK, 
defines the CG thus: “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” 
(Cadbury Committee Report, 1992). Over the years, CG has grown in size gradually, 
because of corporate scandals, legislation failures, weaknesses in rules to organise 
financial markets, or systematic crises. Ho and Wong (2001) indicated that the Asian 
financial crisis was the result of a lack of effective CG and transparency that led to a 
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loss in investor confidence. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the reason for 
higher asymmetric information is due to lower transparency. Balachandran and Bliss 
(2004) reported that the need for CG in the Asian region is to protect investors and 
avoid corporate failures. CG is considered as the mechanism to reduce the level of 
gap between the separation of principal and agent; in other words, CG helps in 
reducing the cost of the agency (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Andreou et al., 2014).  
CG has been found in prior studies to have an impact on LVD (Gul and Leung, 2004; 
Kent and Stewart, 2008; Mohamad and Sulong, 2010; Rouf, 2011). In addition, many 
scholars reported poor CG was cited as a main reason of corporate collapses (Leung 
and Horwitz, 2004; Gul and Leung, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006). This study extends the 
previous studies, by investigating the impact of CG mechanisms on LVD in the 
financial business environment in Kuwait. CG mechanisms that are used in this study 
to examine its effect on voluntary disclosure include non-executive directors (NEDs), 
board size, role duality, audit committee and audit firms. 
1.5.3 Ownership structure 
There is separation between the ownership and the management in modern 
corporations; hence, there is increased investor monitoring of the decisions and 
performance of management in order to protect their significant interests. The 
usefulness of corporate information to any investor, and existence of contractual 
relationships between ownership (principal) and agent (management), can be 
understood through agency theory context (Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978). Arnold and Lange (2004) referred to the existence of information asymmetry 
when the agent has superior access to the information compared to the principal. 
Gray et al. (1996) inducted that every company must provide information to anyone 
who has a direct or indirect interest in it, according to the normative perspective of 
the accountability model, because it is responsibility of the company to disclose 
information. 
Prior studies found conflicting results for the impact of ownership structure on level 
of disclosure, such as (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Barako, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; 
Laidroo, 2009; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Hashim and Devi, 2008; Eng and Mak, 
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2003). Dhaliwal et al. (1982) reported that firms with ownership concentration are 
more likely to be monitored than firms with diffuse ownership. Raffournier (1995) 
found a positive association between ownership diffusion and disclosure. However, 
some studies found a negative relationship between disclosure and ownership 
concentration, such as (Chau and Gray, 2002; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Barako, 
2007). In addition some studies such as (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005) found a significant relationship between ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
In this study, ownership structure is defined in two forms ownership concentration 
and ownership diffuse. The approach of La Porta et al. (1999) is adopted in this study 
to determine ownership structure: if an investor owns (directly or indirectly) more 
than 20% of the company’s shares, this means the company has concentrated 
ownership. Hence, this study investigates the effect of ownership structure on 
voluntary disclosure in Kuwait listed companies. 
1.5.4 Firm characteristics 
Previous disclosure studies in both developed and emerging / developing countries 
provided evidence that firm characteristics influence LVD either positively or 
negatively, while another group of studies did not find any effect of firm 
characteristics on LVD (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Barako, 
2007; Wang et al., 2008; Rouf, 2011). Scholars found firm characteristics play an 
important role in corporate politics about disclosure (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Donnely and Mulcahy, 2008). According to empirical 
investigations from developed countries like the US, the UK and some European 
countries, the effect of firm characteristics – such as firm size, firm age, and industry 
type – on LVD are different between countries, because each factor has a different 
effect dependent on the location investigated. 
Researchers have discussed the relationship between firm characteristics and LVD in 
annual reports through a variety of factors such as, firm size, firm age, liquidity, 
gearing (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Alsaeed, 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Wang 
et al., 2008; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Laidroo, 2009; Rouf, 2011). For example, firm 
size has positive significance for level of disclosure in the annual report 
(Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Tsamenyi et al., 
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2007; Alsaeed, 2006). While Aljifiri and Hussainey (2007) found negative 
insignificant relationship between firm size and level of disclosure. However, Aljifri 
(2008) found a negative association. Another example, gearing, was found to have no 
significant relationship with level of disclosure (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Wang et al., 
2008), but Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) found a positive association. Hence, this study 
investigates the effect of firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure in Kuwait listed 
companies. 
  
1.6 Research Approach and Process 
To examine the associations among LVD, CG mechanisms, ownership structure and 
firm characteristics in Kuwaiti listed companies, this study adopted methods from 
previous research. This study adopts a quantitative approach, which is based on the 
positive paradigm in order to analyse the association between LVD and corporate 
governance, ownership structure and firm characteristics. Data is collected from both 
primary and the secondary sources, such as annual reports, textbooks, articles, 
journals, Kuwaiti legislation, publications and the website of the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange, and magazines and newspapers relevant to the Kuwaiti business 
environment. 
The research process in this study involved various steps. The first step is a literature 
review to discover results from previous research on the general problem, identify 
relevant explanatory variables, as well as theories relevant to assisting in selecting 
the appropriate research methodology and research design in order to answer the 
research questions in this study. In the second step, the voluntary disclosure checklist 
was constructed and an appropriate scoring approach chosen with applicability to the 
annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies to answer the first two questions by 
applying a descriptive analysis. In the third step, hypotheses were developed from 
relevant theories and previous studies, and these were tested using both univariate 
and multivariate analyses. 
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1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
This study is divided into three main parts and ten chapters, as shown in figure 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1.1 Organisation of the thesis 
 
Part One: 
The theoretical framework 
Part Two: 
Methods and Analysis 
 
Chapter ONE 
Introduction 
 
  Chapter Two 
Voluntary Disclosure and its 
Determinants 
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Chapter Six 
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Discussion 
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Chapter 1 is a brief presentation of the thesis. It introduces the general aim of this 
study and transforms it into objectives and research questions. Empirical questions 
are generated by this procedure; the significance for this thesis is also presented. A 
summary of the methodology and research design are provided; also, contributions 
and are discussed briefly. Finally, the structure of the thesis is reported. 
Chapter 2 presents the historical background to corporate financial reporting and the 
definition of corporate governance (CG), and spotlights the factors that affect 
voluntary disclosure, CG mechanisms, ownership structures and firm characteristics. 
Chapter 3 is divided into two parts: in the first part, a theoretical review is presented 
of common theories used in explanation of voluntary disclosure practices in many 
countries; and in the second part, empirical disclosure studies are discussed, both on 
total voluntary disclosure and on voluntary disclosure categories. 
Chapter 4 presents an overview of background and financial reporting practice in the 
Kuwaiti environment as the context of the study, the Kuwaiti capital market and 
listing requirements on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange (KSE), and corporate financial 
reporting and regulation in Kuwait. 
Chapter 5 presents the research hypotheses of the present study, which are 
developed, based on the empirical disclosure studies discussed in chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 presents the research process and philosophy, research paradigm, research 
approach and methodological choices. The research design is presented, which 
includes data collection, reasons for choosing annual reports, how to measure level 
of disclosure, construction of the disclosure index, the scoring method, and assessing 
the reliability and validity of disclosure. The model and formulation of independent 
variables hypotheses are presented. Finally, an explanation of the statistical tests used 
in the study is presented.  
Chapter 7 presents part one of the empirical work for the present study. To examine 
LVD in Kuwaiti listed corporations and their development over time, to provide 
answers for the first two research questions, a detailed analysis was developed of the 
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results of the voluntary disclosure index through the self-constructed index. This 
starts with the total LVD, passing through its categories and then to information 
items (hierarchical analysis). 
Chapter 8 presents part two of the empirical work for the present study, to identify 
the determinants of LVD practices in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies 
to provide answers for the third question. This starts with description of continuous 
independent variables, and then quantitatively investigates the relationship between 
LVD as the dependent variable and the independent variables, i.e. CG mechanisms, 
ownership structure and firm characteristics over the four years, from 2007 to 2010. 
Chapter 9 presents the results of the two parts of the empirical study presented in 
chapters 7 and 8, in order to analyse the information, to identify the determinants of 
LVD and discuss the tests for hypotheses of the present study. 
Chapter 10 presents the conclusions of this study. The chapter highlights a summary 
of the findings of the study, as well as the contribution to knowledge of this study. 
The limitations of the study and, where possible, how to overcome these limitations 
are addressed. In addition, suggestions are provided for further research. 
1.8 Conclusion 
An overview of the subject matter of this study was provided in this chapter; namely, 
voluntary disclosure and the factors which may affect the extent of disclosure, 
specifying the research objectives, the significance of the study, the research 
questions, a summary of the research methodology and methods, and the 
organisation of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Voluntary Disclosure and its 
Determinants 
This chapter reviews the key concepts related to voluntary disclosure and the 
determinants that affect it to determine the theoretical foundations and framework for 
this study, develop testable hypotheses, and choose an appropriate methodology. 
This chapter is organised as follows: a historical introduction to corporate disclosure, 
types of corporate disclosures and evaluation of voluntary disclosure is given in 
section 2.1. CG definitions and the relationship between LVD and each of CG 
mechanisms, ownership structure and firm characteristics are discussed in section 
2.2. The conclusion is presented in section 2.3. 
2.1 Corporate Disclosure 
During the period 1870 to 1900, a number of American companies needed capital 
from Europe (Mumford and Peasnell, 1993). Thus, corporate financial reporting was 
derived from the companies’ need to acquire capital from external sources. 
Furthermore, it became a significant aspect in the twentieth century, with 
augmentation of the partition between management and ownership control within 
firms, thus raising the focus on governance relations within firms. In earlier times, 
the differentiation of financial reporting practices across two countries fell into two 
groups. One group was concerned mainly with the safeguarding of shareholders (e.g. 
in the UK and the USA); while the second group was concerned with defending the 
interests of creditors as well as establishing the efficacy of taxation (e.g. in France 
and Germany). The publication by the Accounting Standards Steering Committee 
(ASSC) in the UK in 1975 of the “Corporate Report” was termed as the best 
endeavour to develop “Corporate Financial Reporting”. In addition to that, in 1980, 
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants published another document 
regarding corporate financial reporting called “Corporate Reporting: Its Future 
Evolution” (Ibrahim, 2006). Financial statements consist of balance sheet, income 
statement and statement of cash flow that depict the financial conditions of the 
company. Different sorts of user use those statements such as creditors, management, 
investors and government regulatory body (Wolk et al., 1992). The shareholders do 
not have access to accounting information in the accounting department; hence, they 
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depend on published financial statements. At first, the accounting department gathers 
all the information regarding financial activities of a firm. Then it classifies that 
financial information and presents the information to the interested parties. 
2.1.1 Types of corporate disclosure 
More recently, financial reporting has evolved to corporate disclosure. In the 
accounting literature, disclosure is perceived as the final phase of the accounting 
process, which means notifying the public via financial statements of the firm (Choi 
et al., 1999). Corporate disclosure possesses a number of advantages, such as those 
indicated by Healy and Palepu (2001) who considered corporate disclosure as a 
significant indicator of a competent capital market, reducing information asymmetry, 
reducing the cost of capital and mitigating agency cost (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991; Lev, 1992; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Despite the benefits, there are two sorts 
of costs of corporate disclosure: direct and indirect. Direct cost occurs at the 
dissemination phase of information to the public, whereas indirect cost occurs when 
parties other than investors, such as regulators, competitors, tax authorities etc, use 
listed companies’ information. In this regard, Verrecchia (1983) stated that 
companies would be discouraged from circulating information whenever other 
parties, other than investors, take advantages. Thus, corporate financial reporting 
possesses three salient purposes: assisting the country’s taxation procedure, 
publishing information for investors, and protection of creditors. Wolk et al.’s (1992) 
study reveals that the purpose of disclosure of financial information is to assist 
investors to make profitable investment decisions. 
Companies can disseminate their information to users through a number of ways. 
However, literature regarding disclosure refers to two sorts of disclosure, voluntary 
disclosure and mandatory disclosure. Ghazali (2008) argued that mandatory 
disclosure consists of reporting as required by the regulations of a government such 
as accounting standards, companies act, listing requirements of stock exchanges; 
whereas voluntary disclosure varies in the form of disclosure. According to Hassan et 
al. (2009), the mandatory financial disclosures are the income statement, balance 
sheet, statement of changes in equity, cash flow statement, board of directors’ report, 
notes to the accounts and external auditor’s report. Mandatory disclosure means 
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providing financial information to the users to meet disclosure requirements 
stipulated in different forms, such as laws, standards and rules of stock exchanges. 
Mandatory disclosure is needed to fulfil the requirements of a government’s 
regulations and legislations as well as the listing rules of stock exchanges (Hassan 
and Marston, 2010). 
On the other hand, voluntary disclosure means disseminating financial information in 
excess of mandatory disclosure (Hassan and Marston, 2010). That is why voluntary 
disclosure is termed as willingly disclosures of financial information as a part of 
company management, which may assist the users of annual reports to take 
prudential decisions regarding investment (Meek et al., 1995). The forms of 
voluntary disclosure are conference calls, annual reports, and discussions with 
financial analysts, presentations, newspapers, booklets, press releases and different 
sorts of letter to shareholders. Given the unavailability of a definition of voluntary 
disclosure, Debreceny and Rahman (2005) observed that it seems difficult to provide 
a specific and generally accepted definition of voluntary disclosure. If disclosure of 
financial information remains within the identified minimum limits of the 
management of a firm then it is called mandatory disclosure. On the other hand, if 
disclosures surpass the limits then it is called voluntary disclosure (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996). From the viewpoint of Lang and Lundholm (1996), voluntary 
disclosures assist the financial analysts by depicting the better scenario of 
companies’ performance, which enable them to provide reliable forecasts. Voluntary 
disclosure is perceived as a buzzword nowadays, which attracts the interest of 
accounting literature (Inyang, 2009). It investigates the aspects that influence 
voluntary disclosure of information with a view to notifying decision makers and 
users regarding financial information. Different researchers have identified a number 
of aspects regarding voluntary disclosure. For example, Meek et al. (1995) identified 
aspects that affect voluntary disclosure in German, English and French firms. 
Williams (1999) investigated the environmental and societal aspects of voluntary 
disclosure that affect it within the Asian pacific countries (Australia, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia). Ho and Wong 
(2001) assessed the degree of voluntary disclosure of firms that are registered with 
the institutional management of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (SEHK). 
The influencing factors of registered firms of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX, until 
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2001, TSE), Canada, have been examined by Bujaki and McConomy (2002). Chau 
and Gray (2002) investigated the affiliation between voluntary disclosure and 
ownership structure of Hong Kong and Singaporean firms; Eng and Mak’s (2003) 
findings were similar to these. The above studies investigate the features of firms that 
deliberately disseminate information and the influencing aspects of voluntary 
disclosure. A review of the literature reveals that the majority of the studies are 
completed in developed, western countries, whereas less concentration is given to 
countries in Asia and the Middle East (Ding et al., 2004). 
2.1.2 Evaluation of voluntary disclosure 
According to Choi and Meek (2008), disclosure is the mechanism by which 
accounting information is communicated to the user who needs it; Researchers have 
tried to answer the question by evaluating disclosure. They have also tried to find out 
if there is any linkage between measured disclosure and explanatory variables. The 
studies on voluntary disclosure have tried to depict disclosures, which were 
published through annual reports, though it should be mentioned that other 
disclosures have been studied too, such as press releases. Disclosure can be measured 
through studying reports, which will provide a list of potential voluntary disclosures. 
The annual report can be ranked based on potential voluntary disclosure. Voluntary 
disclosure can be elaborated as disclosure in addition to mandatory disclosure. 
Company law or an accounting standard does not support voluntary disclosure. 
These disclosures include new information, not available in some other source. 
Though some scholars have attached value to this information, it is worth nothing. 
After consulting with financial and academic analysts, different weights have been 
given to different disclosures based on their relative importance. The accuracy of 
issuing weights is subject to the user (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Thus, giving 
weights to any disclosure will be subjective in nature. It should be noted that 
companies, which disclose important information, would disclose a very limited 
amount of irrelevant information. Thus, it can be concluded that there is very limited 
scope for weighting. However, it matters little to assign a weight or not. The major 
consideration of the report has been given on discussing different level of disclosure. 
It is not mandatory to evaluate the appropriateness of each disclosure. To explain 
various levels of disclosures, accounting theories have been implemented such as 
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agency and signalling theories. From this theoretical background, hypotheses have 
been developed and tested to find out whether there is any relationship or not. In the 
research paper, the researchers did not mention what sort of information the company 
should disclose, but they said why the company discloses information by 
implementing an appropriate accounting theory. It is found that these studies have 
implemented a positivist methodology. This thesis follows the same methodology. It 
is appropriate to justify accounting theories, which are supported by the literature of 
voluntary disclosure. The accounting theories must be evaluated based on their 
appropriateness in explaining related disclosure (ibid.). 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Different interested parties, for instance, scholars, academics, professional bodies 
and regulators over the years, have defined the concept of CG in many paradigms. 
The literature reviewed does not agree on one definition of corporate governance. 
Authors explain the concept of CG through their own knowledge and understanding 
of it. Hence, Keasey et al. (2005) indicate that the definitions of CG carry different 
explanations and these definitions have a special analysis for each definition, which 
involves various disciplines and representations. Sullivan (2000) Noting the different 
points of view about the concept of corporate governance, it can be classified into 
two perspectives. 
The first is shareholder perspective (narrower definition) which focuses on the result 
of the separation between agent and principal, and concentrates on increasing the 
wealth for shareholders; some scholars have named it the traditional school of CG 
(Bhasa, 2004). Solomon and Solomon (2004 ) point out that this narrow definition of 
CG is based on the relationship between shareholders and company. Through this 
perspective the role of CG “should be to improve the achievement of shareholders’ 
objectives, not to interfere with corporate operations” (p.2), this perspective is 
compatible with agency theory because according to this theory the shareholders 
seek to increase and maximise their wealth. Through the first perspective, La Porta et 
al. (1999) argued that CG becomes an issue when a conflict arises between large 
shareholders and small shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined CG as: 
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“The ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment” (p.2) 
Also Egana (1997) reported CG sought to increase confidence in the accounting 
profession and reliability by reviewing the politics and programmes of companies 
and reducing the dominance of the board of directors. Parkinson (1994) defines CG 
by emphasises shareholders, he stated: 
“The process of supervision and control intended to ensure that the company’s 
management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders” (p.159) 
In addition, Gregory (2001) defines corporate governance by Millstein as: 
“Corporate governance refers to that blend of law, regulation and appropriate 
voluntary private sector practices which enable the corporation to attract 
financial and human capital, perform efficiently, and thereby perpetuate itself 
by generating long-term economic value for its shareholders, while respecting 
the interests of stakeholders and society as a whole”. 
These definitions only focused on CG as a way of monitoring shareholders’ interests 
without giving attention to other parties, which amounts to a shortcoming in the 
concept. Aguilera (1998) found the concept of CG had emerged because of 
weaknesses in accounting information and a lack of confidence among users. Cohen 
et al. (2004) emphasised the other parties in his definition of CG as mechanisms, 
which contain many parties, management, and external and internal auditors and 
audit committees. 
The second is stakeholder perspective (broader definition) that focuses on the 
concept of corporate accountability to stakeholders. According to the second 
perspective, Solomon (2007) defined CG as: 
“the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensure that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activity” ( p.14). 
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This perspective is in agreement with stakeholder theory that concentrates on the 
accountability, which gives stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, clients, tax 
departments and suppliers, the right to hold the company accountable. The most 
famous and narrow definition of CG in the business environment around world is the 
definition of CG by Sir Adrian Cadbury, mentioned in his report on CG (The 
Cadbury Report, 1992), who defined CG as: 
“the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (section.2.5). 
In addition to the second perspective, the OECD (2004) also defined CG from the 
stakeholder perspective (broader definition) by stating that: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are 
in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring.” (p.11)  
In addition, some studies focused on CG from the viewpoint of accountability, 
because it is a very important issue from all perspectives. Rogers (2008) defines CG 
as being: 
“about building credibility, ensuring transparency and accountability as well 
as maintaining an effective channel of information disclosure that would foster 
good corporate performance. It is also about how to build trust and sustain 
confidence among the various interest groups that make up an organisation” 
(p.4) 
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2.2.1 Corporate governance and corporate disclosure 
During in the last few years, many scholars, practitioners, professional bodies, 
shareholders and other stakeholders have shown considerable attention in corporate 
governance (Francis and Schipper, 1999; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Eng and Mak, 
2003). That is due to a number of international collapses and corporate scandals 
around the world, such as Adelphia, Tyco International, Health South, WorldCom, 
Enron and Communications (USA), Nortel, Saffron (Canada) and Parmalat, Anglo 
Irish Bank and Royal Ahold (EU) and Polly Peck, MiniScribe and Barlow Clowes 
(UK). In Asia, scandals have also been reported in various companies, such as 
Hongguang, Yorkpoint, Chaoda, Daqing Lianyi and CITIC (China), Satyam 
Computer Services (India) and Olympus Corporation (Japan) (Ming et al., 2009; 
Browning and Jonathan, 2002; Rouf and Harun, 2011). Hence, the awareness of CG 
has been increased in order to protect the interests of parties (shareholders and 
stakeholders) alike, which has led to strong regulations and more transparency and 
credibility. According to Beekes and Brown (2005), reported that firms have higher 
corporate governance will disclose more and more information. 
The CG concept is an important issue in capital markets due to the separation of 
principal and agent, which dominates characteristics of modern corporations. The 
result of this separation between ownership and control, particularly in large 
companies, has led to the need for monitoring and accountability, in order to ensure 
those companies’ management and behaviour of directors is in accordance with the 
interests of the owners and stakeholders. Researchers and academics have 
investigated the role of CG in several areas, such as investor protection (La Porta et 
al., 1998); firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007) 
and dividend and debt policy (Alwi, 2009). Ghazali and Weetman (2006) said that 
level of disclosure, corporate governance, accountability and transparency are basic 
pillars of market confidence. CG seeks to encourage efficient and effective 
sustainable companies for the prosperity and welfare of any society. Imhoff (2003) 
concludes that CG has a strong effect on investor protection. By analysis the 
shareholder and creditor protection laws across several countries, La Porta et al. 
(1998) found empirical evidence on the relationship between strong investor 
protections and effective CG .Broadly speaking, the concept of CG may be having an 
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important effect on LVD practice of a state. (Chau and Gray, 2002; Arcay and 
Vázquez, 2005). Wright (1996) pointed out the existence of empirical evidence on 
the relationship between specific institutional features of CG and the credibility of 
financial statements. Others have a different point of view on the relationship 
between CG and corporate disclosure. For instance, (Fox, 1999; Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999; Baker and Wallage, 2000) argue that to have a good system of CG requires 
efficiency and an adequate financial reporting system. Although more literature has 
been focused on CG in developed countries and less has been undertaken in 
developing countries, the issue of CG is suitable for all countries, developing or not 
(Mueller, 2006). 
2.2.2 Corporate governance mechanisms 
The level of disclosure in the annual report may be affected by CG mechanisms. 
Many researchers have investigated the influence of CG mechanisms on disclosure 
by a variety of variables, such as the non-executive directors, board audit committee, 
board size, role duality and family members on the board (Leung and Horwitz, 2004; 
Barako, 2007; Kent and Stewart, 2008; Donnely and Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha, 2010; 
Rouf, 2011). 
2.2.2.1 Non-executive directors 
Klein (1998) pointed out the composition of the board has a direct impact on a 
company’s activities and its performance. In the business world, the board for any 
company consists of two kinds of directors. The first type includes executive 
directors (insiders) that are full-time employees of the firm. They have clearly 
defined roles and have responsibilities for the daily operations in the firm, like 
finance and marketing. They are either from the management or the firm’s own 
family. The second kind of director is non-executive directors (outsiders). They do 
not form part of the executive management team. They are not an employee of the 
company or affiliated with it in any other way (Weir and Laing, 2001). The main 
responsibility of the board of directors is to protect the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders. In addition, they ensure they obtain a decent return on their investment 
and optimise their benefits. Whilst some of the board of directors instead tries to 
maximise the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, they may also manipulate 
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financial accounts and financial records to maximise their bonus entitlements 
through inflating stock prices, enhancing their remuneration, and use different 
approaches every year in order to cause a valuation of the assets other than their true 
value. The OECD Principles of CG (2004) state that: 
“Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision 
making of the board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the 
performance of the board and management. In addition, they can play an 
important role in areas where the interests of management, the company and 
its shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, succession 
planning, changes of corporate control, take-over defences, large acquisitions 
and the audit function” (p.64) 
In this regard, many prior studies indicate the major role of independent non-
executive directors, which may assist to observe and monitor the top management. 
Additionally, they can ensure that the stakeholders’ interests are taken into 
consideration when making decisions; however, sometimes non-executive directors 
do not succeed in their duties. The issue of the failure of non-executive directors in 
their duties has addressed by several authors such as (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; 
Crowther and Jatana, 2005). They mentioned reasons of that failure such as the 
inability of non-executive directors to prevent some irregularities because they are a 
minority on the board; a lack of skills for solving board issues; personal 
relationships; and multiple positions held. 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted to survey the effect of non-
executive directors on voluntary disclosure in different developed and developing 
countries. Agency theory is considered the most used theory to explain this 
relationship between these two variables, such as in (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) 
For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out that outside directors on the board 
of directors are motivated to do their duties in observation and monitoring of a firm’s 
management. In addition, outside directors do not have any connection with top 
management against stakeholders’ interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that 
the proportion of non-executive directors may not only increase the effectiveness of 
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the board; but it may also mitigate the agency conflicts by controlling and monitoring 
opportunistic management. 
2.2.2.2 Board size 
Although the importance of board size has received considerable attention in 
previous literature, scholars differ among themselves regarding the effect of board 
size on corporate disclosure. Some of them conclude that board size has a material 
impact on other dependent variables, with either positive or negative effect (Rouf, 
2011). In contrast, some scholars found the size of the board did not have an effect 
on the relationship with other dependent variables (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). In 
the prior literature, there are different viewpoints about board size; some scholars 
agreed with large size and others agreed with small size. For the first view, a number 
of studies support the notion that large boards can decrease monitoring ability. 
Bédard et al. (2004) and (Xie et al., 2003) found in their studies that in firms that 
have large board size, it plays an important role in monitoring and observation of 
activities and operation of the top-management in the firm by diminishing the level 
of earning manipulation. Empirically, Yerrnack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
found that firm valuation is negatively associated with board size. The board of 
directors with smaller size is better than larger size, because the large board may 
suffer with communication and coordination problems. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
and Jensen (1993) reported that the task of monitoring and observation for any board 
have diminished when the board is too large, that mean the smaller board suffers less 
than the large board, since they do not face poorer communication (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988). This is consistent with the conclusion reached by Yerrnack (1996), 
who reported large board size is less efficient in decision-making than small size 
because there is less agency conflict among the board directors. Kovner (1985) 
mention that oversized boards are ineffective in decision-making. In addition, 
Yermack (1996), who found higher market valuation of companies with a small 
board of directors, investigated the effect of board size on the market. 
For the second view, many scholars concluded in their studies that a large board of 
directors have many advantages. Faccio and Lasfer (1999) found that firms that have 
board sizes above the sample average of his study have better performance. The 
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small board might not be effective in monitoring and observation the behaviour of 
managers in top management (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Klein (2002) concluded the 
firm will be better with a large number of directors, which means the quality of work 
will be at its best in a firm with a large board size, and vice versa. 
2.2.2.3 Role duality 
Role duality as discussed as one of the CG mechanisms has remained controversial 
in the literature. It distinguishes between whether the chair of the board of directors 
and the chief executive officer positions should be occupied by one person (unitary) 
or by different persons (dual). OECD Principles of CG (2004), which suggest 
separation between chairman and CEO on the board, reported that: 
“Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can help 
to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and 
improve the board’s capacity for decision making independent of 
management” (p.63). 
The advantages and disadvantages of separating the board of directors and the chief 
executive officer positions have been studied extensively (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Baliga et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1998). For example, Pi and Timme (1993) in their 
study about separation between the board of directors and the chief executive officer 
covered 112 banks in the US during 1987-1990 to show that approximately 25% of 
the banks have separation between the board of directors and the chief executive 
officer, while 75% have duality. 
Some researchers recommend the separation between the two positions based on 
agency theory, while others recommend chairman and chief executive officer 
positions to be held by one person. As result, the latter will impair the functions of 
monitoring and control, and create incentives for the chief executive officer to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of shareholders, and because of 
which he will be able to dominate the board; but other researchers do not see it this 
way (Rouf, 2011). 
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Jensen (1993) shows that the benefits of separation between the two positions of 
chairman and chief executive officer are in dismissal pay compensation and 
evaluation as well as in the shareholders’ interest. Booth et al. (2002) stressed that 
CG should separate the role duality between the chairman and the CEO. Shivdasani 
and Zenner (2004) reported that if one a person had occupied the CEO and chairman 
duties in any company at the same time, it was extremely difficult for the board of 
directors to replace a poor-performing CEO. Goyal and Park (2002) reported duality 
reduces the flexibility of a board to address poor performance. 
Therefore, duality will enable the chief executive officer to obtain more information 
than other directors on the board. Mohamad and Sulong (2010) argued that, when the 
chairman of the board and CEO positions are held by one person, he or she may 
withhold information from outsiders. Fama and Jensen (1983) found the role of 
duality refers to the mix of decision control and decision management and that “the 
board is not an effective device for decision control unless it limits the decision 
discretion of individual top managers” (p.314). This leads to a reduction in the 
management’s ability to take control and fulfil a governance role (Finkelstein and 
D'Ave, 1994). Also, Cadbury (1992, p.21) recommends that the two roles of 
chairman of the board and CEO be separated in quoted companies in the UK. From 
the above, companies with duality between the chairman and the CEO are more 
likely to be related to lower levels of disclosure, and thus may be exposed to fraud 
and ineffectiveness. 
Forker (1992) found a negative association between disclosure quality and CEO 
duality. Gul and Leung (2004) addressed the relation between role duality and LVD 
in Hong Kong; they observed 385 firms to examine the effect of expertise of outside 
directors on the relationship between CEO duality and LVD. They found a negative 
association between CEO duality and LVD, and a relationship between outside 
expertise and LVD. Huafang and Jianguo (2007) examined the relationship between 
level of disclosure and role duality in China with a sample consisting of 559 listed 
companies in 2002. They employed Checklist items: 30 voluntary items un-
weighted, which provided evidence of negative association between role duality and 
LVD. This finding is consistent with the findings of Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) 
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study that examined the association between role duality and voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia, which found a negative association. 
Many previous studies have found a negative relationship between role duality and 
level of disclosure; they point to the importance of separation between the chairman 
and CEO (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Khodadadi et al., 2010). 
2.2.2.4 Audit committee 
In recent years, researchers have focused on the role of the audit committee after a 
consequence of corporate scandals, which have happened across the world. 
Previously, the appointment of auditor, compensation, and supervision of preparation 
of the financial statement and the annual report were responsibilities of the chief 
financial officer, but since the (US) Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, the audit 
committee is directly responsible for these functions (Ali, 2014). The role of the 
audit committee is “oversight and monitoring” of a firm’s financial reporting, 
financial performance and dealing with external auditors, who review financial 
statements and internal control, thus it provides assurance of high quality financial 
information. In addition, the audit committee is considered as a method to enhance 
the concept of corporate accountability and CG (Carcello and Neal, 2000). Wallace 
and Zinkin (2005) reported the role of the audit committee is to ensure the company 
follows both local and international accounting standards in decisions regarding 
accounting disclosures, practices and financial policies. In addition, the audit 
committee has other duties, such as reviewing outcomes of the process of external 
and internal audits, and supervision of the financial reporting process. 
The presence of the audit committee will guarantee continuous contact between the 
board and external auditors (Rashidah and Fairuzana, 2006), increase of confidence 
in financial statements and a reduced rate of errors, irregularities (Rouf, 2011). Thus, 
audit committees have influence on the company’s board to reduce information 
asymmetry and have a role in effective corporate governance. Forker (1992) 
regarded the audit committee as a tool to improve disclosure and reduce agency 
conflict, and as one of the most effective oversight mechanisms. Therefore, if audit 
committees have a large proportion of independent outside directors, and they have 
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financial backgrounds, experience and training, they will understand their duties and 
enhance the oversight process. 
2.2.2.5 Audit firm 
The need for external audit is to constrain fraud and asymmetries on financial 
statements and increase the level of confidence. Adelopo (2011) stated, “The 
theoretical expectation of a relationship between auditor type and disclosure stem 
from the fact that auditors provide certification for the truth and fairness of some of 
the information in the annual report” (p.4). Therefore, the role of external auditors is 
to ensure the client complies with accounting standards and other regulations. The 
audit firm, as a neutral party, provides the responsibility to declare the reliability and 
validity of the financial data (Porter et al., 2003). In addition, the audit firm has a role 
to mitigate the conflict between directors and shareholders and, consequently, reduce 
agency conflict (Hossain et al., 1994; Naser et al., 2002). Therefore, the audit firm 
can influence the level of disclosure (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). The audit firm size 
can affect the level of disclosure; the audit firm preserves its reputation by increasing 
the level of disclosure. Alsaeed (2006) stated, “Audit firms are primarily divided into 
large (Big 4) and small (not Big 4). Large audit firms are widely spread across the 
world while small audit firms operate domestically” (p.484) 
The big audit firms seek to protect and avoid damage to their reputation through 
provision of the high level of disclosure, more so than small audit firms (DeAngelo, 
1981; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). The type of audit may play an important role 
in enhancing the credibility of disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). From the 
signalling theory background, the big audit firms may use the information released 
by their clients as signalling their own quality (Inchausti, 1997). 
According to Owusu-Ansah (1998), they reported the big audit firms have a 
competitive advantage over small audit firms for three reasons. First, the big audit 
firms have many customers, which means they are not economically dependent on a 
particular customer, and therefore, it is easy to report any errors or misstatements if 
found in the annual report of the customer. Second, large companies are interested in 
their reputation, and any damage to their reputation will lead their current customers 
to convert to another audit firm. Third, the big audit firms’ potential exposure to 
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legal liability is larger since the investors are mainly dependent on the auditor’s 
reports of large companies in making their investment decisions. 
However, Malone et al. (1993) reported small accounting firms may succumb to their 
clients’ needs to keep dealing with them. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) 
indicated the ability of the big audit firms to apply international accounting standards 
(IASs) more than small audit firms, where the big audit firms have experience in 
accounting and auditing. 
2.2.3 Ownership structures 
Regarding using ownership structure in disclosure studies, previous studies have 
investigated the impact of ownership structure in several aspects on level of 
disclosure, such as government ownership used in Eng and Mak (2003),Hashim and 
Devi (2008),(Jiang, 2009) and (Al-Akra et al., 2010). Foreign ownership was used in 
Meek et al. (1995) and Liang et al. (2012). Family ownership was used in Chen and 
Jaggi (2000), Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Chau and Gray (2010). Outside 
ownership was used in Fama and Jensen (1983), Hossain et al. (1994), Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) and Tsamenyi et al. (2007). Block-holder ownership was used in Eng 
and Mak (2003) Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and(Ismail and Elshayeb, 2012).  
According to agency theory, which is based on the separation between ownership 
(principals) and management (agents), agency conflict arises because of differences 
of interest and asymmetric information between the two parties (Chrisman et al., 
2004). Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed agency theory, explaining it as: 
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf that involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the 
agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal 
can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives 
for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant 
activities of the agent” (p.5) 
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The managers may seek to pursue their interests (not always maximize shareholder 
value) at the expense of shareholders; that is because of the greater separation 
between ownership and management: here agency conflict between insiders and 
outsiders would be generated (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Depoers, 2000). From a 
different viewpoint, La Porta et al. (1998) suggested the presence of another type of 
conflict of interest in companies: this conflict occurs when controlling shareholders 
confiscate the rights of minority shareholders; that confiscation is represent in loan 
guarantees, transfer of resources and excessive executive compensation. In other 
words, Jalila and Devi (2012) pointed to the existence of two types of agency 
problem, TYPE I and TYPE II: a Type I agency problem happens when there is 
misalignment between the agents and principals; while a Type II agency problem 
happens when there is conflict between the majority shareholder and the minority 
shareholder. They call Type I the “Alignment effect”, that occurs when shareholders 
do not play an active role in the management although they invest in the business of 
the firm. The Type II is called the “Entrenchment effect”, that occurs when the 
majority shareholder who is a manager, in fact, (occurs mainly in family companies) 
confiscates the rights of the minority shareholder. 
Omar and Simon (2011) indicated the managers are acting in accordance with the 
interests of the owners in order to reduce the cost of monitoring so as not to harm 
managers’ remuneration. Moreover, Fama (1980) suggested that the managers may 
be disciplined for their bad performance through the managerial labour markets, 
which provide “full ex post settling up” of the conflict problems, since managerial 
labour markets enhance the managers’ reputations. As mentioned above, the 
ownership structure may take different forms in companies. Concentrated ownership 
is a characteristic for Kuwaiti listed companies, where the concentration of 
ownership is in family ownership or government ownership and their agencies. La 
Porta et al. (1999) indicated that ownership concentration is a common form in 
companies, as large shareholders are either institutions or individuals may control the 
management of the firm. Previous disclosure studies suggest that the ownership 
structure of a company could be a determinant factor of the extent of disclosure in 
the company (Eng and Mak, 2003; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005). 
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Various studies have investigated the effects related with concentrated ownership or 
dispersed ownership in developed or developing countries. (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
indicated the conflict of interest between the shareholders and management arises 
with a low concentration of ownership. Hossain et al. (1994) indicated the managers’ 
actions under monitoring when the ownership is dispersed widely. Moreover, Barako 
et al. (2006) suggested the ability of the company with institutional owners to 
monitor disclosure practices. According to Hasan et al. (2013), who examined the 
relationship between the concentrated ownership and the level of corporate 
disclosure in Bangladesh, they found concentrated ownership has the power to 
influence the level of disclosure. Huafang and Jianguo (2007) investigated the effect 
of ownership structure (blockholder ownership and foreign listing/shares ownership) 
on voluntary disclosures of listed companies in China; they found ownership 
structure is associated with increased disclosure; while White et al. (2007) found no 
association between disclosure practice and ownership concentration in Australian 
biotechnology companies. In addition, Bozzolan et al. (2006) and Woodcock and 
Whiting (2009)failed to find any proof of ownership concentration affecting level of 
disclosure. 
On the other hand, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that ownership diffusion in 
positive significant association to LVD. In addition, Gelb (2000) reported there is 
positive significant association between the quality of annual reports and ownership 
diffusion. However, Wallace et al. (1994) and Naser et al. (2002) found insignificant 
relationship between ownership dispersion and level of disclosure. Regarding 
corporate social and environmental disclosure, Reverte (2009) suggested that 
companies with concentrated ownership are less likely to release more information to 
the public, while companies with diffused ownership are more motivated to release 
more information about their social and environmental performance to stakeholders. 
2.2.4 Firm characteristics 
Firm characteristics are corporate attributes that can affect the level of corporate 
disclosure. Since the 1960s, many researchers started to investigate the associations 
between level of disclosure and firm characteristics. Various characteristics were 
used in previous studies, by the location of these studies, such as: Alsaeed (2006) in 
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Saudi Arabia used firm size, debt, firm age, profit margin, return on equity liquidity 
and industry type as firm characteristics; and in Malaysia, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) 
used firm size, gearing and profitability. Hossain and Hammami (2009) used firm 
age, firm size, profitability, complexity and assets-in-place in Egypt. Rouf (2011) in 
Bangladesh used just two variables, firm size and profitability as firm characteristics. 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) in Saudi Arabia used firm’s profitability, liquidity, 
debt ratio and size as firm characteristics. 
Several theories have provided explanation of the effect of the firm characteristics on 
disclosure, such as agency theory, political cost theory and signalling theory that are 
used to explain the effect of firm size on the level of disclosure. Stakeholder theory 
and political cost theory are used to illustrate the impact of firm age on disclosure. 
Signalling theory is used with liquidity. Agency theory is employed to explain the 
effect of profitability on disclosure. From these examples, it may be worth indicating 
that previous studies used different theories in order to explain the effect of firm 
characteristics on disclosure. That means there is no particular theory that can be 
used to provide justification for the effect of firm characteristics on level of 
disclosure. 
Different measures have been used to identify each firm characteristic, such as firm 
size can be measured by log of total assets, total capital employed or total number of 
employees. Firm age can use number of years since foundation or number of years 
since listing in the stock market. Profitability can be measured by net profit divided 
by total shareholders’ equity, net income available to shareholders divided by net 
sales or net income divided by total assets. Gearing can be measured by debt ratio = 
total debt divided by total assets or by debt-to-equity ratio = total debt divided by 
total equity. Regarding the industry type, one can use a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 when the firm has interests in particular industries; it is otherwise zero. From 
the previous example, it can be noted there is no agreement on the use of a particular 
scale to measure the specific characteristics of the company. 
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However, the findings of effect of firm characteristics on the extent of disclosure 
varied in previous studies; for example Wallace et al. (1994), Barako et al. (2006), 
Aksu and Kosedag (2006), Hassan et al. (2006 ), Soliman (2013), Ullah (2013) and 
Uyar et al. (2013) found significant positive association between firm size and LVD. 
While Aljifiri and Hussainey (2007) in the UAE and Hasan et al. (2013) in 
Bangladesh found insignificant association between firm size and disclosure. Firm 
age was found to have insignificant association with disclosure, such as in Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002), Uyar et al., (2013) and Wijana A P et al. (2013); while 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) in UK and Dutch companies, and Alsaeed (2006) in 
Saudi Arabia found positive significant association between the company age and 
disclosure. Liquidity was found in positive relationship with disclosure, such as in 
Cooke (1989), Camfferman and Cooke (2002) and Mathuva (2012). However, 
Wallace et al. (1994), Naser et al. (2002), and Mangena and Pike (2005) found a 
negative relationship between liquidity and disclosure. In addition, Barako et al. 
(2006) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) did not find any significant association 
between disclosure and liquidity. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on voluntary disclosure and the factors which have an effect on 
LVD, and addressed the historical background to corporate financial reporting. A 
definition for each of voluntary disclosure and CG were provided and their 
importance discussed. Information asymmetry in corporate reports was discussed. 
The importance of transparency in disclosure and evaluation of voluntary disclosure 
was observed, because disclosure is the mechanism by which accounting information 
is communicated to the user who needs it. How CG mechanisms, ownership structure 
and firm characteristics as factors may affect LVD were discussed. In the next 
chapter, theories of voluntary disclosure, used in the previous disclosure studies, are 
discussed. In addition, previous disclosure studies in both developed and developing 
countries are reviewed. 
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Chapter 3: Theories and Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter is divided into two parts; in the first part, a theoretical review of 
common theories that used in explanation of voluntary disclosure practices in many 
countries that attempt to explain the incentives that motivate corporate to disclose 
more information voluntarily is discussed. There are seven theories employed in this 
study, used to form the research questions and hypotheses of this study. In the second 
part, empirical disclosure studies on LVD and its categories are discussed. The gap in 
the previous empirical studies on both voluntary disclosure and categories is 
discussed. 
The chapter is organised as follows: theories of voluntary disclosure are presented in 
section 3.2. These theories are: section 3.2.1, Agency theory; section 3.2.2, 
Signalling theory; section 3.2.3, Capital need theory; section 3.2.4, Stewardship 
theory; section 3.2.5, Legitimacy theory; section 3.2.6, Stakeholder theory; section 
3.2.7, Political cost theory; and then in section 3.2.8, the theories are discussed. 
Empirical disclosure studies are discussed in section 3.3: on total voluntary 
disclosure in section 3.3.1, and on voluntary disclosure categories in section 3.3.3. 
The gap in the previous literature studies is discussed in section 3.4. Finally, section 
3.5 presents the summary. 
3.2 Part One: Theories of Voluntary Disclosure 
3.2.1 Agency theory  
Agency theory is an economic theory, related to business organisation that was 
evolved in the 1970s. According to agency theory, a business firm is in contract 
between two parties where one is a principal, and the other one is the agent; here the 
shareholder acts as the principal, and managers are the agents. Hendry (2001) and 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued that recent economics is dominated by such a kind 
of firm having agency relationship; these firms rapidly engage with best corporate 
governance practices. In this respect, it should be addressed that conflict between 
principal and agent comes from policy and contractual conditions of the firms. Zahra 
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and Pearce (1989) argued that there are some assumptions in the agency model that 
focus on the conflict between agent and principal, which is very important for 
controlling and monitoring board’s function. 
In addition, agency theory established the necessary mechanisms to defend 
shareholders from administration’s conflict of interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Daily and Dalton (1994) they advocate that the board should contain outside and 
independent directors in the positions of chairman and CEO or the agency cost 
becomes higher and the firm will suffer in the financial market. From the control 
viewpoint, CEO has more influence than chairman (Johnson et al., 2005). 
It is generally acknowledged that the quality of the annual report may be developed 
through willingly providing more information (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Watson et 
al., 2002). Agency theory can describe why managers wish to release more 
information. In disclosure literature, many propositions have been established 
depending on agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discovered that in a widely 
established company there exists a high potentiality for conflict of interest between 
proprietors as a principal and managers as an agent. The agency cost rises as the size 
of the company increases. Consequently, a positive relationship between company 
size and disclosure is anticipated by agency theory. Similarly, a positive relationship 
between disclosure and each of gearing register status and auditor excellence is also 
anticipated by this theory. Cooke (1989), Ruland et al. (1990) and Hossain et al. 
(1994) are some examples of disclosure theories that applied agency theory in 
clarifying the distinction in disclosure practices. 
Furthermore, in applying agency theory for the company management a problem 
arises regarding information irregularity. Ng (1978) claimed that as the 
organisation’s authentic payout is expected to be noticeable by the manager even 
though financial reporting denotes an information system to the owner of the firm, it 
is indeed not information to the manager. For the financial reporting matter, this 
distorted information feature has great importance. Agency theory creates another 
problem in that it pays attention solely to the necessities of financial stakeholders 
(shareholders and creditors) for financial information and neglects the desires of 
 
 
38 
 
other stakeholders (such as employees and the public) having interests in company 
fiscal reports because they are not have connections with the managers. 
Therefore, information unevenness has been acknowledged as one of the impetuses 
for deliberate disclosure decisions in the perspective of disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). For the reduction of agency cost, it is observed that disclosure is one of the 
useful monitoring tools (Craswell and Taylor 1992). To moderate the severity of the 
problem of information irregularity, the two parties can use level of disclosure as a 
tool. Managers, as agents, acting in the interests of owners can have a motivational 
impression. On the contrary, managers are inspired, and sometimes forced to disclose 
more information by the owners. It is stated that this theory fails to explain non-
monetary incentives for preventing disclosure (Ockabol and Tinker, 1993). 
3.2.2 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory has been applied as a possible explanation of deliberate disclosure 
practices, as contemporary accounting outrages have repeated brought attention to 
corporate clarity. Spence (1973), in the perspective of education, based on Akerlof’s 
(1970) seminar paper, first initiated the concept of signalling. Spence disputed that 
workers having greater efficiency will attain education (assuming education is a 
signal of ability) with a view to differentiating themselves from those having less 
efficiency, as employers cannot readily notice workers’ capability. As the costs of 
attaining education are too high for less-skilled workers, the underlying theory is that 
the signal cannot be attained cost-free. To explain deliberate revelations, signalling 
theory can be used. That information irregularity is one of the shortcomings in the 
corporate environment is well understood from the study of Morris (1987). As a 
common phenomenon, signalling is applicable in any market having information 
irregularity. When the party having more information hints it to others, in that case 
the model displays how irregularity can be lessened (Morris, 1987). 
Furthermore, businesses having no information may desire to differentiate 
themselves from businesses bearing bad news, to avoid confrontational perceptions 
that would happen if they do not do so, corporations have inducements to continue 
with releasing information (Ross, 1979). Verrecchia (1983) advocated that 
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considering the consequence of disclosure on the market, a manager’s decision will 
be made regarding disclosing information (i.e. to release or withhold the signal). 
Hypothesized by Verrecchia, an “inception level of disclosure” will be present; the 
manager will reveal information above this level and will suspend information below 
this level. By way of non-disclosure, interpretation by the market of this level will be 
defined in portion and for withholding information, the market’s speculation on the 
manager’s motivation will disrupt that. Verrecchia recommended in an earlier paper 
(1990) that the initial level may be prejudiced by the quality of information existing 
to the manager; in essence, there is an inverse relationship between the quality of 
information and the threshold level of disclosure. 
According to Ross (1979), the disclosure system of strong and weak firm signalling 
theory is used for differentiation, in which it is observed that weak firms are more 
unwilling to disclose their information than the strong firms. Regarding this issue, 
Grossman (1981) said that because of the tendency of people to discuss the 
undisclosed matter, the firm should disclose both good and bad information about the 
company, if that is costless. In addition, Skinner (1994) says that the disclosure of 
bad news helps the company to prevent declining share price by signalling the 
reduction of reputation cost for non-disclosure of information where good news 
indicates the quality of the company. The company may also disclose its difference 
with companies who have bad information, if the company has no important 
information to disclose. Consequently, quality signalled information can add great 
value to the company with the trade-off decision between the informational 
advantage and financial advantage. 
Eccles et al. (2001) argued that managers should use credible signals to give signals 
correctly to stakeholders. On the other hand, Hughes (1986) stated that misleading 
information will harm the company. The company information disclosed will be 
treated as false if people find it wrong once, thus the firm will lose its credibility. The 
effects of signalling are different for different stakeholders, such as investors and 
competitors as shown by Farrel and Gibbons (1989). Besides, a signal will send 
correct information when the company concentrates more on the investors than do 
competitors. In addition, the firm will lose its credibility if it becomes more 
concerned about the entrance of new competitors. In addition, it is observed that the 
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involvement of multiple users will make the process more difficult (Newman and 
Sansig, 1993).  
3.2.3 Capital need theory 
For maintaining existing operations, companies who have growth potential will 
search for outside finance, debt or equity. Obtaining funds becomes costly because of 
market uncertainty and one-way information (Suwaidan, 1997). This happens 
because of compensation claim against the investment risk by the investors. The 
expected rate of return may fall if the company wants to disclose more information to 
the market (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Besides, the company willingly discloses more 
information to reduce the information asymmetry while making capital market 
transactions. Firth (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Cooke (1993), Marston 
and Shrives (1996) and Botosan (1997) argued that for reducing the cost of capital 
the managers may take the decision to increase disclosure of information. Gray and 
Roberts (1989) and Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) suggested that market pressure 
works as the fuel of corporate disclosure. It is a function of the financial reporting 
system to disclose information to interested parties in the capital market through both 
formal and informal contracts (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992). Thus, to increase the 
quantity and quality of disclosure the listed companies should create pressure on the 
users act contact. 
To collect capital at the lowest possible rate is the main reason for information 
disclosure, and this is said based on capital need theory. This may be done in the 
forms of both shares and loans by ensuring the reduction of investors’ uncertainty 
and information asymmetry while raising capital cheaply. For increasing market 
efficiency, it needs to reduce information asymmetry in the capital market and this is 
the key function of a financial reporting system. According to Core (2001), for 
collecting capital cheaply there is not enough fixed disclosure. On the other hand, 
Barry and Brown (1986), Merton (1987) and Suwaidan (1997) suggested that the 
company has to compensate premium against investment risk. 
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According to Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Cooke (1993), Hossain et al. (1994), 
Botosan (1997), Sengupta (1998) and Healy and Palepu (2001), increase of share 
price, decrease of information risk and cost of capital are the result of more 
disclosure. Besides, Meek et al. (1995) stated that companies compete with one 
another to obtain capital at the lowest possible price based on information disclosure 
and other related issues. 
3.2.4 Stewardship theory 
From the studies of Hoskission et al. (2000) and Blair (1995), it is well understood 
that there are also some critics of agency theory, as there is limitation in the 
sociological and psychological mechanism of the principal-agent relationship to 
explain in detail. Davis et al. (1997) they suggested stewardship theory as an 
alternative to agency theory for corporate governance. Boyd (1995), Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) and Donaldson (1990) referred to psychology and sociology as the 
roots of stewardship theory, which is also similar to organisational theory. Donaldson 
and Davis (1991) stated that, the stewards have to act according to the interest of 
their principals and the aim is to observe the prevailing situation. 
Managers are good stewards of firms: this is the main theme of stewardship theory. 
According to this theory, the managers are so good that they do not want to make 
secret profit in expense of the shareholders’ interest and try to disclose more 
information to avoid conflict of interest for assets of the company. The shareholders 
of the company appoint the directors and the directors are held responsible for their 
practice of power at the AGM. To know whether the company’s accounts and 
financial statements are true and fair or not, an independent auditor is appointed who 
presents a report regarding this issue. Adams (2002) argued that, because of 
excessive rules and legislations this theory remains at the starting point. 
Now, it can be said that to develop mutual trust and cooperation between stewards 
and principals is the focal point of stewardship theory. According to Tian and Lau 
(2001), a company’s performance is strongly co-related with the credibility and 
cooperative relationship between stewardships and principals. To avoid the 
information asymmetry problem of agency theory, this theory can be used as it has 
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an efficient mechanism to share information. Thus, this theory will contribute to the 
management control system, which is very important for becoming a successful 
company. 
3.2.5 Legitimacy theory 
According to Brown and Deegan (1998), in regards of elucidating corporate affairs, 
legitimacy theory has been evolved. Watson et al. (2002) described that, generally, 
companies reveal certain information in their annual report. This is an example of 
legitimacy theory that is perceived as the signal of companies’ legitimacy. In this 
regard, Suchman (1995) perceived legitimacy theory as a generalised idea that if the 
customs, beliefs and values are socially established then people’s reactions will be 
pertinent and desirable. According to the theory, corporate information is revealed as 
the feedback toward the environmental factors, which include economic, social and 
political aspects with a view to legitimating corporate actions. Companies are 
encircled by political, social and economic systems, which force them to reveal 
information (Williams, 1999). Rizk (2006) argued that an organisation can sustain 
itself if it acts according to a suitable value system. Therefore, organisations tend to 
acquire social approval on the basis of this theory which can be called legitimacy of 
their actions (Patten, 1991; Reich, 1998; Deegan, 2002). 
Deliberate revelation of information is related to the legitimacy concept. 
Management intends to legitimize its actions with a view to gaining approval in 
society. Managers of companies should emphasize stakeholders’ interests toward the 
companies (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Both of them should work 
collaboratively. It is perceived as an ethical prerequisite for a company’s 
management to legitimize its actions. A ‘legitimacy gap’ may arise due to the 
discrepancy of values between society and company (Sethi, 1979). Therefore, 
companies can lessen the legitimacy gap by disseminating information. According to 
Watson et al. (2002), the basis of the entire analysis is that disclosure of information 
indicates the companies’ signal toward their legitimacy. Watson et al. (2002) also 
argued that companies should reveal corporate information, including corporate 
governance information willingly. As a result, smooth communication can be 
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established between the directors and stakeholders, which led to increase confident 
about the companies’ financial and non-financial performance.  
Generally, corporate performance is measured on the basis of the extent of profit 
maximization. According to Ramanathan (1976), legitimacy theory perceives profit 
maximization broadly as a measure of organisational legitimacy. From the viewpoint 
of Adams and Roberts (1995), being a responsible corporate member, managers 
provide adequate information to shield their self-interests to maintain, promote and 
legitimize relationships. Nevertheless, to stay away from probable regulatory 
intervention managers provide that information (Gray and Roberts, 1989). Lindblom 
(1994) and Rizk (2006) argued that companies’ actions can be legitimized by four 
approaches. Firstly, stakeholders have to be made aware about the alterations in 
companies’ performance. Secondly, stakeholders’ perceptions have to be changed 
rather than their actual behaviour. Thirdly, their concerns have to be diverted to other 
relevant issues with a view to influencing their perception. Finally, exterior 
expectation has to be changed regarding performance.  
Disclosure plays a significant role in each of the above-mentioned approaches. 
Managers can easily contact stakeholders and society by revealing information 
deliberately. That is why managers will endeavour to legitimize corporate actions as 
well as their managerial positions. To elucidate disclosure practice legitimacy theory 
has been applied. After gaining social acceptance, most of disclosure studies, such as 
social and environmental disclosure, have been based on this theory. The concept of 
disclosure has been supported by the evidence of these studies, which are perceived 
as a means of legitimacy (Deegan, 2002). 
3.2.6 Stakeholder theory 
Mary Parker Follett introduced the concept of stakeholder theory around 75 years 
ago, which re-emerged in the 1980s (Schilling, 2000). Freeman (1984, quoted in 
Schilling, 2000) defines a stakeholder as, whenever organisations’ achievements 
manipulate or are manipulated by any group of people or individual then that group 
of people or individual is called a stakeholder. The stakeholders mean a number of 
people who have direct or indirect interest in the business (Carroll 1993, quoted in 
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Schilling, 2000). Freeman (1997) stated that large multinational companies became 
much too commanding, and were answerable to shareholders only. That is why to 
reflect the fear at societal level stakeholder theory has been evolved. To elucidate 
corporate disclosure stakeholder theory has been applied (The Corporate Report, 
1975). The spectrum of corporate financial report users has been enlarged from 
shareholders to stakeholders. From another point of view, stakeholders have the right 
to get information regarding companies’ activities. However, stakeholder theory has 
been perceived as an interesting aspect in light of the companies’ behaviour 
regarding corporate financial reporting (Gray et al., 1995). 
Gray et al. (1995) stated that agency theory deals with the relationship between 
managers (the agent) and shareholders (the principal). On the other hand, stakeholder 
theory deals with the relationship between managers and all other stakeholders (the 
principal) such as staff, shareholders, customers, government and suppliers. From the 
viewpoint of Crowther and Jatana (2005), stakeholder theory involves a number of 
stakeholders in the organisation. All of them expect some output for their investment. 
Therefore, the focal point of the theory is the answerability of the company towards 
its shareholders (Sternberg, 1997). Management intends to balance the stakeholders’ 
interest with the company’s objective. Thus, the company attains its objectives and 
maintain ethical conduct. To attain stakeholders’ support and approval, their 
perceptions are managed by disclosure (Gray et al., 1996). Also disclosure is used to 
deflect stakeholders’ disagreement and disapproval. In this regard, Deegan (2002) 
argued that managers intend to disseminate information toward some specific group 
of stakeholders to prove that they are meeting those stakeholders’ desire.  
Watson et al. (2002) stated that managers use deliberate disclosure to contact the 
stakeholders with a view to obtaining their support. However, different stakeholders 
require different information and seek different priorities (Wolfe and Puder, 2002). 
Furthermore, they gather information in different ways. That is why effective usage 
of deliberate disclosure policy may assist in building faith with the stakeholders and 
shareholders. In this circumstance, Rowley (1997) explains that, “Firms do not 
respond to each stakeholder individually but instead must answer the simultaneous 
demands of multiple stakeholders” (p.907). 
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A number of points should be considered to handle issues such as competition degree 
and information cost. Stakeholder power will affect the disclosure decision (Mitchell 
et al., 1997). Therefore, the manager should find balance amongst the stakeholders’ 
information needs. However, stakeholder theory is applicable in transitional 
economies, developing countries and highly controlled industries (Rizk, 2006). To 
establish the voluntary disclosure approach, different strategies should be considered 
which might gratify the information need of stakeholders. 
3.2.7 Political cost theory 
Political cost is perceived as one of the salient costs of companies. That is why 
companies intend to lessen this cost. In 1987, Watts and Zimmerman introduced the 
concept of political cost theory for the first time to include it in voluntary disclosure. 
Based on Watts and Zimmerman’s research, a number of researchers use political 
cost theory. Among them, some researchers reveal the relationship between social 
divergences and type of industry and between social divergences and size of 
company. In this regard, Watts and Zimmerman opined that companies would find 
measurement of social divergence to be beneficiary. According to Watts and 
Zimmerman’s theory, political expenditures are shown to the market. Politicians can 
utilize the distribution of wealth, such as taxes, aid, insurance, contributions etc. As a 
result, companies will be influenced to take the policy. Due to this influence the flow 
of taxes, information and special rules are changed. That is why sensitive companies 
will intend to take accounting choices to lessen the anticipated political costs (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978). To elucidate voluntary disclosure a large number of studies 
utilise political cost theory. From those studies, it has been presumed that there is a 
relationship between disclosure and sensitivity toward political pressure. A number 
of studies considered company size as a proxy for political cost approach, although 
Watts and Zimmerman (ibid.) disagreed on this point. From some other studies it has 
been indicated that industry sensitivity may be a proxy for political cost approach 
(Patten, 1991; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Patten and Nance, 1998). 
Based on the theory of Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Milne (2002) assessed 
voluntary and social disclosures, which have relied on positive accounting theory. 
Watts and Zimmerman’s theory has an association to discretionary management 
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behaviour. That is why Milne has not found any full arguments in favour of the 
theory. Simultaneous application of all the three hypothesized predictors of 
behaviour cannot be found (the debt/equity hypothesis, the bonus plan hypothesis, 
and the political cost hypothesis). Political cost hypothesis or size are used most of 
the time, which indicate a weak test of the original argument. According to Milne, no 
studies have taken the chance to assess management behaviour except the chosen 
disclosure approach.  
3.2.8 Discussion of theories  
Signalling theory, like agency theory, acknowledges the isolation of ownership and 
management and also advocates that managers are motivated to release information 
due to market pressure. Then more than any others, i.e. owners and investors, 
managers have more information regarding the company. Managers may wish to 
drive signals to concerned parties – owners, investors, and governmental agencies – 
to differentiate themselves from other companies. For this purpose, disclosure can be 
employed as a useful means. Companies with both good news and bad news or no 
information news have motivations to signal others. Skinner (1994) revealed that 
managers of companies having bad news may also have motivations to unveil the 
bad news to decrease the reputation costs and if they do not unveil this news in a 
timely manner that cost may be sustained. 
Both signalling theory and agency theory have been critiqued for the assumption that 
individuals are acting in their self-concern. Moreover, a number of writers have also 
criticized the hypothesis of equal distribution of power. They dispute that 
organisations exercise power not the individuals (e.g. Gray et al., 1996, as cited in 
Watson et al., 2002). The involvement of three parties, namely the stockholder, the 
company and the potential competitor, speeds up the use of signalling and disclosure 
(Newman and Sansig, 1993). Disclosure is made to help the shareholders make their 
investment decision; on the other hand, the abovementioned experts assume that the 
main task of the company is to maximize the wealth of the shareholders. Besides, it 
will make it difficult for competitors to enter into the market. It is also said by them 
that the communication problems of the company may become more complicated if 
the number of users is increased for analysis expansion.  
 
 
47 
 
There are some arguments regarding stakeholder theory. As a supporter of agency 
theory, Sternberg (1997) criticized stakeholder theory on several points. According 
to him, stakeholder theory is unsuited to corporate governance and business. It does 
not focus on the maximization of long-term owner value. The theory allows the 
managers to be unanswerable to their owners. Thus, they violate their obligations 
toward the owners. Furthermore, Sternberg states that balancing stakeholder benefits 
is a worthless job. In addition to that, stakeholder theory weakens private property 
and answerability. 
Legitimacy theory shows the usage of disclosure to legitimize their business. 
However, it is inadequate to clarify disclosure practices. In this regard, Rizk (2006) 
stated that legitimacy theory is inapplicable in developing countries due to the low 
level of social disclosure. Depending on the power of the stakeholders, managers 
find out the significance. Hence, there is no difference between stakeholder, 
legitimacy and political economy theories in light of the social disclosure literature 
(Gray et al., 1995). 
3.3 Part Two: Empirical Evidence 
3.3.1 Empirical studies on total voluntary disclosure 
Yuen et al. (2009) examined the impact of ownership concentration, government 
ownership and legal entity, percentage of tradable share, CEO-is-top director, and 
independence of board and audit committee on voluntary disclosure provided by 
publicly listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in China. The 
sample was 200 randomly selected companies from the Shanghai A-share market. 
The study used a checklist of 34 items divided into six categories (board structure 
and functioning, employees, directors’ remuneration, audit committee, related party 
transactions, stakeholder interests); with the weighted approach used in this study, 
items where applicable, took the ratio predefined in the disclosure index. Multiple 
regression models were employed in this study. Firm-specific characteristics were 
control variables. The findings show the adjusted R-squared for model is 31.3%. The 
extent of voluntary disclosure of publicly listed companies on the SSE is relatively 
low (21.4%). The percentage of tradable share and independence of board were 
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found a significant positive relationship with voluntary disclosure at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively, while the audit committee was found to have a significant 
negative relationship with voluntary disclosure at the 5% level.  
In the case of Bangladesh, Rouf (2011) addressed the association between corporate 
characteristics, governance attributes and the extent of LVD based on a sample of 
120 listed non-financial companies in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in 2008. 
Corporate characteristics included firm size, profitability. Corporate governance 
attributes included NEDs, audit committee, board leadership structure, board size and 
ownership structure. An un-weighted approach was used in order to measure 
voluntary disclosure. The researcher established the disclosure checklist (91 items) 
which depended on previous research such as Akhtaruddin et al (2009), Chau and 
Gray (2002), Ho and Wong (2001), and Ferguson et al. (2002). The Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression model was applied to examine the association between 
voluntary disclosure and explanatory variables. The findings indicated the adjusted 
R-squared is 58.6%. There are positive relationships between board size, audit 
committee and the role duality with voluntary disclosure at the 10% level for the first 
two variables and the 1% level for role duality. While ownership structure and net 
profitability were found to have a negative association with voluntary disclosure at 
the 1% level and 5% level, respectively. NEDs was not significantly related with 
disclosure. With regard to firm size, it was not significantly related with disclosure 
when measured by either the total assets of the firm or the total sales of the firm. 
In Iran, Khodadadi et al. (2010) investigated the effect of corporate governance 
structure (independent directors on the board, role duality and the percentage of 
institutional investors) on the extent of voluntary disclosure in listed firms on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). They investigated 106 observations during 2001-
2005 among listed companies on the TSE. A disclosure checklist comprising 31 
voluntary items was used to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure. An un-
weighted approach was used in this study for two reasons: first, they thought 
individuals have no more information and knowledge about their decision-making 
and judgement; second, this approach allowed the researchers opportunities to make 
measurements independently from different individuals’ viewpoints. The three 
hypotheses were tested by using regression logistic, the results indicated that only the 
 
 
49 
 
percentage of institutional investors was found to have a significant positive 
association with voluntary disclosure at the 1% level. They mentioned that NEDs’ 
role does not comply with the fundamentals of agency theory in Iran. However, they 
noted this supervisory tool has a small role in enhanced financial disclosure. Duties 
and liabilities of chairman and CEO have not been well separated in Iranian firms. 
Chau and Gray (2010) addressed empirically the relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and levels of family ownership and board independence 
including the influence of an independent chairman on 273 listed firms in Hong 
Kong for the year 2002. A disclosure checklist consisting of 88 information items 
split into twelve categories was established to measure the extent of disclosure. An 
un-weighted approach was used to scores voluntary disclosure in each company 
under investigation. To investigate the relationship between the dependent variable 
and independent variables the authors used three panels: panel A was the full sample 
(273 firms); panel B contained a non-independent chairman (127 firms); and panel C 
contained an independent chairman (146 firms). Linear multiple Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression model was employed to investigate the relationship 
between the dependent variable of voluntary disclosure and the independent 
chairman, proportion of NEDs to total number of directors, and family ownership of 
a firm. In other words, they used three regression models in this study. In addition, 
several sensitivity tests were conducted. The findings indicated that the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is associated with the level of family shareholding and more 
closely examined the nature of this relationship. The appointment of an independent 
chairman positively impacts on LVD and reduces both the influence of NEDs and 
family ownership levels. Release of more corporate accounting information may help 
to attract international investors because disclosing more information will reduce 
information asymmetry as well reduce the cost of capital for the firm. However, the 
evidence from previous studies is mixed. Table 3.1 summarizes some empirical 
studies. 
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Table 3.1 Previous studies of the relationship between the disclosure and its determinants 
Study contrary Sample size Independent variables Methodology Results 
Nandi & 
Ghosh 
(2012) 
India 60 firms listed 
through period 
from 2000-01 to 
2009-10 
ard size, board 
composition, audit 
committee, family 
control, and CEO 
duality. firm size, 
profitability, leverage, 
liquidity and firm age 
Multiple regression 
(Year-wise) The 
Standard & Poor 
(2008) model has used 
in order to measure 
the level of corporate 
disclosure. 
Weighted approach 
and un-weighted 
approach  
The extent of voluntary disclosure is 62.42 %. 
All corporate governance attributes were 
positively association with the disclosure, 
expect board composition it was negatively 
associated The firm size, profitability and 
liquidity were fond positively association with 
the disclosure, while leverage and firm age 
were found negatively association  
Bhayani 
(2012) 
India 
 
45-listed non-
financial firm for 
the period of 2008-
2009 to 2010-2011 
Firm age, listing status, 
ownership structure, 
leverage, size of the 
audit firm, residential 
status, firm size and 
profitability 
Nine regression 
models used .The 
corporate disclosure 
index is consist  of 74 
reporting items, Un-
weighted approach  
Ownership structure was found significant 
positively association, While audit firm size 
was significant negatively relationship in all 
nine models with the disclosure at 1% level.  
Listing status of the firm were found 
significant positively at 5% level in models 1, 
4, 5 and 7 where it were significant at the 
10% level in models 2,3,6,8  and 9.Levearge 
was negative correlated at 1% in models 
2,3,6,7,8 and 9. However, it was significant 
negatively at 5% level in models 1 and 4, 
while in model 5 it was significant at 5% 
level. Firm age was found insignificant in all 
models. Profitability as measured by return on 
capital employed (ROCE) explains more 
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     significant variations in the disclosure 
more than both the return on net worth 
(RONW) and return on sales 
(ROS).the firms audited by the big 
four auditing release more information 
than others. The firms, which have 
more debts, it will disclose only 
mandatory information. 
Satta et al 
(2013) 
Italy 32 documents 
during fiscal year 
2010  
Diffuse ownership, 
institutional investors’ 
ownership, the 
proportion of owners 
on the board of 
directors, the board 
size, the proportion of 
independent non-
executive directors, the 
number of committees 
established on the 
board and the presence 
of an audit committee 
A linear regression 
model has applied by 
using QDA-Miner 
software. 
 Content analysis  
The adjusted R square is 61.91%. The 
diffuse ownership, the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors, the 
board and the presence of an audit 
committee were found positively 
association with the quality of voluntary 
disclosure5% for the diffuse ownership 
and independent non-executive directors, 
while at 1% for the audit committee. The 
proportion of owners on the board of 
directors, the board size and the number 
of committees established on the board 
were negatively association with the 
quality of voluntary disclosure at 5% for 
the proportion of owners on the board of 
directors and board size while at 1% for 
the number of committees established on 
the board. The institutional investors’ 
ownership was insignificant with the 
quality of voluntary disclosure. 
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Dhouibi 
& 
Mamoghli 
(2013) 
 Tunisia 10 banks for the 
years 2000-2011 
Board size, NEDs, role 
duality, blockholder 
ownership, auditor 
reputation, state 
ownership, foreign 
ownership, firm 
performance and firm 
size  
Prais-winsten 
regression model to 
overcome the problem 
of multicollinearity 
The adjusted R square are 66.1% and 69.5% 
for model 1(exclude foreign ownership) and 
model 2 (exclude state ownership) 
respectively. The board size, blockholder 
ownership and state ownership were found 
negative and statistically significant with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure, while foreign 
ownership, firm performance and Firm size 
were found positive and statistically 
significant. However none of independent 
non-executive directors, role duality and 
auditor reputation have significant with the 
disclosure. 
Ibrahim & 
Jaafar 
(2013) 
Nigeria 69 listed companies 
out of the total top 
100 companies at 
31 December 2011. 
NEDs, board size, the 
frequency of board 
meetings, the 
separation of CEO and 
chairman role, the 
independent outside 
directors in the audit 
committee, audit 
committee size, the 
frequency of audit 
committee meetings, 
firm size and the 
industry type 
Multivariate 
regression model, 
disclosure index based 
on the number of 
operating segment 
items 
Un-weighted method 
The adjusted R square is 20%. The separation 
of CEO and chairman role and firm size were 
found positively significant association with 
the dependent variable at 10%, while industry 
type was positive significant association at 
1% level. The frequency of board meetings 
was found significant association with the 
dependent variable but negatively at 5% level. 
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Htay 
(2012) 
Malaysia 108 observations 
from1996 until 
2005 
Board leadership 
structure, board 
composition and board 
size ,director 
ownership, institutional 
ownership and block 
ownership 
GLS regression 
Disclosure index 
comprise 46 of 
information items.  
The disclosure index 
was scored by the 
opinions of 131 
accountants and 51 
financial analysts. 
The adjusted R square is 88%. The two 
variables of corporate governance 
mechanisms were found positively significant 
with the voluntary accounting information 
disclosure; independent non-executive 
directors on the board at 1%level while board 
size at 5% level. Regarding with ownership 
structure, the block ownership is the only 
variable was negatively with the voluntary 
accounting information disclosure at 10% 
level. 
Al-Janadi 
et al 
(2013) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
87 firms years 2006 
and 2007 
 NEDs, the proportion 
of family members on 
the board, independent 
audit committee 
members, role duality, 
audit size, government 
ownership and foreign 
ownership 
OLS regression the 
disclosure checklist    
consists of 22 
voluntary items, 
dichotomous 
procedure; 2 if fully 
disclosed, 1 slightly 
disclosed, 0 not 
disclosed. 
The adjusted R square of model is 55.8%. 
Three variables of internal mechanisms were 
significant with the level of voluntary 
disclosure; non-executive directors is 
positively significant at 1% board size is 
positively significant at 10% but role duality 
is negatively with the level of voluntary 
disclosure at 10%. On other hand, two 
variables of external corporate governance 
mechanisms were significant with the level of 
disclosure, audit firm is positively significant 
at 10% while government ownership was 
negatively significant at 5%.The remaining 
variables have no effect on the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Soliman 
(2013) 
Egypt The top 50 most 
active-traded 
companies listed in 
the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange over the 
period 2007-2010, 
Firm size, auditor size, 
profitability and firm’s 
age 
OLS regression 
stepwise method  
The disclosure 
checklist include 60-
disclosure item. The 
un-weighted approach  
The results show the adjusted R square is 
58.42%. the average of the level of voluntary 
disclosure is 32%.Firm size and profitability 
were found to have positive significant 
association with the level of voluntary 
disclosure at 5% level, while firm age was 
positive significant association with the level 
of voluntary disclosure 10 % level. Auditor 
size has no bearing on the level of disclosure. 
Hasan et 
al (2013) 
Bangladesh 214 companies 
from four sectors of 
the Bangladesh 
stock market 
Board independence, 
dominant personality, 
board size, institutional 
ownership, general 
public ownership and 
external auditor  
ANOVA technique 
and OLS regression 
Disclosure checklist 
of 220 information 
items 
Un-weighted approach  
The adjusted R square is 57.5%. The external 
auditor is positively significant association 
with the disclosure in. The remaining 
variables have no bearing on the level of 
disclosure. 
 
Allegrini 
& Greco 
(2013) 
Italy 177 of non-
financial in 2007 
Board independence, 
board size, role duality, 
lead in board 
committees, dependent 
director, and board and 
audit committee 
diligence 
OLS regression 
disclosure checklist 
include 60  disclosure 
items 
The adjusted R square is 40.7%. The average 
of the level of disclosure is 35%. The board 
size is positively significant association with 
the disclosure at 5% level, while role duality 
is negatively significant association at 10% 
level. Board and audit committee diligence 
board activity is positively significant 
association with the level of disclosure at 5% 
level, while audit committee activity 
positively significant association at 1% level. 
The remaining variables have no effect.  
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Hassaan 
(2013) 
Jordan 75 of non-financial 
companies in 2007 
Board independence, 
board leadership, board 
size, ownership 
structure, government 
ownership, 
management 
ownership, private 
ownership and public 
ownership in addition 
control variables 
Stepwise regression 
The disclosure 
checklist consist on 
the IFRSs include 275 
IFRSs based items 
The adjusted R square for model is 24.5%. 
The public ownership ratio is the only 
variable that explains variations in the levels 
of compliance with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the Jordanian. The 
public ownership ratio was found to be 
significant negative relationship with 
dependent variable at the 0.05 level. 
Companies with dominant public ownership 
responded less with the overall mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
Uyar et al 
(2013) 
Turkey 131 annual reports 
of manufacturing 
companies listed in 
BIST. 
Institutional/corporate 
ownership, ownership 
diffusion/dispersion, 
independent directors, 
board size, listing 
place, listing age, firm 
size, profitability, 
leverage and auditor 
size 
OLS and 2SLS 
regressions 
Disclosure checklist 
of 96 information 
items 
Un-weighted approach  
The adjusted R square for Model 1(2SLS) is 
32.3%, Model 2(2SLS) is 32.2%, Model 
3(OLS) is 36.2% and Model 4(OLS) is 
35.5%. There are a positive relationship 
between disclosure and the variables such as 
auditing firm size, proportion of independent 
directors on the board, firm size and 
institutional/corporate ownership, while 
leverage and ownership diffusion were found 
to have negative significant relationship with 
the disclosure. The remaining variables were 
found to be insignificant.  
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3.3.2 Discussion 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013), in Saudi Arabia, adopt a disclosure checklist from the study 
of Al-Janadi et al. (2012), and Nandi and Ghosh (2012), in India, used the Standard 
& Poor (2008) model in order to measure the extent of disclosure, while all studies 
established some disclosure checklist. However, different statistical methods were 
used to investigate the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables among the studies. Moreover, some studies used more than 
one model in order to investigate the relationships, such as Bhayani (2012) who used 
nine models, Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013) who used two models, and Uyar et al. 
(2013) who used four models. 
Most of the studies used an un-weighted method to measure level of disclosure, 
while Yuen et al. (2009) used a weighted approach, but Nandi and Ghosh (2012) 
used both weighted and un-weighted approaches. It is noticeable that scholars did not 
indicate whether there was a difference in the results between these different 
approaches. The adjusted R-squared in most of studies varied from study to study; 
the highest adjusted R-squared was in Htay (2012), in Malaysia, and smaller adjusted 
R-squared appeared in Ibrahim and Jaafar (2013), in Nigeria. The difference of 
adjusted R-squareds among the studies may be due to the different independent 
variables used in these studies or differences of culture of the business environment 
among countries. 
Not all the studies covered all companies listed on the stock exchange, each study 
using a sample of companies. The largest sample was 273 companies in Chau and 
Gray (2010), in Hong Kong, while the smallest sample was 32 companies in Satta et 
al. (2013), in Italy. In addition, sectors used varied between most studies. Rouf 
(2011), Bhayani (2012), Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Hassaan (2013) used non-
financial companies, while Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013) and Htay (2012) used a 
sample from the banking sector. Ibrahim and Jaafar (2013) and Soliman (2013) used 
the top 100 companies listed and the top 50 most active-traded companies listed, 
respectively. Satta et al. (2013) used medium-sized listed firms and Hasan et al. 
(2013) used a sample from four sectors, while Uyar et al. (2013) used a sample from 
manufacturing companies listed. 
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Most prior studies use a single point of time, though there are studies using a period 
of ten years, such as Nandi and Ghosh (2012) and Bhayani (2012) in India, Dhouibi 
and Mamoghli (2013) in Tunisia, and Htay (2012) in Malaysia. Furthermore, 
Khodadadi et al. (2010) in Iran used a period of five years, and Soliman (2013) in 
Egypt used a period of three years. It is noticeable from these studies that there is an 
increasing interest in the application of longitudinal study because it provides more 
explanation as to how disclosure practices develop over time. 
3.3.3 Empirical studies on voluntary disclosure categories 
Most of the previous studies analysed only one dimension of level of disclosure. In 
1995, Meek et al. analysed level of disclosure based on the categories of voluntary 
disclosure. They recommended greater consideration of the importance of this style 
of analysis; they stated that: 
“One reason for doing this is that the decision relevance of information 
probably varies by type. For example, the strategic and financial information 
categories have obvious decision relevance for investors. The non financial 
information category is directed more toward a company’s social 
accountability, extending beyond the investor group to include other company 
stakeholders as well. As a result, the variables affecting voluntary disclosure 
choices may also vary by information type”. (p.562) 
In terms of this type of analysis, recently disclosure studies have started to analyse 
voluntary disclosure based on its categories. Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2007) 
reported that analysing different categories of disclosure assists with understanding 
the different determinants of this disclosure. Recently, a number of disclosure studies 
have focused not only on total voluntary disclosure but also on the categories of 
voluntary disclosure. The following paragraphs address some previous studies that 
employed this type of analysis, beginning with Meek et al. (1995) who are 
considered as one of the founders of this analysis. 
Meek et al. (1995) examined factors influencing voluntary disclosure of three types 
of information (strategic, non-financial, and financial) based on the annual reports of 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) from the US, UK and continental Europe. They 
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investigated association between voluntary disclosure and explanatory variables 
(firm size, country/region of origin, industry type, gearing, multi-nationality, 
profitability and international listing status). The study used a sample of the annual 
reports for the year 1989 of 226 multinational companies from different countries: 
US 116 firms, UK 64 firms, France 16 firms, Germany 12 firms and the Netherland 
18 firms. A self-constructed checklist containing 85 items was employed, and an un-
weighted approach used to score voluntary disclosure in order to measure the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. The findings for adjusted R-squared 
were 33% for strategic information category, 14% for non-financial information 
category, 45% for financial information category and 35% for overall disclosures. 
Thus, the findings show that the factors explaining voluntary annual report 
disclosures differ by information category. The strategic information category seems 
to reflect national/ regional influences and international listing status. Disclosures in 
Europe are more developed than in the United States. Industry type may also be more 
politically sensitive. That approach (dividing voluntary disclosure based on the 
information types) used in this study is useful to understanding the determinants of 
disclosure.  
In Hong Kong, Ferguson et al. (2002) examined the impact of international capital 
market pressure on voluntary disclosure based on three types of information, 
strategic, financial and non-financial, in the annual reports of former wholly state-
owned People’s Republic of China (PRC) enterprises, listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong (SEHK). The authors followed the model developed by Meek et al. 
(1995). The sample included the annual reports of 142 non-financial companies for 
the year 1995/1996. The disclosure checklist contained 93 disclosure items 
established to measure the extent of LVD; the un-weighted approach is used to score 
level of disclosure for each firm. To investigate the association between the impact 
of international capital market pressure and voluntary disclosure five explanatory 
variables were used in this study (firm size, gearing, industry, multiple-listing status 
and firm type (Local vs. H-Share vs. Red-Chip) by a regression equation. The 
findings indicated the adjusted R-squared was 25.1% for strategic information 
category, 14.7% for non-financial information category, 33% for financial 
information category and 34.23% for overall disclosure. Firm size was a positively 
associated significant variable with total voluntary disclosure and in each of the three 
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categories. Gearing was positively significant in financial information category and 
with overall disclosure. H-Share was positively significant with overall disclosure, 
strategic information category and financial information category. The authors noted 
that formerly wholly state-owned enterprises disclose significantly more strategic 
information and more financial information than other listed companies. 
Leventis and Weetman (2004), in Greece, examined voluntary disclosure practices in 
corporate annual reports from the Athens Stock Exchange. In this study, three 
categories of voluntary disclosure were developed, namely corporate environment, 
social responsibility and finance-related disclosures. They follow Meek et al. (1995), 
in the same way dividing voluntary disclosure but by different category labels. Each 
category is tested for association with seven company-specific variables as 
explanatory variables: these variables were corporate size, gearing, profitability, 
liquidity, industry, share return and listing status. In order to measure the extent of 
disclosure, the authors used a self-constructed checklist of 72 items for annual 
reports. An un-weighted approach was applied to score voluntary disclosure of the 
sample, which included 87 annual reports of non-financial publicly-traded companies 
listed on the Athens Stock Exchange for the year 1997. To test the hypotheses related 
to explanatory variables, the study used ranked regression. The results indicate the 
adjusted R-squared of overall disclosure was 35.6% while the categories were 22.3% 
for corporate environment category, 15.4% for social responsibility category and 
29.3% for financial information category. Corporate size was found to have a 
positive significant association with overall voluntary disclosure and in each 
category, while share return was negatively significant associated with overall 
voluntary disclosure and in each category. Profitability, liquidity and gearing were 
found to have no significant relationship with overall voluntary disclosure, or with 
the three categories. However, the remaining variables were varying among the 
categories of voluntary disclosure.  
Based on the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) methodology, Aksu and Kosedag (2006), in 
Turkey, addressed transparency and disclosure scores and their determinants in the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) based on the 52 largest and most liquid firms. The  
annual report and corporate website were investigated for each firm in the sample. 
The disclosure checklist used to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure consisted 
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of 106 information items classified into three categories, namely, ownership structure 
and investor relations, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board 
and management structures and processes. The study employed four explanatory 
variables, namely, profitability, gearing, market capitalization, and market-to-book 
ratio, to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure. Cross-sectional regressions 
were used to investigate the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure 
and the explanatory variables. The results indicated profitability, firm size and 
market-to-book ratio to be significant variables that could explain the variation in 
overall voluntary disclosure and each of ownership structure and board and 
management categories only, while gearing is an insignificant variable with overall 
voluntary disclosure in the three categories. The annual reports and websites did not 
contribute enough to increased voluntary disclosure. 
To address perpetuating traditional influences, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in 
Malaysia, examined factors associated with voluntary disclosure in corporate annual 
reports in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) after the 1997 financial crisis. 
In the same vein as Meek et al. (1995), the authors used a disclosure checklist 
classified into three main categories: strategic, financial and corporate social 
responsibility; the checklist consisted of 53 information items. An un-weighted 
approach was applied to score voluntary disclosure for each company in the sample. 
Ownership (ownership concentration, number of shareholders, director ownership, 
government ownership), board of directors (family members on the board, NEDs, 
independent chairman) and competitiveness costs (degree of company 
competitiveness and degree of industry competitiveness) were employed as 
explanatory variables, using stepwise regression to explain voluntary disclosure and 
its categories. The results indicated the adjusted R-squared for overall disclosure was 
36.1%, while financial information category was 26.4%, strategic information 
category was 21.5% and corporate social responsibility information category was 
16.6%. Number of shareholders and director ownership are significant at the 1% 
level in explaining all types of information disclosure. Neither of the two variables 
reflecting new governance initiatives for board of directors (NEDs and independent 
chairman) is statistically significant in explaining any type of information disclosure. 
The findings also presented that competitiveness considerations, as a proxy for 
proprietary costs, do not have a significant influence on voluntary disclosure. The 
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profitable firm will release more information to signal the shareholder that the 
company is well-managed and professionally-run by the management. In all the 
disclosure models, industry competitiveness was the only factor, which was not 
significant. 
Agca and Onder’s (2007) study contains 51 non-financial companies from various 
sectors, excluding banking and insurance, listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 
2003, following the classification of Meek et al. (1995), and examined voluntary 
disclosure practice in their corporate annual reports. The authors employed a 
checklist consisting of 87 information items, classified into three categories, namely 
strategic information, financial information and non-financial information, to 
measure disclosure. The study used explanatory variables (firm size, auditor type, 
gearing, ownership structure, profitability and multi-nationality) in OLS regression in 
order to explain voluntary disclosure and its categories. The results indicated firm 
size and profitability variables are significant for the strategic information category, 
while the gearing variable is significant for the non-financial information category. 
According to the total disclosure model, firm size, profitability, and auditor variables 
are significant. On the other hand, firm size and auditor variables are significant for 
the financial information category. Table 3.2 summarizes some empirical studies on 
voluntary disclosure categories. 
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Table 3.2 Empirical studies on voluntary disclosure categories 
Study contrary Sample size The components of 
voluntary disclosure 
Methodology Results 
Lim et al 
(2007) 
Australia    181 firm 
observations 
Forward looking 
quantitative category, 
strategic category, non-
financial category and 
historical financial 
category    
OLS  and 2SLS 
dichotomous scores 
The voluntary 
disclosure checklist 
consists of 67 items  
 
The Adjusted R-sq was 20.69%, 6.01%, 21.25% and 
34.37% for forward looking quantitative category, 
strategic category, non-financial category and 
historical financial category respectively. 
Board composition was found a positive association 
with voluntary disclosure of information in annual 
report, while the independent boards found more 
voluntary disclosure with forward looking 
information category and strategic information 
category. Board structure has no impact on the 
voluntary disclosure of non-financial category and 
historical financial information category. 
Patelli & 
Prencipe 
(2007) 
Italy 175 non-
financial 
Italian listed 
companies 
in 2002  
Background 
information  category 
historical category 
non-financial statistics 
category  
projected information 
category 
the segment 
information category 
management discussion 
and analysis category 
Multivariate analysis 
Weighted approach 
The voluntary 
disclosure checklist 
consists of 74 items   
 
The independent directors were found to be 
significantly associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure and with each of background information 
category, key non-financial statistics category, and 
management discussion and analysis category 
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Wang et al 
(2008) 
China 109 
companies 
Strategic information 
category, financial 
information category 
and non-financial 
information category 
Multivariate analysis  
An un-weighted 
approach The 
disclosure index 
consists of 79 
discretionary items   
  
 
 
The proportion of state ownership, foreign ownership, 
firm performance measured by return on equity, and 
audit firm were found a positive relationship with the 
overall of the level of voluntary disclosure, while 
leverage has no bearing on all types of voluntary 
disclosure. The both state ownership and foreign 
ownership significantly affect strategic information 
category while they were not bearing on the financial 
information category. Firm size was found positive 
associated with overall voluntary disclosure and 
strategic information category only. The voluntary 
disclosure  no relation with cost of capital 
Al-Shammari 
(2008) 
Kuwait  82 
companies 
(2005) 
Corporate environment 
category, social 
responsibility category 
and financial 
information category 
Multivariate 
regression 
 An un-weighted 
approach  
The disclosure index 
consists of 76 
discretionary items   
 
The Adjusted R-sq of the different categories was 
39.5% for corporate environment category, 12.1% for 
social responsibility category and 11.5% for financial 
information category. Corporate environment 
category was positively associated with size and 
leverage, while it was negatively significant with real 
estate industry. In social responsibility category, size 
and complexity are the only significant variables. 
Company size, leverage, age and auditor are the only 
significant factors in explanation differences in the 
level of financial information category 
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Murcia 
&Santos 
(2012) 
Brazil 98 
companies 
in 2006, 100 
companies 
in 2007 and 
92 
companies 
in 2008  
Economic (43) and 
socio-environmental 
(49)  
Content analysis 
An un-weighted 
approach  
The disclosure 
index consists of 
92 items   
 
The Adjusted R-sq of total disclosure is 17.93%, 
economic disclosure is 6.64 % and socio-
environmental disclosure is 24.35%. Sector and 
Origin of Control are the only two of explanatory 
variables were positively significant with the overall 
disclosure or with any of the two categories, while 
profitability was positively significant with the 
overall disclosure and the economic category. 
Tobin‟s Q was statistically significant with the 
overall disclosure and the social - environment 
category. Leverage and auditing firm are statistically 
significant only in the economic category. However, 
the remaining variables have no bearing on the 
overall disclosure or two categories.    
Alves et al 
(2012) 
Iberian 
Peninsula  
38 firms 
from 
Portugal, 
102 firms 
from Spain 
Strategy category, 
market and 
competition category, 
management and 
production category, 
future perspective   
category, marketing 
category and human 
capital category 
Multiple 
regression 
models 
Un-weighted 
approach  
The disclosure 
index consists of 
60  items   
 
The Adjusted R-sq of strategy category is 48.6%, 
market and competition category is .32%, 
management and production category is 26.6%, 
future perspective category is 30.3%, marketing 
category is 44.6% and human capital category is 
47.5%. Firm size is the only the variable was 
positively significant with all categories, while 
performance was positively significant with all 
categories, except future perspective category. The 
board expertise was positively significant with 
management and production category and market and 
competition category. Management ownership was 
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     negatively significant with all categories, except 
market and competition category, and future 
perspective category. The proportion of directors’ 
remuneration was positively significant with market 
category and human capital category. The presence of 
a large shareholder was negative association with the 
level of voluntary disclosure in Iberian Peninsula 
companies.  
Samah et al 
(2012) 
Egypt The most 
active 100 
Egyptian 
companies 
in year 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial transparency 
category, ownership 
structure/ exercise of 
control rights category, 
board and management 
structure/ process 
category, corporate 
responsibility 
/compliance category 
and auditing category 
OLS  model  
A weighting 
approach  
The ISAR checklist 
includes of 53 
disclosure items 
  
 
The Adjusted R-sq of overall disclosure is 61.8%, 
while ownership structure and exercise of control 
rights category, financial transparency and board and 
management structure and process category and 
corporate responsibility and compliance category 
were 51.6%,15.4%,45.6% and 63% respectively. 
Board composition was found positively significant 
with the overall disclosure, ownership structure and 
exercise of control rights category and financial 
transparency category. Role duality was negatively 
significant with overall disclosure and ownership 
structure and exercise of control rights category and 
board and management structure and process 
category. Audit committee was just positively 
significant with corporate responsibility and 
compliance category. Board size, director ownership 
and number of shareholders have no bearing on the 
overall disclosure or its categories. 
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3.3.4 Discussion 
Most of the studies reviewed were in developing countries, although this type of 
research study began in developed countries. However, scholars still follow the 
approach of Meek et al. (1995) in splitting voluntary disclosure into specific groups/ 
categories of information. That is evidence of the growth of knowledge in developing 
countries, and that they are keeping pace with recent development in the science of 
accounting. 
The majority of studies reviewed were conducted in their countries, except Ferguson 
et al. (2002), in Hong Kong, where they used a sample of wholly state-owned 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) enterprises, listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK). Alves et al. (2012), in the Iberian Peninsula, used samples from two 
states 38 firms in Portugal, 102 firms in Spain.  
Although Meek et al. (1995) split voluntary disclosure into three categories, the 
following studies split voluntary disclosure into more than three categories, for 
example Lim et al. (2007), in Australia, divided the index into four categories. In 
Italy, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) divided the index into seven categories; Alves et al. 
(2012), in the Iberian Peninsula, split the index into six groups. In contrast to these 
studies, Murcia and Santos (2012), in Brazil, split the total voluntary disclosure into 
only two categories (economic (43) and socio-environmental (49)). 
The reviewed studies were based on analysis of voluntary disclosure in only one 
period, except Murcia and Santos (2012), in Brazil, who used the panel data 
approach (98 companies in 2006, 100 companies in 2007 and 92 companies in 2008). 
The researcher may face underlying problems with some variables such as gearing 
when comparing a profitable company with a company that has problems with debts 
in one period, but if the researcher conducts a longitudinal study, may be the debts of 
the company have been solved. 
There are different ways to allocate some items to the different categories among the 
studies reviewed; for example, if researcher has allocated item A in category X, 
maybe another researcher has allocated the same item A in category Y. That means 
 
 
67 
 
there is no agreement on the categorization of some items. The reasons for this 
conflict may be due to the thoughts of the researchers and their understanding of how 
to deal with the items based on their scientific environment. 
Statistical methods used in the studies reviewed were found to vary. For example, 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007), Shammari (2008), China, Wang et al. (2008) and Alves 
et al. (2012) used multiple regression in order to investigate the relationship between 
the dependent variable and independent variables. However, Lim et al. (2007) used 
two-stage least squares regression (2SLS), and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) used 
stepwise regression, while Leventis and Weetman (2004) used ranked regression, 
and in Turkey, Aksu and Kosedag (2006) used cross-sectional regressions. Samah et 
al. (2012), in Egypt, used the Ordinary Least Squares regression for overall 
disclosure and three categories, while using binary logistic regression for corporate 
responsibility and compliance categories. In addition, most studies reviewed used an 
un-weighted approach to score LVD, except the study of Patelli and Prencipe (2007), 
which used a weighted approach to score level of disclosure. The reason for using 
different statistical methods in one study is due to the attributes of the data. 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) not only split the disclosure index into categories but also 
went further, to split the independent variable. Four types measured the independent 
variable. (INDIR98) the proportion of independent directors excluding those who 
were already part of the same board in 1998, (INDIR3) the proportion of independent 
directors excluding any that sit on more than three boards and (INDIR) the 
proportion of independent directors excluding any that sit on more than five boards. 
While (INDIRADJ) the proportion of independent directors after excluding all the 
cases above. This method is better to investigate the potential effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
68 
 
3.4 The Gap in Previous Literature Studies on Voluntary Disclosure 
Part two of this chapter reviewed and discussed previous literature on voluntary 
disclosure in developing and developed countries, and the studies on voluntary 
disclosure categories. The following paragraphs identify the gap in the literature 
regarding voluntary disclosure, especially with regard to the Kuwaiti context. 
It is noticeable that most of the previous studies were conducted in the business 
environments that have corporate governance codes, but in Kuwait the financial 
sector has corporate governance codes since 2004, which were issued by the Central 
Bank of Kuwait. On other words, the corporate governance codes do not apply to all 
companies in the Kuwait business environment, except the financial sector. The 
study is intended to provide more explanation of disclosure practices in the business 
environments where corporate governance is not applied in all listed companies. 
Prior studies have employed several theories to provide explanation of why 
companies disclose information to the public, such as agency, signalling, capital 
need, and political cost theories. It is noticeable that each study employed one theory 
or, at most, two theories; however, this study employs seven theories – additionally 
including stewardship theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory – in order to 
explain voluntary disclosure practices in the Kuwaiti context. 
Most studies reviewed used firm characteristics as independent variables to 
investigate their effect on voluntary disclosure. That is evidence of the importance of 
firm characteristics, which may enhance understanding about the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Al-Shammari (2008) is the only study applied in Kuwait, being a 
longitudinal study over the period 2007 to 2010. To the best of this researcher’s 
knowledge, there is no previous empirical longitudinal study, at the time of 
conducting this study, concerning voluntary disclosure with firm characteristics for 
this period in the Kuwaiti context. 
There are some studies, which analysed the determinants of voluntary disclosure, 
such as corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and firm 
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characteristics, but there no study which analysed these determinants together in the 
Kuwaiti context to the best of this researcher’s knowledge. 
As regards methodology, previous disclosure studies used one or two statistical 
techniques, such as correlation (parametric and non-parametric), Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression, two-stage least squares regression (2SLS), ANOVA and 
generalised least squares (GLS). This study goes further by using five statistical 
techniques in order to investigate the relationship between LVD and its determinants, 
namely, OLS regression, normal score model, GLS model, Tobit model and the 
quantile model at different points, to increase confidence in the results of the study. 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter summarises the most common theories applied in literature reviews to 
explore disclosure practices in different countries. These theories are agency theory, 
signalling theory, capital need theory, stewardship theory, legitimacy theory, 
stakeholder theory and political cost theory. These theories were discussed in 
subsection 3.2.8. Empirical disclosure studies on both total voluntary disclosure and 
voluntary disclosure categories in both developed and developing countries are 
discussed in section 3.3. After reviewing these studies, the gaps in the previous 
literature studies on voluntary disclosure were demonstrated in section 3.4. 
In the next two chapters, background and financial reporting practice in the Kuwaiti 
context are discussed in chapter 4, and the research hypotheses are presented in 
chapter 5.  
 
 
70 
 
Chapter 4: The Background and Financial Reporting 
Practice in Kuwaiti  
4.1 Introduction 
It has been argued that historical, political, economic and legal systems have affected 
the state’s accounting system (Salter and Niswander, 1995; Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003). Černe (2009) stated regarding the accounting system, “As a 
social science, accounting is affected by the environment in which it operates, but at 
the same time, it is one of the factors impacting on this same environment. This is a 
fact that points to the interdependency of accounting and its environment” (p.66) 
After shedding light on the theoretical framework and the most relevant theories and, 
in addition, reviewing the relevant literature in previous chapters, this chapter 
provides an overview of the Kuwaiti business environment. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 provides a brief history of Kuwait. 
The economy of the Kuwait is presented in section 3.3. Information about the 
Kuwaiti capital market and the Al-Manakh crisis is in section 3.4; the new Kuwait 
stock exchange in section 3.5; the market divisions in section 3.6; listing 
requirements on the KSE in section 3.7; and the tax system in Kuwait in section 3.8. 
Section 3.9 sheds light on corporate financial reporting and regulation in Kuwait. 
The importance of corporate governance in Kuwait is considered one of the factors 
that may affect LVD, and is discussed in section 3.10, in addition, to highlight the 
board of directors, shareholders and general meetings, disclosure and auditing in the 
Kuwait business environment. The summary is presented in section 3.11. 
4.2 A Brief History of Kuwait  
The official name of Kuwait is the State of Kuwait. It is an Arab country in western 
Asia. It is surrounded by the Arabian Peninsula on the north-eastern boundary, and is 
located at the tip of the Arabian Gulf. Here borders are shared with Saudi Arabia to 
the south and Iraq to the north (see figure 5.1). The word “Kuwait” is derived from 
the word “kut”, which means a “small fort” (Casey, 2007). The history of Kuwait 
commenced in the 18
th
 century. Some tribal people and families migrated toward the 
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northeast zone from the central Arabian Peninsula. Among them the Al-Sabah family 
was one of the recognized families who belonged to the Al-Anazi tribe. That is why 
Sabah was perceived as the first monarch of Kuwait, who was elected by his peers 
and started the Royal family of Kuwait. Kuwait was ruled by Sabah from 1756 to 
1762. However, Kuwait entered into an agreement with the British Empire from 
1899 to 1961; according to the agreement, the United Kingdom assured Kuwait’s 
security and protection. In addition to that, UK also agreed not to interfere in 
Kuwait’s domestic issues. The agreement was ended on 25th February, 1961, which 
was declared as the independence day of Kuwait. The Al-Sabah family has ruled 
Kuwait since its founding, more specifically from 1756 until now. The size of the 
country is 17,820 square kilometres (6,880 square miles). According to the statistics 
of The Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI, 2013), the current population 
of Kuwait is around 4 million people; 31% of them are Kuwaiti citizens, whereas the 
rest are immigrants or labourers who come from other countries to earn their 
livelihood. Arabic is the first language and English the second, which is widely used 
in education and business. The Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) is the official currency of 
Kuwait, whose average and current exchange rate is 0.446 KD to £1.  
Figure 4.1 Kuwait country map 
 
The government system of Kuwait is parliamentary with a constitutional monarchy. 
The economic and political capital is served from Kuwait City. It is widely perceived 
as a liberal country in the Arab region; it is also recognized as having the world’s 
fifth largest oil reserves and petroleum products. At present, 87% export revenue and 
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75% government income come from this source. It is regarded as the eighth richest 
country in the world in terms of per capita income. The World Bank has categorized 
it as a high-income economy. Furthermore, it is recognized as a key non-NATO 
supporter of the United States (CBK, 2010). 
From the start of the 18
th
 century, Kuwait concentrated on trade commerce and it 
expanded its business from the Gulf to Africa, Asia and Europe to earn more income. 
Kuwait proved to be a booming merchant class arena due to its customs of fishing, 
pearls, trade and seafaring. The prior mentioned sectors were the basis of Kuwait’s 
economy until the 1920s. After that, Japan bought cultured pearls, for which reason 
Kuwait’s pearl industry came to a sudden end and faced the Great Depression. More 
recently, Kuwait’s economy recovered in 20th century through the discovery of oil in 
the Gulf region (AL Amiri, 2013).  
4.3 The Economy of Kuwait 
A significant economic period was commenced with the first oil shipment in 1946. 
However, Kuwait firstly enjoyed the benefit of oil in 1934, when it formed an oil 
company named the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) which was perceived as an equal 
partner of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now British Petroleum) and the Gulf Oil 
Corporation. Commercially, oil was discovered in 1938. After ten years, Aminoil (an 
American company) was allowed to search and mine the islands and territorial 
waters off the shores of Kuwait. In addition to that, in 1958 a Japanese trading 
company was granted offshore exploration and oil extraction in Kuwait. In the 
1960s, the Kuwaiti government formed Kuwait National Petroleum Company 
(KNPC) as a joint venture. With the passage of time, the Kuwaiti government had 
taken control of the entire petroleum sector by 1978. After that, the Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation (KPC) was formed which brought all industrial sectors under 
one holding company. Thus, the control of those industries became more effective. 
The KPC manages eight large companies, each of which is specialized in its own 
arena in terms of manufacturing, oil production and transportation (KPC, 2013). 
The economy of Kuwait has undergone an extensive augmentation since the 
discovery of oil. The national income, as well as Kuwaiti society, has seen a 
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substantial increase due to the discovery of oil. Kuwait attained infrastructure 
development from the oil revenue. Nevertheless, the government has enabled the 
other sectors to flourish, such as education, real estate, financial sector and health, 
with the oil revenue generated. These massive developments in all sectors of Kuwait 
have dramatically augmented the national income as well as economic and social 
life. The price of oil increased due to high international demand from 1972 to 1980. 
According to the annual report of Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK), the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) increased to KD7,755 million in 1980 from KD1,264 
million in 1972 (CBK, 2008, 2010).  
The growth of Kuwait’s economy was at its peak after the 1973 oil price rise. At that 
time, the government developed the infrastructure of the country, such as water, 
electricity, highways, education and health. In the meantime, the price of oil declined 
to below US$10 per barrel in 1980, which made the country’s revenue fall; the GDP 
also decreased to KD 2,805 million in 1989. By this time, the Iraqi-Iranian War 
(1980-1988) had caused huge losses to the Kuwaiti government and neighbouring 
countries. In the last phase of 1982, speculation grabbed the Kuwait Stock Market 
(KSM), which resulted in the Al-Manakh crisis. A number of banks became bankrupt 
at that time (described in the next chapter). The situation became intense when 
Kuwait was attacked by Iraqi troops in 1990 (ibid.).  
 
Table 4.1 Kuwait’s GDP and Oil Prices 
Year GDP, billions dollars Average oil price ($) 
1970 2.9 3.6 $ 
1975 12 12.21 $ 
1980 29 37.42 $ 
1985 21 26.92 $ 
1990 18 23.19 $ 
1995 27 16.75 $ 
2000 38 27.39 $ 
2005 81 50.04 $ 
2010 120 71.21 $ 
Resource: InflationData.com and Forecast Chart  
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Kuwait’s GDP and oil price increased ten-fold from 1970 to 1980. The GDP was 
$2.9 billion and the average oil price was $3.6 per barrel, which increased to GDP of 
$29 billion dollars and average oil price of $37.42. Due to the war between Iraq and 
Iran in 1985, the GDP of Kuwait declined to $21 billion. However, due to the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the oil price further declined to $23.19, resulting 
in the GDP dropping to $18 billion. However, the GDP and oil price largely 
augmented up to 2010. The GDP reached $120 billion and average oil price reached 
$71.21 at that time. The Central Bank of Kuwait (2007) reported that the oil industry 
covers 94% of the total export merchandise, 88% of the government’s revenue 
budget and 50% of the total GDP. The demand and price of oil depends on the 
world’s political and economic situation. That is why the Kuwaiti government and 
national assembly are endeavouring to decentralize their sources of income. (See 
table 3.1.)  
4.4 The Kuwaiti Capital Market 
The Kuwaiti government perceived the need for shareholding or joint stock 
companies after the unearthing of oil. These are needed to develop the country’s 
infrastructure. That is why it enticed companies to issue shares on the KSE, which 
was formed in 1952. The National Bank of Kuwait was regarded as the first public 
company that traded on that market. The KSE was formed to establish a dependable 
mechanism for financing large investment projects. Nevertheless, it maintains the 
balanced development of both private and public sectors. Thus, it created adequate 
wealth by meeting up investors’ desire. Kuwaiti companies became self-disciplined 
to raise KSE finances. To do so, those companies have to be managed very 
professionally to improve performance according to expectations. The first trade 
occurred on the KSE in 1950 in public cafés and real estate brokerage offices. Both 
of these possessed different prices and quantities to trade. After that, the National 
Bank of Kuwait traded in 1952, the National Cinema Company in 1954, Kuwait 
Airways in 1956, and Kuwait Oil Tankers in 1957. The companies mentioned helped 
to shape the modern Kuwaiti economy (KSE, 2001; CBK, 2005). 
The Kuwaiti government emphasized the employment of all its citizens in 1960. It 
concentrated on augmenting domestic liquidity so that people can accumulate more 
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savings and investments. Due to the high demand for public shareholding companies 
and a large number of Kuwaiti investors, the Kuwaiti government invested in the 
KSE, which gave rise to unofficial brokers and unqualified investors. The first 
Company Law No. 15 was enacted in 1960 by the government with a view to 
regulating new companies. This law was followed, commercial Law No. 27 in 1962. 
According to this law, Kuwaiti companies can be established abroad. However, the 
need for regulating the KSE rose in the last phase of the 1960s. To meet this need, 
Commercial Law No. 32 was enacted in 1970, which regulated stock trading in 
shareholding companies. From 1972, the KSE launched daily reporting on trades 
(ibid.). 
In the Gulf area, the KSE is known as the first and the largest stock exchange. It 
commenced operation in 1962, after gaining independence from the British. But 
share trading started in the country in 1952. The market fell in 1976 due to its prior 
speculative trading in the over-the-counter market. Then restrictions were put on the 
listing of new companies by the government. The government also brought forward 
trade and margin regulations. The KSE was established and stabilised by 1977. Souk 
Al-Manakh
5
 (a parallel stock exchange) was established in 1979, due to the 
prohibition of the government on the formation of public companies. It was a much-
unregulated market in Kuwait, where many Gulf-based companies traded that did not 
meet the official market listing requirements. In 1981, the authorities became relaxed 
on the banning of forward trading; thereafter prices in the official and parallel market 
rose sharply. Until mid-1982, the market price followed an increasing trend. After 
that, the stock market fell and then collapsed. Therefore, the government made a 
number of reforms to augment the efficacy of the stock market. Hassan et al. (2003) 
stated the underlying reforms. Some of the major measures that have been believed 
to be effective for the improved functioning and efficiency of the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange (KSE) can be outlined as:  
 The limit system on price alteration and written auction system that 
relentlessly matches stock transactions.  
                                                 
5
 Al-Manakh is the building’s name. 
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 Official market and parallel market were separated, emphasis on the 
disclosure rules to ensure transparency of the market and the registration of 
brokerage companies and dealers 
 Disclosure rules imposition in regards to ensure the transparency and 
accountability in the market. (p.8) 
After the Al-Manakh Crisis, Kuwaiti government showed negligence toward those 
Gulf companies, as the Al-Manakh market was not based on law. According to the 
government’s belief, every individual is liable for their investment decisions. It could 
not anticipate that the trading on the Al-Manakh market would rise so much, and that 
caused the ultimate problem. In the first phase of 1982, the trading on the Al-Manakh 
market and the KSE surpassed the anticipation of the government. A number of 
investors from other countries were enticed to invest in Kuwait. That is why large 
investors and illegal brokers used this chance to speculate on the share price. As 
there was no requirement to publish financial statements and analyses, so investors 
could not get the pricing information of shares (Al-Yaqout, 2006). 
Four reasons that caused Al-Manakh crisis were traced by Al-Yaqout (2006). Firstly, 
the respective authorities were unsuccessful in enacting laws to control the stock 
markets. Secondly, post-dated cheques were used to solve problems while share 
prices fell very rapidly whenever investors presented the post-dated cheques due to 
the dearth of liquidity. Thus they faced huge losses. Thirdly, financial information 
was not reliable, as there was no control on it. Many companies had submitted 
erroneous reports. The last and foremost reason was that the investors were 
inexperienced and less informed.  
The Kuwait Stock Exchange brought foreign investments successfully after the 
enactment of the Foreign Investment Law on the 10th September 2000. Savings are 
encouraged by foreign investment activities. It entices Kuwaiti citizens to invest in 
securities. Thus, the financial sector of Kuwait has become developed. On the other 
hand, a number of factors hindered the development of the KSE such as small size of 
market makers and foreign ingeniousness and GCC-nationals’ restrictions on ease of 
access to the market. Hassan et al. (2003) argued that the Kuwaiti government 
significantly controls economic movements, unsuitability of short selling, inadequate 
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facilities for securities lending and borrowing, negligence of information disclosures, 
tendency of bankruptcy of companies and non-existence of derivatives.  
The year 2007 was regarded as a successful year for the Kuwait market. A number of 
successes had been achieved in this year, such as neutralization of 23 stocks, and 
declaration of new listing conditions, etc. The prior mentioned developments 
occurred in the first phase of 2007, which occurred after correcting in 2006. 
Nonetheless, the booming trend of the market continued up to the end of 2008. More 
specifically, the great achievement was the reduction of income tax from 55% to 
15%, which was imposed on commercial institutions operating in the country. This 
effort entices a massive amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country. In 
addition to that, the capital market benefitted from an approved bill that exempted 
profit that had been made by foreign companies who trade stocks in the KSE. This 
trading of stocks is made directly or via portfolios and investment funds. Thus, a 
massive amount of portfolio investments can be expected to come via foreign 
institutional investors in the country (CBK, 2008). 
Moreover, the KSE is regarded as the second largest stock exchange in the Arab 
world. In the last phase of 2007, the size of Kuwait’s equity market was $194 billion 
which covers 124% of GDP. Thus, Kuwait became one of the largest budding 
economies in the world in terms of GDP. The notable thing is that the KSE became 
the most effective stock exchange amongst the Arab countries. In the KSE, there are 
191 listed companies, of which 17 are non-Kuwaiti. A quarter of the total listed 
companies are asset management firms and non-bank investment houses (KSE, 
2009). 
4.5 The New Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) 
The government became more aware after the Al-Manakh crisis, when it 
concentrated on regulation of the KSE. In this regard, the KSE was made an 
independent financial institution in August 1983, administered by an executive 
committee. The KSE brought a new trading system in September 1984, which 
offered widespread stocks and derivatives to investors. It consists of 180 companies 
listed in eight sectors. With a view to augmenting the efficacy of the market, it runs 
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independently. Moreover, the Kuwait Clearing Company monitored movements of 
share prices and speculation. Nevertheless, a price unit method was launched to 
control the sharp movement of share prices. It controls the movements up to a 
maximum of five units during a single day. Lastly, to control the forward dealings of 
the market, a committee was formed to set rules. The operation of the KSE was 
stopped after the attack by Iraqi troops in 1990 until September 1992. Due to this 
fact, the KSE operated on a small scale from 1992 to 1994. However, the KSE 
regained its confidence in 1995, from when trading increased until 2002. The trading 
functions soared to the record heights of KD16, 253 million in 2003 and KD28,422 
million in 2005 after the third war (Iraq liberation war).  
The stock market trading in Kuwait was influenced by the global economy, as the 
performance of the KSE is affected by the performance of stock markets of other 
countries, the credit crunch, and the Dubai crisis in 2009; many other corporate 
scandals throughout the world since 2001 have affected the performance of the KSE. 
In addition, volatile political conditions in the Gulf region badly affected the capital 
movements of the KSE (the Iranian-Iraqi War in 1980 and the second Gulf War in 
2003). 
After the Iraq liberation war, the price of oil increased, which enticed the government 
to invest in those projects, which were beyond control at a prior time due to budget 
deficits. The share price index soared to a high of 12.558.9 points in 2007. The 
Kuwaiti Capital Markets Authority was founded, in accordance with Law No. 7 
(2010), which was approved by the Kuwaiti parliament in February 2010. Under the 
law, the authority was granted to the Law Commission to regulate and control the 
activities of securities and realization of the principles of transparency, fairness, 
efficiency, and requiring listed companies to implement corporate governance 
principles and practices to protect investors from unfair and contrary. 
4.6 Market Sectors 
The KSE is segmented into primary (official) and secondary (parallel) markets. The 
regular market is perceived as the equity market. Here, based on price-time priority 
(5 percent of the firm’s capital), sell and buy orders are matched. The ‘small cap’ 
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market is known as the parallel market. It consists of such companies, which have 
less capital or less than three years of continuation. There are seven major sectors of 
firms in the KSE, namely, insurance, real estate, banks, investment, food, industrial 
and services. Total trading volume from 2007 to 2010 is depicted in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2  The total trading volume (Shares)  2007-2010 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Banking 6.86% 5.36% 7.55% 7.39% 
Investment 34.67% 35.14% 33.32% 31.36% 
Insurance 0.13% 0.08% 0.04% 0.12% 
Real Estate 28.60% 21.77% 25.06% 26.42% 
Industrial 7.8% 6% 5.79% 6.93% 
Services 20.4% 30.61% 26.78% 26.67 
Food 1.535 1.05% 1.46% 1.11% 
Total(KD) 65,211,018,500 75,751,678,000 97,914,252,500 68,942,152,500 
Source: Kuwait Stock Exchange 
 
It is shown in table 4.2 that the total trading volume of the seven sectors has 
increased in the KSE to KD 68,942,152,500 from KD 65,211,018,500 between 2007 
and 2010. Within this, the share trading of the banking sector has increased from 
6.86% (2007) to 7.39% (2010), however, it declined in 2008 to 5.36%; the insurance 
sector has negative growth in 2008 and 2009, though it increased in 2009 to 7.55%. 
Though share trading of investment and real estate started at 34.67% and 28.60%, 
respectively, in 2007, they ended up at 31.36% and 26.42%, respectively, in 2010. 
The share trading of the insurance sector has seen a dramatic decline from 2007 to 
2009, 0.13% to 0.04%; the investors have shown confidence on trading of insurance 
shares resulting in it trading at about 0.12% in 2010. It has happened to the industrial 
sector share trading as well, i.e. even though the share trading of this sector was 
7.80% in 2007, it saw a negative trend in 2008 and 2009, at 6% and 5.79%, 
respectively. The share trading flow of services has performed in a steady manner, 
for example, the share trading of the services sector was 20.40% in 2007, ending up 
trading at 26.67% in 2010. The food sector has seen a declining trend of share 
trading during this period, i.e. 1.53% share trading in 2007 has declined to 1.11% in 
2010.  
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4.7 Listing Requirements on the KSE 
To be listed on the KSE, first of all a company has to obtain approval from the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry. Then it has to apply to KSE. However, listing 
requirements vary based on the company’s desire, whether it wants to be listed in the 
Parallel Market or Official (First) Market. Generally, the Parallel market is used to 
trade shares before sending it to the Official market. Those who want to be listed in 
the Official (regular / First) Market have to satisfy eight underlying conditions. (1) 
The firm’s paid-in-capital should be equal to or more than KD10 million. (2) The 
firm’s net shareholder equity should be more than or equal to 115 percent of the 
weighted average of the paid-up capital in each of the last two fiscal years. (3) Profit 
has to be earned in the last two fiscal years, and the yearly net profit should be more 
than or equal to 7.5 percent of the weighted average of the paid-up capital at the end 
of each fiscal year. (4) A number of shareholders should occupy 30 percent of the 
company’s capital, which has been set by the market committee’s scheduled guide, 
according to the book value of the latest fiscal year (KSE, 2009); ownership of the 
company should not be confined to trading units. (5) In the case of a closed 
company, it has to augment its capital up to 50 percent in a single fiscal year in order 
to be listed in the market and the capital augmentation should last for at least one 
fiscal year (KSE, 2009). (6) 25 percent of the paid-up capital has to be kept in the 
clearing chamber for two years from the enlistment date. (7) The company should 
comply with all the listing procedures of the KSE within four months after obtaining 
approval from the committee. If it fails then its enlistment will be considered as void. 
(8) In the case of a closed company, strategic shareholders (shareholders holding 5 
percent or more of a company’s share capital) should possess a minimum of 25 
percent of the shares.  
4.8 The Tax System in Kuwait 
The citizens of Kuwait do not pay income tax, which is a unique characteristic of 
Kuwait’s economy. The Kuwaiti government does not impose any sort of social 
security tax or income tax on local residents or on non-resident workers. The citizen 
pays tax in the form of Zakat. The amount of payable Zakat is determined by 
measuring the net worth of the payers. Zakat is one of the most important 
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fundamentals in Islam and it is regarded as the third pillar of Islam. Zakat can be 
explained as a mechanism by which funds are transferred from the surplus unit to the 
deficit unit of society. Generally, Zakat refers to purification or purity. However, the 
payer pays Zakat to express his worship towards Allah.  
In general, it is thought that the most important reason for paying Zakat is that it 
ensures purity of both body and soul. It is the duty of rich people to help the poor to 
satisfy their needs by paying Zakat. Undoubtedly, Zakat improves and strengthens 
the relationship between the poor and the rich in society. The amount of payable 
Zakat is determined based on the capacity of the payer, which ensures social justice. 
In this aspect, the National Assembly has passed a new law that will determine the 
amount of payable Zakat (according to Islamic shari’ah law) for all the share holding 
companies in Kuwait. Law No 46 of 2006 explained the significance of Zakat and 
shareholding companies and the role of public. The law was issued on November 27, 
2006 in the state budget of Kuwait. All the closed share holding companies and 
public limited companies of Kuwait, except foreign companies and government 
companies, are bound to pay Zakat. Eligible companies will pay Zakat at the end of 
the financial year, which ends in December. Each company is required to pay Zakat 
of one percent of annual net profit. Each company is bound to pay Zakat if they do 
not have any outstanding obligation and the company is growing year after year.  
4.9 Corporate Financial Reporting and Regulation in Kuwait 
The Kuwait government evaluates and justifies the financial reporting of the 
companies in order to protect the interests of investors and other financial report 
users. The KSE and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issue most of the 
regulatory laws for listed companies in Kuwait. Some of the important laws are 
Ministerial Resolution No. 18 (1990), the Stock Exchange Law (1983) and its 
amendments, and Company Law No. 15 (1960) and its amendments. According to 
Company Law No. 15, companies must maintain a record of their activities. It is the 
duty of each of the board of directors to prepare a profit loss statement and balance 
sheet which will represent the accurate financial position of the company. The report 
must be presented to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry within three months 
after the end of the financial year. At least two registered auditors will audit all the 
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financial statements. Financial statements must be distributed among the 
shareholders. However, the law did not specify what sort of accounting principles 
should be maintained in preparing financial statements.  
According to the Stock Exchange Law of 1983 and its amendments, to be listed on 
the KSE, companies must follow certain accounting standards. Companies must 
publish audited annual report of the last two years that will present satisfactory 
financial structure and operating profit. It is the sole discretion of the KSE authority 
to implement any additional requirements that are necessary to be listed on the KSE. 
It is obligatory for each of the companies to present audited financial reports of profit 
loss statements and balance sheet to the KSE. Companies submit interim and 
quarterly statements within two months of the end of the fiscal year and profit loss 
statements and balance sheet within three months after the end of the fiscal year. All 
the listed companies on the KSE are required to follow accounting rules and 
regulations of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Otherwise, be de-listed or 
ceased. However, the law did not specify any definite standard that should be 
followed in preparing financial reports.  
Neither the Stock Exchange Law of 1983 nor Company Law No. 15 dictates any 
specific accounting standard. To develop information disclosure, the Ministerial 
Resolution No. 18 of 1990 was implemented. It is obligatory for all companies that 
conduct business in Kuwait to maintain International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs). The Kuwait Accounting and Auditing Association started its operation in 
1973, which is regarded as the only professional association. The association has no 
authority to enforce compliance or to control professions; rather the government has 
requested the association to provide advice to all companies. Most of the activities of 
this association are confined to conducting courses in financial statement analysis 
and accounting standards.  
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4.10 Corporate Governance in Kuwait  
4.10.1 Characteristics of the board of directors 
According to Article 90, the establishment of the board of directors will be by the 
founding members of the company who hold a large portion share of the company, 
because Kuwaiti companies are closely held. Company members are elected by the 
vote of shareholders at the general meeting. The ultimate duty of the board is to 
ensure that the company is complies with the articles of association and most of the 
structure of the board is single tier.  
According to Articles 138 and 141 of Kuwait’s Company Law, each company must 
elect at least three directors for the next three years through ballot voting of the 
shareholders. The duration of the selected directors is renewable. The directors of a 
listed company must be qualified enough, must not have any connection with 
criminal or fraudulent activities and must not breach the trust or honour of the 
company. Article 139 says that the worth of share of directors must be at least 
KD7,500 or £15,000. Directors must deposit this share within 30 days after 
appointment into the company, and will not be able to withdraw this portion until his 
term is ended. Article 139 also says that if the value of the shares goes below KD 
7,500, directors will lose their position.  
No individual can be director of more than three companies. Any individual director 
cannot be appointed as a chairman or managing director if he is already appointed as 
such in other organisations. However, no directors can sell his share as long he is 
holding a position in the company. Without further approval of the general assembly, 
no director can expose company decisions or secrets (Article 140). According to 
Article 142, any director (governmental, institutional or individual) can appoint a 
representative on his own behalf to the board. According to Article 43, if any board 
director resigns his position, the largest shareholder will take responsibility for that 
position.  
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Board members must meet four times each year. According to Article 144, in each 
meeting at least fifty percent of the directors, including three directors, must be 
present. According to Article 145, board members must elect one or more managing 
directors for the company who will be the core representatives of the company; at the 
same time directors must select one chairman and deputy chairman through secret 
ballot voting. The board has the authority to operate the company according to 
general assembly resolution, articles of association and company law. According to 
Article 146, the power of the board of directors is limited in the perspectives of 
sanctioning loans, selling company property, giving guarantees to third parties and 
discharging borrowers from paying their liabilities. 
The chairman is regarded as the president of the company. The chairman is 
responsible for operating board resolutions and he has the authority to represent the 
company as well as to sign representing the company. According to Article 147, the 
deputy chairman will represent the company in the absence of the chairman. Articles 
148 and 149 say that the board members as well the chairman are jointly responsible 
to the shareholders, company, stakeholders and to all concerned parties for each law 
violation, fraudulent activity and misappropriation and misuse of the company’s 
articles of association. The board distributes the authority to conduct regular 
operation to the concerned authority. The board holds the power of decision-making 
in the aspects of new investment, dividends and write-offs. 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) are also regarded as company directors, but they do 
not take part in the day-to-day activities of management like executive directors. 
NEDs are members of the company’s board. Thus, NEDs also participate in board 
meetings. Though Kuwaiti law does not indicate any significant differences between 
non-executive and executive directors, it always permits the directors to donate their 
time for the welfare of the management as well as of the company. NEDs are usually 
appointed from high government officials who support the company in many 
problematic situations, and also help to obtain any kind of government permission. 
NEDs are usually appointed from rich and influential families of Kuwaiti society. 
Though some NEDs are appointed on the basis of their qualifications, nevertheless 
personal relationship and connection with officials are very important. To get any 
type of independent opinion, companies usually go outside the firms. Consequently, 
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in most of the listed companies in the KSE, the NEDs cannot act properly either for 
the minority shareholder or for the executive shareholders, rather they simply discuss 
and suggest different plans and ideas; thus, NEDs should hold at least a few shares of 
the company. According to the Kuwaiti Company Law, there is no article which 
obliges companies to establish audit, nomination or compensation committees; 
however, some companies have established some committees, but these cannot be 
considered as corporate governance mechanisms, which are not provided for in the 
Commercial Law. 
4.10.2 The rights of shareholders  
Company shareholders do not take part in the regular operation of the company. 
Rather, they perform certain supervisory functions, such as appointing and removing 
auditors and directors, attending the general assembly, approving the annual financial 
statement and collecting financial information. Kuwaiti laws support shareholders to 
protect their rights, to assist in registration, to enforce rights and to transfer 
ownership. According to Articles 131 and 132, all the shareholders have an equal 
amount of rights as well as liabilities in the aspects of receiving annual financial 
reports, purchasing new shares, disposing of shares, accessing the company’s 
registers, filing an action, participating in general meetings and management, 
receiving shares in the company’s property at liquidation and receiving dividends. 
The common shareholders or the ordinary shareholders have the right to vote in the 
extraordinary or general meetings.  
According to KSE listing requirements and the Company Law of Kuwait, it is 
mandatory for all listed companies to arrange an annual general assembly. If the 
company fails to comply with this requirement, it will be de-listed from the KSE. 
The board will prepare the agenda of the meeting and the directors will decide the 
location and time of assembly. However, the shareholders, directors and government 
have the right to arrange any special meeting in addition to the general assembly in 
case of urgency. The agenda as well as notice of the meeting must be published at 
least 15 days prior to the date of the meeting and in at least two Arabic daily 
newspapers. The shareholders can receive a copy of the report of the board of 
directors, the auditor’s report and the financial statement of the period. 
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The management of a company has to consider the demands of the shareholders, 
which are raised at the general meeting. If half of the shareholders are not present in 
the general meeting then it will not be considered as a valid one. Without showing 
any cause, the board can call another meeting if the quorum is not fulfilled. 
According to Article 154, to be counted as a representative of the meeting and as a 
voter the shareholders have to collect an invitation card. In Article 155, it is said that 
anyone can cast a vote at the meeting if they have the card whether they are 
shareholders or not. Vote per share is the basis for casting votes for making laws of 
the company, and the majority will be granted in case of making any decision. On the 
other hand, the number of votes cast on a given issue can be counted where a person 
may cast his vote according to the number of his shares if there is a pole system. In 
this system, the large share holder can affect the decision regarding his investment. 
At the general meeting, the chairman counts the raised-hands vote. According to 
Article 157, the following issues may be included in the general meeting: 
1. Financial position and annual report of the company 
2. Evaluation of financial and annual report based on auditor’s report for future 
planning of the company 
3. Allocation of profit, dividend, and approval of financial statement 
4. Making decision on bonus, appointing an auditor and his/her fees and electing 
board members 
5. Making decisions on issuing guarantees, bonds, mortgaging or borrowing and 
relieve directors from liability 
6. Any issues raised by at least 10% shareholders who are interested about the 
issues must be discussed. 
According to Article 133, it is not possible for the general meeting to sue against 
directors of the company, to constrain the rights of shareholders, to reduce the profit 
distribution percentage or to increase the financial liability of shareholders. Article 
134 suggested that a register should be kept for recording the sales volume of shares, 
the number of shareholders and members in details with amount paid for shares by 
individuals. Article 158 refers to some particular situations, such as merger with 
another company, to set up whole company activities, to amend the memorandum 
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and articles of the company and to increase or decrease company capital, on which 
the general meeting can share opinions. 
It is possible to remove the directors from the company before their expiry by setting 
up an extraordinary meeting when shareholders having more than 25 percent shares 
want to do so. In Article 159, it is recommended that the board is bound to arrange 
the meeting within 30 days after the proposal of the shareholders. But the meeting 
will not be lawful if no representative of the rest share capital attends. Again, 
according to the Article 160, the board has the right to arrange a second meeting if 
the first one fails to meet the quorum. In addition, this time any one of the 50% 
shareholders must attend the meeting to make the meeting successful. The dividend 
is the main concern for shareholders. According to company law, the dividend is 
usually declared in the annual general meeting of the company. Directors usually 
declare the amount of dividends. According to Article 167, if the company fails to 
earn satisfactory profit in any year, the dividend will be given from the statutory 
reserve of the company.  
4.10.3 Disclosure and auditing 
Shareholders put greater concern on the disclosure policy of the company. Usually, 
there are two sources available for disclosure such as the regulation of the KSE for 
listed companies and company law. As mentioned earlier, companies usually 
disclose information at the general meeting, such as director’s remuneration, 
shareholder’s register and company’s agenda. According to Article 191/4 and 93, 
each of the shareholders has the right to receive the balance sheet, profit and loss 
statements of the year, official gazette and a list of the board of directors.  
According to Article 161/11, all listed companies must appoint auditors who will be 
present at the general meeting and they will audit all the financial statements for the 
coming years. In order to ensure independence of the auditor, Kuwaiti law strongly 
prohibits any servant or officer of the company from being an auditor. Apart from 
this, none of the auditors can be a partner of the company; nor can they be an 
employee of the company; nor can they offer consultancy services to the company 
(Article 162). It is the power of the auditor to audit any and all types of books and 
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documents, including the financial statement. According to Article 163, auditors will 
report to the shareholders about the accuracy of the financial statements and reports 
that have been examined; at the same time, they will also comment on the income 
statements and balance sheets that have been presented at the general meeting.  
Moreover, after auditing the financial statements, the auditor will certify that from 
the explanation and based on their knowledge the financial statements are fairly 
presented without material mistake. Auditors will also certify that financial 
statements possess all types of information that are very essential for the concerned 
parties, and that they comply with regulatory requirements. The role of auditors is 
very significant for all concerned parties. The laws do not suggest the board to 
maintain an external auditor to observe the operation of external auditors. According 
to Article 164, auditors must report to the shareholders on the following facts: 
1. Whether the auditors have got all sorts of cooperation and information to 
carry on audit independently 
2. Whether company maintain proper records of their activities 
3. When the book of accounts depicts the real picture of profit loss statement 
and balance sheet 
4. Whether the books of accounts are prepared in accordance with director’s 
report 
5. Any violation of the articles of association or violation of company law 
6. Whether there are any fraudulent activities or breach of contract between 
Shareholders and auditors. 
Generally, the shareholders put greater importance on the audit report and director’s 
report because these reports contain information regarding company business, future 
plans, employment and financial position. According to Article 131/4, shareholders 
must collect all these reports. According to Article 151, shareholders have the right 
to know about the decisions of board and company. The board members cannot enter 
into any type of contract with the company without approval of the shareholders. The 
board will act to protect the interest of the shareholders. The KSE also bound 
companies to disclose information. Investors receive more and more information 
because of regulatory requirements. Listed firms must submit any type of statements 
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to the KSE on their demand. According to Article 15, the KSE control unit must keep 
all records of shareholders. According to Law No 2 (1999), the company must report 
to the KSE regarding those shareholders who have more than five percent share in 
the company.  
4.11 Conclusion 
After reviewing the Kuwaiti market, laws and regulations governing the market and 
some of the corporate governance mechanisms, the following key factors may be 
concluded: 
1 The capital market of Kuwait is not highly liquid and it is dominated by a small 
number of firms; at the same time trading volume is not significant. The equity 
market is not well improved. It has thin trading, and noisy stock price. Firms do not 
maintain a high disclosure policy. 
2 In Kuwait, the practice of good corporate governance has not properly developed 
yet due to lack of dispersed ownership. For example, Kuwaiti companies exhibit very 
few outside directors, high takeover attempts, equity based incentives for 
management and an absence of proxy fights.  
3 Company law does not suggest the board to maintain an audit committee that will 
observe the functions of external auditors.  
4 The founding members of any company highly control and dominate the 
corporate world. They influence the decision of management by imposing their 
representative on the management or on the board. Family members and owners are 
dominant on the board of any company. According to Al-Shammari (2003), internal 
information of the company is available to these groups. Omet (2005) reported that 
family owned private companies control the capital market of Kuwait and few state-
owned companies and the total number of large listed companies is very few. 
5 The chairman, the CEO and the board members are not well organised. In the 
majority, the chairman plays the role of CEO. 
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Though the market of Kuwait is safe and regulated through certain legislative bodies, 
they still have not developed a comprehensive structure for the security market. 
Therefore, no definite regulation can support companies to develop disclosure. Some 
of the relevant laws are: the new Kuwait Capital Markets Law (KCML), the rules 
and regulations of the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) for banks and investment 
companies, the Kuwait Commercial Companies Law (CCL) and the listing rules of 
the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) for listed companies. Thus, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) advised the introduction of a new, distinctive, independent and 
single law that would regulate the operation of the capital market of Kuwait. This 
law would develop a regulatory body that would solely supervise the function of the 
capital market. In order to introduce a capital market authority, the government 
recently passed Law No. 7 of 2010. The new capital market law works to protect the 
interest of the minority as well as of the majority shareholders. It compels the listed 
companies to practise the code of corporate governance. According to the new law of 
the capital market, the managers of listed companies are bound to disclose their 
ownership percentage in the company concerned. The capital market authority 
compiles all the segregate issues of capital market and put it in a unique system.  
To sum up, disclosure practice in Kuwait is not developed to the standard 
international practice and it is still practiced in a scattered manner. The laws usually 
cover the general concepts of disclosure, which are related to transparency, and 
accountability of the board to the Kuwaiti Stock Commission (KSC). Moreover, the 
practice of general concepts cannot ensure the highest standard of disclosure 
practice. Thus, Kuwaiti companies should follow the practice of the GCC, because 
they have made tremendous improvement in practising standard forms of corporate 
governance. 
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Chapter 5: Hypotheses 
5.1 Introduction 
The empirical study aims at quantitatively examining LVD practices and their 
association with CG mechanisms, ownership structure and firm characteristics in the 
annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies. In previous chapters, the theoretical 
framework was reviewed, in chapter 2, reviewing the importance of LVD, definitions 
of LVD and motivations that induce companies to disclose information to public, in 
addition, reviewing definitions of CG and the effect of CG mechanisms, ownership 
structure and firm characteristics on LVD. In chapter 3, the theories used in this work 
to explain LVD practices were reviewed, as well as previous studies on LVD in 
developed and developing countries. In chapter 4, an overview of the Kuwaiti 
business environment was provided. 
The third objective of this study is to find whether there are statistically significant 
relationships between LVD and its categories with the CG mechanisms, ownership 
structure and firm characteristics. In the following sections, each factor is reviewed 
through previous studies to provide their impact on LVD in order to build the 
hypotheses used to achieve the third objective. 
5.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
CG mechanisms affect LVD for the annual report. According to previous disclosure 
studies, many scholars have investigated the influence of CG on disclosure through a 
variety of variables. NEDs, board audit committee, board size, role duality and audit 
firm have been examined, such as in Leung and Horwitz (2004), Barako (2007), 
Kent and Stewart (2008), Samaha (2010), Rouf (2011), Mohamad and Sulong 
(2010), Uyar et al. (2013) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013). The following sections shed 
light on these mechanisms. 
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5.2.1 Non-executive directors  
There is a strong belief in the business environment that the existence of NEDs 
(outsiders) on the board of directors is an internal mechanism to help the board of 
directors with observation and monitoring of the activities and behaviour of top 
management (Stapledon and Lawrence, 1997). Hanson and Song (1998) pointed out 
that a board of directors that includes NEDs (outsiders) is only suitable to monitor 
the performance and action of the firm’s management. The increased presence of 
NEDs (outsiders) increases the independence of the board, and subsequently 
increases disclosure. 
By empirical evidence from prior studies, NEDs (outsiders) play a more important 
role than the executive directors (insiders) in maximising shareholders’ wealth, but 
executive directors (insiders) can give more to a firm through their knowledge and 
skills than outside directors. At the same time, NEDs (outsiders) are necessary to 
supply independent opinion, on matters such as executive director appointments, pay 
awards and lay-offs when they deal with the executive directors (insiders). As such, 
effective management should have independent directors, which means a board 
consisting of NEDs (outsiders) (Mohamad and Sulong, 2010). 
However, the executive directors (insiders) have experience and are knowledgeable 
about the firm’s operations; they have an intimate knowledge of what is happening in 
the firm. The firm needs executive directors to set up its strategic planning and make 
decisions (Bhagat and Black, 1999). Concerning financial reporting, outside directors 
may persuade firms to disclose more financial and non-financial information to 
stakeholders. A board dominated by outside directors is less likely to suffer the 
issuance of any financial statement that includes any fraud (Beasley, 1996). Forker 
(1992) also argues that, because NEDs have fewer relations with the management, 
this will push the management to disclose more data to shareholders. 
In the USA, Beasley (1996) analysed 75 fraud and 75 no-fraud firms. He found that 
financial statement fraud was less when the board had a high proportion of NEDs, 
because the appointment of outside directors to the board of directors increases the 
ability and power of the board to observe and monitor activities of top management 
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from any fraud and errors. In this state, companies are able to issue the annual report 
without fraud and errors. Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) found that companies with a 
larger proportion of independent NEDs on their board may expect more disclosure. 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) tested the effect of various variables on level of 
disclosure (size, gearing, profitability, ownership structure and independence of 
directors on the board of directors) in 175 listed companies in Italy. They provide 
evidence of a positive association between LVD in corporate annual reports and the 
proportion of NEDs on the board of directors. In addition, they reported that board 
composition is one of the many factors that can reduce agency conflicts inside the 
firm. Cotter and Silvester (2003) concluded that Australian companies obtain benefit 
from a board of directors that includes NEDs on the board.  
In a similar vein, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found a significant positive 
association between a high proportion of independent directors and level of 
disclosure in the annual report in Singapore. In Hong Kong, Chen and Jaggi (2002) 
found, when they examined the relationship between independent directors and level 
of disclosure, a positive relationship. These results agree with agency theory, which 
predicts that a higher proportion of independent directors will increase LVD (Barako 
et al. 2006).  
On the other hand, some literature found a negative association between NEDs and 
LVD. Eng and Mak (2003) examine the impact of ownership structure and board 
composition on LVD in the annual reports of 158 Singapore listed firms; their study 
has been extended to address the effects of firm size, gearing, industry type, 
reputation of the auditor of the firm, number of analysts following the firm, and stock 
price. Although NEDs have greater representation on the board of Singapore firms 
(average=57%), the researchers found a negative association between NEDs and 
LVD because NEDs are elected by blockholders to represent their interests and may 
be able to obtain information directly, rather than through other public disclosure 
channels. 
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In Hong Kong, Gul and Leung (2004) tested the relationship between NEDs and 
LVD in 385 listed companies for 1996. They found a negative association between 
LVD and the proportion of NEDs (expert) on the board. That study used 1996 data, 
to test the relationship between CG variables and LVD. This was, however, one year 
before the Asian Financial Crisis in July 1997; after 1997, many rules and legislation 
were issued by Hong Kong authorities, for example, CG requirements and 
accounting standards by the Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants (HKSA). 
In contrast, some of the literature shows that NEDs do not have any effect on LVD. 
For example, Ho and Wong (2001), for Hong Kong listed companies, examined the 
relationship between four major CG attributes (independence of NEDs on the board, 
audit committee, dominant personalities (CEO/ chairman duality) and the percentage 
presence of family members on the board) on LVD; they used a weighted related 
disclosure index to measure LVD. They cannot provide any significant relationship 
between board independence and LVD. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) investigated whether CG and personal attributes, in 
addition to company-specific characteristics, are possible determinants of LVD in 
Malaysia, where they found no relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and LVD. In addition, Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir (2004) failed to find a 
significant influence of the existence of independent directors on LVD. 
In Kuwait, there are no laws or regulations to organise the structure of the board of 
directors in Kuwaiti listed companies
6
, which allows any company to organise its 
board according to its vision. However, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) found 
the average of NEDs is 0.82; their sample was 170 companies listed in 2007. That 
percentage shows Kuwaiti companies listed are interested to appoint NEDs to their 
board of directors. 
                                                 
6
 The first rule of principle (1-1) of corporate governance rules that issued in 2013 and the Article No. 
(218) of Legislative Decree No (25) for the year 2012 on the issuance of the Companies Act, as 
amended, provides that “should be the majority of the Board of Directors of the non-executive 
members...” 
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Thus, NEDs (measured by the proportion of outside directors on the board) may be 
expected to be positively related with LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies. The task of 
board of directors is to observe and monitor activities of the top a firm’s management 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Stapledon and Lawrence (1997) and Hanson 
and Song (1998) observed that if the company has a higher proportion of NEDs on 
the board it will increase the level of monitoring and observation of the operation and 
activities of a firm’s management and will restrict directors’ opportunism. NEDs will 
encourage the management to disclose more information to other parties. 
Since the prior literature indicated mixed evidence about the relationship between 
NEDs and LVD. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H1. There is an association between the non-executive directors and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
5.2.2 Board size 
The value of a company may be affected by board size, through the role that the 
board plays in monitoring and observation on the firm’s activities; besides the role of 
the board to monitor managerial performance, the board reduces opportunistic 
behaviour and enhances financial disclosures. With respect to board size, it is one of 
the independent factors employed in previous literature to investigate the relationship 
with LVD. The total number of members sitting on each company board measures 
board size. In accordance with the law, any company should have a board consisting 
of one or more members. Some scholars mention that increased board size may 
increase the expertise diversity on the board, including financial reporting expertise; 
the board of public firms should consist of not less than three members (Eisenberg et 
al., 1998).  
Board size is considered as one of many factors which may influence LVD. 
However, previous studies have shown that a small board is more efficient, dynamic 
and functional than a large board. Chen and Jaggi (2000) argued that information 
asymmetry might decrease with a large number of directors on the board. The ability 
to encourage higher LVD is affected by the size of the board (Zahra et al., 2000). 
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Daily and Dalton (1992) indicated board size is a main factor of board structure; it 
has stirred debate concerning board size by scientists. During the last 50 years, there 
was a belief regarding board size: the early literature indicated that the average board 
size is between 12 and 14 (Gordon, 1945), while Chaganti et al. (1985) reported that 
board size ranges from 5 or 6 members to 30 plus members. Board size is different 
from country to country, depending on the laws and legislation of each country. The 
duties of the board of directors, as the top-level management body in a company, are 
formulating policies, monitoring and strategizing, and this may influence LVD, 
according to the size of the board. Jensen (1993) warned that the board of directors’ 
work with eight directors or more may face difficulties to monitor the firm’s work; 
also the board is unlikely to function effectively. Kim and Nofsinger (2007) 
suggested a board with fewer directors might be a better board. In addition, Yermack 
(1996) reported that a larger board size was believed to lead to a worse performance 
and that decision-making was less efficient. In Kuwait, according to the Company 
Law No. 15 of 1960 and its amendments, the number of directors on the board 
should be no less than three, and there is no maximum number of directors (Article 
183).  
In order to reducing opportunistic behaviour of directors, Lauenstein (1977) pointed 
out that the firm with large board size led to avoiding adopting decisions by the 
board and reduced individual commitment by directors. Singh and Harianto (1989) 
mentioned in their search for the size of the board that it plays an active role in 
deterring opportunistic behaviour of directors, such as any actions against 
shareholders’ interests; and whenever the size of the board is large that it led to more 
deterrence that is effective. 
However, some previous studies found a negative association between board size and 
level of disclosure, such as Parsa et al. (2007), Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013) and 
Damagum and Chima (2013). However, some studies found a positive association 
between board size and LVD, for example, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) and Al-
Janadi et al. (2013). In addition, some others found insignificant association between 
board size and LVD, such as Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Hasan et al. (2013) and Uyar et al. (2013). 
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In the Kuwaiti business environment, the legislator indicates that the minimum of the 
board size should at least have three members but there is no maximum limit of the 
board size
7
. Although previous disclosure studies focused on the relationship 
between board size and the extent of disclosure, there is no certain theory to explain 
this relationship; also the results were mixed. This researcher would expect board 
size, measured by the total number of members (executive and non-executive) sitting 
on each company board, to be negatively related with LVD in Kuwaiti listed 
companies, since the previous literature pointed out mixed evidence about the 
relationship between board size and LVD. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H2. There is a negative association between the board size and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
5.2.3 Role duality 
Some researchers consider duality have many advantages for a company, for 
example, Pfeffer and Salancik (1977) argued that duality between chairman and chief 
executive officer will increase corporate awareness and ability to save its vital 
resources. Anderson and Anthony (1986) indicated duality let a company focus on its 
objectives and goals, and improved the level of operations. Another advantage of 
duality is its ability to remove any kind of confusion, misunderstanding or conflict 
between chairman and chief executive officer. Thus, it provides a safe and suitable 
environment for more effective and smooth of decision-making in a company. Boyd 
(1995) shed light on the effect of duality through the concept of stewardship 
behaviour; he found the dual leadership structure in environments characterized by 
scarce resources and complexity has a positive impact on firm value.  
Donaldson and Davis (1991) pointed out through stewardship theory about the 
duality between chairman and CEO, “The executive manager, under this theory, far 
from being an opportunistic shirker, essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good 
steward of the corporate assets” (p.51). That indicates duality will add value to the 
company. Davis et al. (1997) mentioned that in the case of duality between the CEO 
and chairman of the board, it will increase the ability of the company to maximise 
                                                 
7 
The minimum of the board size should at least have five members; this article has been modified 
according to the provisions of the Companies Act No. 25/2012. 
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corporate value, and thus reflect on shareholders interest better than in the case of 
separate CEO and chairman.  
Nevertheless, the evidence from previous LVD studies is mixed. Some of them 
found negative association and others positive association; also, there are many 
which found no evidence to choose between duality and LVD. For example, Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006) examined the relationship in 104 firms listed on the Singapore 
Stock Exchange (SGX) in the year 2000; they found no relationship between CEO 
duality and LVD. In addition, Ho and Wong (2001), in a study of the association 
between CEO duality and LVD in Hong Kong’s listed firms, pointed out that there 
was no significant relationship between CEO duality and level of disclosure.  
A number of studies in many countries around the world found no evidence of role 
duality having an effect on LVD, for example, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) in Spain; 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) in Singapore; and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in 
Malaysia. However, Forker (1992), Haniffa and Cooke (2002) Gul and Leung 
(2004), Xiao and Yuan (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Laksmana (2008), Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) found negative 
significant association between role duality and level of disclosure. However, Rouf 
(2011) found a positive significant relationship between dual leadership structure and 
disclosure.  
It is important to note that Kuwaiti company law does not prevent duality in Kuwaiti 
companies, which encourages Kuwaiti companies to combine two positions, 
chairman and CEO, in one person. However, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) 
found 57% of Kuwaiti listed companies in 2007 have role duality, although in 
Kuwait there are no obligatory laws for the separation of roles between chairman and 
CEO
8
. This researcher would conclude that separation between chairman and CEO 
will increase LVD for listed companies in Kuwait, Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H3. There is a positive association between the role duality and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
                                                 
8
 The rules of corporate governance issued in 2013, according the principle (1-1) refers to" May not 
combine the post of Chairman of the Board and CEO" 
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5.2.4 Audit committee 
Mallin (2004) mentioned that any board of directors may set up a number of 
committees and distribute some activities, duties and responsibilities to these 
committees; in return these committees should submit a detailed report about their 
activities and works to the board of directors, although this does not relieve the board 
of directors of the responsibility for these committees. Ho and Wong (2001) argued 
that the presence of an audit committee has an influence over the magnitude of 
corporate disclosure. In the UK, the combined code (2006) recommends three types 
of committees that board of directors should have, audit committees; remuneration 
committees; and nomination committees. In addition, the board of directors may 
establish other types of committee, which it considers necessary for the proper 
functioning and supervision according to companies’ circumstances. 
Thus, audit committees will influence the board to reduce information asymmetry 
and have a role in effective CG. Forker (1992) regarded the audit committee as a tool 
to improve disclosure and reduce agency conflict, and it is one of the most effective 
oversight mechanisms. Therefore, if audit committees have a large proportion of 
independent outside directors who have financial backgrounds, and experience and 
training to understand their duties, it expects that this will enhance the oversight 
process. Furthermore, Kala (2001) reported the audit committee has a role to support 
top management in supervision and to ensure the functioning of the internal controls 
and enhance their effectiveness. 
Scholars and regulators assert that audit committees should only consist of NEDs or 
independent directors to give a higher degree of active supervision (Dechow et al., 
1996; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Abbott et al., 2004). Persons (2005) provided proof 
to support the view that independent audit committees associate positively with the 
financial reporting process and asserted that the audit committee should consist of 
independent directors to show that the financial statement has a low level of fraud. In 
addition, Beasley (1996) showed that the audit committee, which has a high 
percentage of independent outside members, would lower financial statement fraud. 
Both McMullen (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) found evidence that committal of 
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financial statement fraud is high in companies that do not include an audit 
committee. 
Prior research provides a positive association between the presence of an audit 
committee and corporate disclosure (Wright, 1996; Ho and Wong, 2001; McMullen, 
1996; Samah, 2010). Wright (1996) found that an audit committee is robustly related 
to the financial statement. Ho and Wong (2001) and Bliss and Balachandran (2003) 
argued that an audit committee was positively associated with LVD. Therefore, Song 
and Widram (2004) pointed out that one of the characteristics of the audit 
committee’s functions is a final guarantee to approving financial reporting before 
release to stakeholders. 
Rouf (2011) found, when he examined the linkages between company 
characteristics, governance attributes and the extent of LVD in Bangladesh, based on 
a sample of 120 listed non-financial companies on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
in 2007, a positive association between LVD for firms that had an audit committee. 
Furthermore, in Kenya, in the developing countries context, Barako et al. (2006) 
examined the relationship between the presence of the audit committee in Kenya and 
LVD by using a weighted disclosure index. He found a significant positive 
association between the presence of an audit committee and LVD. 
However Abbott et al. (2004) found a negative relation between audit committee 
independence and the financial reporting statement. Forker (1992) also found no 
significant relationship between the existence of an audit committee and disclosure. 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) found the audit committee has no impact on LVD. In 
addition, Kent and Stewart (2008) stated: 
“That company with smaller audit committees and, surprisingly, those with a 
smaller proportion of members with accounting and finance expertise, also 
have a higher level of disclosure in Australian companies” (p.651). 
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Kuwaiti law and legislation do not mention the issue of establishing audit 
committees in Kuwaiti listed companies
9
. However, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 
(2010) found 48% of the Kuwaiti companies listed in 2007 have an audit committee, 
which means Kuwaiti companies are interested in establishing audit committees on 
their board. This researcher would expect audit committees with a large proportion of 
independent outside directors to release more finance information about the real 
finance position of the company and increase LVD. Although there is no legislation 
in Kuwait forcing Kuwaiti listed companies to adopt or establish the audit committee 
Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H4. There is a positive association between the audit committee and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies.  
5.2.5 Audit firm  
Previous research found there is association between level of disclosure and type of 
auditor (Samaha and Stapleton, 2009). Zalan et al. (2013) indicated that companies 
audited by big audit firms have higher quality than other companies audited by small 
audit firms. Chung et al. (2003) indicated the importance of appointment of an 
independent external auditor due to the large role of the independent external auditor 
to reduce managerial opportunism. Hasan et al. (2013) stated:  
“The external audit can be an effective control mechanism to monitor the 
managers and guarantee the integrity of financial reports”. (p.112) 
From an agency theoretical background, Adelopo (2011) indicated auditing by a big 
audit firm is considered like certification by the auditors to reduce agency costs, 
because it enhances the perception of credibility of the annual reports, since the big 
audit firm has the best hands and more experience. In addition, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) indicated that an audit firm might affect the company to release 
more information in order to reduce possible litigation costs. 
                                                 
9
 The second rule of principle (2-2) of corporate governance rules that issued in 2013 and the Article 
No. (216) of Legislative Decree No (25) for the year 2012 on the issuance of the Companies Act, as 
amended, provide that “ The Board may authorize one of its members or a committee from among its 
members or any of the others to do the work of one or more specific or supervision of the facet 
Activity of the company or in the exercise of certain powers or competences assigned to the board " 
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Murcia and Santos (2012) expected that firms audited by big audit firm such as 
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and Ernst & Young, 
may release more information than firms audited by other auditing firms. Also, 
Becker et al. (1998) indicated that many scholars found that financial information of 
companies audited by a big audit firm is more reliable than firms audited by other 
auditing firms. 
Previous studies investigated the relationship between audit firm size and level of 
disclosure. (for example, Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Naser et al., 2002; Al-
Janadi et al., 2013; Uyar et al., 2011, 2013;  Hasan et al., 2013) they found 
significant positive association with level of disclosure, while Forker (1992), 
Wallace et al. (1994), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), and Chau and Gray (2010) found 
insignificant association. However, Wallace and Naser (1995) found a negative 
relationship between audit firm size and disclosure level. 
In Kuwait, several local auditing firms have collaborated with the big audit firms; 
also, Kuwaiti law does not mention that Kuwaiti companies listed should be audited 
from one of the big audit firms. However, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) found 
63% of the Kuwaiti companies listed in 2007 have been audited from one of the big 
audit firms. Although there are some audit firms in Kuwait that have international 
links with the big firm audits, there are no obligatory laws for firms to be audited by 
a big audit firm or limits to the number of audit firms which should be auditing 
Kuwaiti listed companies. Therefore, some Kuwaiti companies are audited by one or 
two local audit firms or by one or two audit firms that have international links with 
the big audit firm or mixed between the two types. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H5. There is positive association between the audit firm and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
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5.3 Ownership Structure 
A firm’s ownership structure is considered as one of the independent variables in this 
study, which may be determinant of LVD. In the modern corporate entity, there is 
noticeable separation of ownership and management, which makes investors increase 
their monitoring of the decisions and performance of management in order to protect 
their interests in firm; information produced by these companies is considered feeds 
for this monitoring process (Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Through the 
agency theory context, characterized by the separation of ownership and control, the 
usefulness of corporate information to any investor can be understood because any 
investor can use the annual report of the firm, which comprises both financial and 
non-financial information, in order to monitor the performance and procedures of 
management and for creating investment decisions. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship thus: 
“As a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (p.5) 
In this condition, the separation of ownership (principal) from agent (management) 
not only has clear benefits, but can also lead to increasing disputes between them. A 
conflict of interest can arise between the principal and agent, owing to the separation 
of ownership and control. Arnold and de Lange (2004) referred to the appearance of 
information asymmetry when the agent has superior access to information than the 
principal. In addition, Morris (1987) said, in this condition, the principals could not 
control the agent’s actions because of separation of ownership and control, thereby 
resulting in a conflict of interest. An underlying assumption in this section of this 
study is that agents disclosing more voluntary disclosures are acting in the interest of 
stakeholders who are expected to gain advantage from increased disclosures (Lev, 
1992; Botosan, 1997). Gray et al. (1996) pointed out that each company must 
provide information to anyone who has direct or indirect interest with it, according to 
the normative perspective of the accountability model, because it is the responsibility 
of the company to disclose information. 
 
 
104 
 
Jalila and Devi (2012) indicated the importance of the formation of ownership in two 
forms ownership concentration and ownership diffuse. They stated: 
“The effect of the ownership structure on financial reporting aspects, including 
disclosures, has been discussed by many researchers. Among the issues raised 
is the effect associated with the concentrated ownership versus the non – 
concentrated ownership either in developed or developing countries” (p.248) 
To highlight the influence of ownership structure in many accounting areas, some 
previous studies used two forms of ownership structure; ownership concentration and 
ownership diffuse ( For example, Wang, 2006 and Hashim and Devi, 2008) they 
used this format to discuss the effect of ownership on earnings in formativeness and 
earnings management. In addition, Reverte (2009) used this format to investigate the 
determinants of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Chau and Gray (2010) to 
examine the effect of ownership on quality of disclosure. Al Nodel and Hussainey 
(2010) used this format when they investigated the effect of debt-to-equity ratio. 
Yuen et al. (2009), Rouf (2011), Satta et al. (2013), Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013), 
Hasan et al. (2013) and Uyar et al. (2013) examined the effect of ownership structure 
on LVD. 
In this study, ownership structure is patterned in two forms of ownership 
concentration and ownership diffuse and follows the approach of La Porta et al. 
(1999) which was adopted in this study to determine ownership structure, if an 
investor owned (direct or indirect) more than 20% of the company’s shares, which 
means this company has concentrated ownership. 
However, some studies found positive association between ownership and LVD, 
such as Hasan et al. (2013) in Bangladesh; they found concentrated ownership has 
the power to influence level of disclosure. White et al. (2007) found no association 
between disclosure practice and ownership concentration in Australian 
biotechnology companies. Uyar et al. (2013) indicated there was a negative 
significant relationship between ownership concentration and LVD. Yuen et al. 
(2009) found insignificant association between shares held by the top ten 
shareholders and LVD. Bozzolan et al. (2006) and Woodcock and Whiting (2009) 
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failed to prove ownership concentration affected on level of disclosure. On the other 
hand, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that ownership diffusion is in positive 
significant association with LVD. In addition, Gelb (2000) reported there is positive 
significant association between quality of annual reports and ownership diffusion. 
This researcher would expect ownership structure with ownership concentration to 
be related to less release of finance information in the annual report of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H6. There is positive association between the ownership concentration and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
5.4 Firm Characteristics 
In the analysis of the relationship of firm characteristics and LVD, six variables are 
considered because these variables could affect firms’ disclosure behaviour. These 
variables are firm size, firm age, liquidity, gearing, profitability and industry type, as 
seen in prior studies, such as Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Aljifri and Hussainey 
(2007), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Rouf (2011) and 
Mohamad and Sulong (2010). 
5.4.1 Firm size 
Firm size is considered the most common variable on the tests conducted on LVD in 
previous disclosure studies (Raffournier, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999; Watson et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Rouf, 2011; 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Nandi and Ghosh, 2012; Bhayani,2012 and Uyar et 
al. (2013). In addition, several theories have provided explanation of the effect of 
size firm on disclosure, such as agency theory, political cost theory, signalling theory 
and others.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained the relationship between firm size and 
disclosure by agency theory through the association between disclosure and the 
amount of outside financing, which means if the size of firm is large it needs more 
outside financing, therefore the firm should release more information in order to 
reassure its creditors. In this regard, Alsaeed (2006) indicated the agency cost in a 
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large firm is higher because the shareholders are spread wide; to reduce the agency 
cost, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) suggested releasing more information for 
shareholders. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) used political cost theory to explain the 
effect of firm size; they reported large firms suffer from higher political costs 
because the firm will be under higher scrutiny from both society and government due 
to their visibility.  
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) they used signalling theory in order explain the 
effect of firm size; they expected a positive relationship between firm size and 
corporate disclosure. They reported under signalling theory the large size firm 
always tends to catch the attention of financial analysts, who need more information 
in order to analyse the position of the large size firm. Thus, that will push the firm to 
disclose more information to meet the analysts’ needs. They also said, the small firm 
will suffer from competitive disadvantages if it tries to keep up with the large firm in 
the case of disclosure of more information. In addition, McKinnon and Dalimunthe 
(1993) stated: 
“Larger firms tend to attract more analysts’ followings than smaller ones, and 
may therefore be subjected to greater demand by analysts for private 
information” (p.40) 
Firth (1979b) reported that firms with higher visibility are more like to release more 
information in order to enhance and improve firm image. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) reported that the large size firm has a larger incentive to release more 
information in the annual report than small size firms because the large size firm 
needs to maintain its reputation and avoid government intervention. In addition, 
Bukh et al. (2005) indicated the ability of large companies to bear the cost of 
production of disclosure over firms of small size. Al-Akra and Ali (2012) stated: 
“Larger firms account for a greater proportion of the economy’s goods and 
services and have a large number of employees. They have a large asset base 
and are more established than smaller firms. All these factors suggest that 
large firms are associated with higher disclosure levels” (p.538) 
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Regarding what measure should be used to calculate firm size, many scholars use 
different measures. For example; number of employees, such as Craven and Marston 
(1999); value of firm (market capitalization), such as Owusu-Ansah (1998); number 
of shareholders, such as Cooke (1989, 1992); revenues, such as Murcia and Santos 
(2012); and total sales, such as Cooke (1989, 1992), Wallace et al. (1994) and Abd-
Elsalam (1999). Some studies use one measure, while other studies use more than 
one measure; by reviewing the previous disclosure studies, it is found that the most 
common measure is total assets. Yuen et al. (2009), Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) 
and Htay (2012) measured firm size by natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  
Previous studies provided mixed results about the relationship between firm sizes 
and the level of voluntary disclosure. For example Ahmed and Courtis (1999), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Naser et al. (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), Alsaeed (2006), Hossain and Hammami (2009), Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013), Soliman (2013), Ullah (2013), Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013), Uyar et al. 
(2013), Wijana et al. (2013) they  found significant positive association. Other 
studies found insignificant association between firm size and disclosure, such as 
Barako (2007), and Aljifri and Hussainey (2007). However, Hasan et al. (2013), in 
Bangladesh, concluded insignificant association between firm size and disclosure. 
Thus, this researcher would expect firms with large size to have a positive 
relationship with the annual report of Kuwaiti listed companies. Thus, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H7. There is positive association between firm size and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
5.4.2 Firm age 
The age of the company is considered one of the modern variables that has been 
discussed recently, as Camfferman and Cooke (2002) stated:  
“The age of a company may be relevant, as older firms may have built up 
differential experience in corporate reporting over time” (p.20) 
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Where lays the importance of the firm age variable in contributing to the expanding 
disclosure literature, helping to understanding the difference in level of disclosure 
reporting among companies (Alsaeed, 2006). Agrawal and Gort (1996, 2002) 
reported that an older firm can be characterized by the knowledge, experience and 
capacity gained through its life. However, that does not make an older firm safer 
from the effects of competition through early disclosure of financial information in a 
business environment, while younger firms do not suffer competition, because 
younger firms do not tend to release more information in order to avoid the 
additional costs of disclosure (Sejjaaka, 2003). Owusu-Ansah (1998) pointed out that 
the additional cost of disclosure is considered as an influential factor, which prevents 
the younger firm from disclosing more information. Kakani et al. (2001) argued that 
younger firms have a lack of reputation and capital, unlike older firms that release 
more information in the annual report, so the extent of a company’s disclosure may 
be influenced by its age. 
According to stakeholder theory, Watson et al. (2002) reported voluntary disclosure 
as the method to communicate with stakeholders, and each stakeholder needs require 
different information from the others. For Wolfe and Puder (2002), therefore, 
voluntary disclosure is an appropriate method to meet the needs of different 
stakeholders. Rowley (1997) states that: 
“Firms do not respond to each stakeholder individually but instead must 
answer the simultaneous demands of multiple stakeholders” (p.907). 
Where older firms have more stakeholders than younger firms, thus older firms 
should release more information to meet the desires of stakeholders. 
Alsaeed (2006) studied the relationship between disclosure and firm-specific features 
of forty firms in Saudi Arabia. The results showed firm age was insignificant in 
explaining the variation of voluntary disclosure. In India, Hossain and Reaz (2007) 
investigated the relationship between level of disclosure and firm characteristics in 
thirty-eight listed banking companies; the findings indicate there is an insignificant 
relationship between level of disclosure and firm age. The same result was found in 
previous studies, such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Bhayani (2012), while 
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Hossain and Hammami (2009) examined empirically the determinants of LVD in the 
annual reports of twenty-five firms listed on the Doha Securities Market (DSM) in 
Qatar. They found age is positive and significant at the 1% level as an explanatory 
variable for LVD; the same result was found in Soliman (2013) in Egypt. However, 
Nandi and Ghosh (2012) examined the impact of firm characteristics and CG 
attributes on LVD of listed firms in India; they found a negative association between 
corporate disclosure and firm age. In addition, Kakani et al. (2001) pointed out that 
long-established banks might not release more information or be more compliant 
than younger banks. Thus, according to previous studies, this researcher would 
expect firm age has no relationship with the annual report of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H8. There is no association between firm age and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
5.4.3 Liquidity 
‘Liquidity’ refers to the firm’s ability to fulfil its short-term liabilities, although there 
is no one measure that could adequately reflect all the aspects of liquidity in a firm 
(Alsaeed, 2006). Liquidity is considered as a method to show the extent of willing 
and ability of the firm to meet its financial obligations, thus the firm with low 
liquidity ratios leads the stakeholder to predict bankruptcy of the firm (Altman, 1968; 
Laidroo, 2008). According to this definition, companies should allow for more 
disclosure if they have high liquidity ratios. On the other hand, companies may make 
more disclosures with low liquidity ratios to appear confident to their stakeholders 
(Laidroo, 2008). Wallace et al. (1994) showed that the company should have an 
incentive for more disclosure with low liquidity, to alleviate fears and inform 
shareholders that the company is aware of the problem. 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) mentioned the previous studies using signalling 
theory and agency theory in order to investigate the relationship between liquidity 
ratio and disclosure levels, Abd-Elsalam (1999) reported firms with high liquidity 
ratio tend to release more information in their annual report in order to distinguish 
themselves from firms with low liquidity ratios. On the other hand, under agency 
theory approach, firms with low liquidity ratios tend to disclose more information to 
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meet the desires of shareholders and creditors for information (Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey, 2012). 
Karim (1996) argued the effect of a higher level of disclosure will be to mitigate 
information asymmetry between firm and stakeholders, thus improving the price of 
stock in the market and resulting in increased liquidity. Wallace and Naser (1995) 
reported firms tend to release more information to stakeholders to justify their 
liquidity position, if they suffer from a low liquidity ratio. Attig et al. (2006) linked 
between liquidity and information asymmetry in the stock market; they implied if 
there is high liquidity that it will reduce information asymmetry.  
Numerous financial ratios can be employed to measure the liquidity position of a 
company, for example, current ratio, quick ratio and net working capital. However, 
the results are mixed. For example, Cooke (1989), Camfferman and Cooke (2002) 
and Mathuva (2012) found a positive association between disclosure and liquidity 
ratio, while Wallace et al. (1994), Naser et al. (2002) and Mangena and Pike (2005) 
found a negative relationship between liquidity and disclosure level. In addition, 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Wallace and Naser (1995), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Ahmed 
and Courtis (1999), Barako et al. (2006) and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) did not 
find any significant association between the two variables. Thus, according to the 
mixed result for the relationship between disclosure and liquidity, this researcher 
would expect liquidity to have no relationship with the annual report of Kuwaiti 
listed companies. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H9. There is no association between liquidity and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
5.4.4 Gearing  
In prior studies, there has been a focus on gearing as one of the variables that has to 
be taken into account when investigating the relationship between the factors 
affecting level of disclosure. The relationship between managers and stakeholders 
(external holders of capital) could be explained by agency theory, where managers 
are the agents and stakeholders are the principals. The cost of disclosure could be 
 
 
111 
 
more in those companies depending on debt in the capital structure (Leftwich et al., 
1981). 
Many scholars defined gearing (capital structure) in terms of debt/equity ratio. Chow 
and Wong-Boren (1987) used a gearing ratio (measured by the nominal value of a 
firm’s total debt divided by the sum of the market value of its equity and the nominal 
value of total debt). In this case, the board of a company could try to alleviate agency 
conflict by disclosure of more financial information (Sejjaaka, 2003). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) concluded that voluntary disclosure can mitigate agency conflict 
between company and creditors and make visible the ability of the company to meet 
its debts. 
Gandia and Andres (2004) argued that more disclosure of financial information gives 
guarantees to debtors that the firm can meet the debt, and Bujaki and McConomy 
(2002) suggested that firms are liable to more disclosure of financial information in 
order to guarantee to creditors that they can effectively service their debts. However, 
Joh (2003) and Watson et al. (2002) did find that a firm with more debt may increase 
agency conflict, especially in the risk and return between the company and creditors. 
Thus, firms tend to release more information about their financial position to 
creditors in order to help them to monitor constantly the financial position of firms to 
assess the firm’s ability to pay the obligations on time. 
The relationship between gearing and level of disclosure was found mixed in prior 
research. Some studies found no significant relationship between level of disclosure 
and gearing. for example, Chow and Wong- Boren (1987), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Raffournier (1995), Wallace and Naser (1995), Ahmed (1996), Chen and Jaggi 
(2000), Depoers (2000), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Chau and Gray (2010), Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) 
and Hasan et al. (2013).  
However, other studies concluded a positive significant association between gearing 
and level of disclosure, e.g. Malone et al. (1993), Hossain et al. (1995), Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999), Naser et al. (2002) and Camfferman and Cooke (2002). In addition, 
with Eng and Mak (2003) and Uyar et al. (2013) found negative significant 
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association between gearing and level of disclosure. Thus, according to the mixed 
result of the relationship between disclosure and gearing, this researcher would 
expect gearing has no relationship with the annual report of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H10. There is no association between gearing and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
5.4.5 Profitability 
Profitability is considered one of the most common ratios to use to evaluate the 
financial position of any company; many investors depend on this ratio in making 
investment decisions. Without something like this ratio, investors cannot differentiate 
between good companies and bad companies (so-called ‘lemons’). Many previous 
disclosure studies have used the profitability ratio as an explanatory variable to 
investigate the variances in LVD. 
According to agency theory, the managers of profitable companies tend to release 
more information in their annual report to stakeholder in order to reduce the agency 
cost, improve their financial positions, and enhance their positions and compensation 
arrangements (Inchausti, 1997). Any company can mitigate the affect problem of 
information asymmetry and maintain their reputation by releasing more information 
for the public (Singhvi, 1968). Agency theory also suggests that to increase the 
manager’s compensation they tend to disclose more information (Abd-Elsalam, 
1999). 
Signalling theory suggests that managers of highly profitable companies tend to 
release more information in their annual report for stakeholders in order to increase 
investors’ confidence, support management continuation of their positions and 
compensation, and raise capital at the lowest cost: see Inchausti (1997), Watson et al. 
(2002), Al-Moataz, and Hussainey (2012). Moreover, Rouf (2011) reported 
managers are motivated to release more information to maintain their positions and 
increase their remuneration and to signal institutional confidence. 
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Abd-Elsalam (1999) reported that bad news might persuade the firm to release it on 
time in order to distance itself from legal liability and to preserve reputation. The 
company with low profitability will disclose more information about the risks they 
face (Vandemele et al., 2009). Firms with bad news may be motivated to release 
more information in the annual report to decrease the degree of risk for legal liability, 
disorder in their reputation and decrease in their share value (Skinner, 1994). In 
addition, Alsaeed (2006) reported management of a profitable firm might tend to 
disclose more information to the stakeholder to promote a positive impression. 
However, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) stated: 
“Therefore, it is not safe to conclude that less profitable firms are more likely 
to produce higher levels of future-oriented information than profitable firms” 
(p.17). 
From the above, it may be seen that there are different theories and different 
explanations to predict the direction of the relation between profitability and LVD. 
Based on the differences in explanation of the relationship between the two variables, 
the previous disclosure studies provided different results. Most researchers have 
found positive association between profitability and level of disclosure, such as 
Wallace et al. (4991), Raffournier (1995), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Naser et al. (2002), Ali et al. (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Agca and 
Onder (2007), Soliman (2013), and Damagum and Chima (2013). Other studies 
provided a negative relationship between profitability and level of disclosure, such as 
Chen and Jaggi (2000), Barako et al. (2006), Schleicher et al. (2007) and Vandemele 
et al. (2009). On the other hand, Wallace et al. (1994), Raffounier (1995), Meek et al. 
(1995), Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Hasan et al. (2013) found an insignificant 
relationship between profitability and level of disclosure. Thus, according to the 
mixed result of the relationship between disclosure and profitability, this researcher 
would expect profitability has a positive relationship with the annual report of 
Kuwaiti listed companies. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H11. There is positive association between profitability and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
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5.5 Summary 
The previous discussion has established the basis for developing the hypotheses to be 
tested in the current study in order to achieve the third objective through reviewing 
previous disclosure studies. Three main hypotheses are developing in this study: the 
first hypothesis relates to CG mechanisms, which have been divided into five sub-
hypotheses; the second hypothesis relates to ownership structure; and the third 
hypothesis relates to firm characteristics, which have been divided into six sub-
hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested later to answer the third research question. 
The following chapters start part two of the study (methods and analysis), which 
consists of chapter 6, research methodology and methods used in this study; chapter 
7, description of LVD (dependent variable); and chapter 8, description of 
independent variables and testing of hypotheses. 
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Chapter 6: Methodology 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to present the research procedures followed in this study to achieve 
its five objectives (chapter 1); and sheds light on the theoretical framework of this 
study, highlighting the most relevant theories in chapter 3; reviewing the relevant 
literature in chapter 4; and providing an overview of the Kuwaiti business 
environment in chapter 5. Based on the proposed theoretical framework and the 
literature review, the empirical section in the current study aims to measure LVD and 
its categories over the period of study. Moreover, it aims to investigate the 
association between LVD and each of CG mechanisms, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics. 
This chapter outlines the research procedures and the methods applied to achieve the 
empirical objectives, starting with an overview of the research process in section 6.2. 
Section 6.3 outlines the philosophical and theoretical perspectives of the study. The 
research paradigm and research approach are presented in sections 6.4 and 6.5, 
respectively. Section 6.6 provides methodological choices appropriate for the present 
study. Section 6.7 provides details of the research design to select the appropriate 
approaches to achieve the aim of the study. The independent variables used to 
investigate the relationship of the dependent variables to the hypotheses are provided 
in section 6.8. The statistical tests include parametric tests, non-parametric tests; 
univariate and multivariate analyses are applied in this study. In addition, the 
assumptions of OLS are discussed in section 6.9. Finally, a summary of the chapter is 
provided in section 6.10. 
6.2 The Research Process 
Every day the term ‘research’ may be heard in many places, such as television, 
newspapers and radio. There is no agreement in the literature on how the term 
‘research’ should be defined because everyone defines it from his special viewpoint. 
However, according Sekaran and Bougie (2013), there are some characteristics and 
features of the research. Research as a process of finding out, examination and 
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investigation, or as a systematic method to generate new knowledge about our life, to 
review and synthesize existing facts, to explore some existing situation, phenomenon 
or problem, to present solutions to a problem, to explore and analyse more general 
issues and to give details about a new phenomenon. From previous characteristics 
and features, Sekaran and Bougie (2013) stated that research in business, “can be 
described as a systematic and organised effort to investigate a specific problem 
encountered in the work setting, which needs a solution” (p.2). Leedy (1989) defined 
research from a more utilitarian point of view; he stated, “research is a procedure by 
which we attempt to find systematically, and with the support of demonstrable fact, 
the answer to a question or the resolution of a problem” (p.5). Research can be 
classified into many different kinds according to the purpose, the process, the logic 
and outcome of research, as in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 The Research kinds 
Type of research  Basis of classification  
Exploratory, Descriptive, Analytical or 
Predictive research  
Purpose of the research  
Quantitative  or qualitative research    Process of the research  
Deductive or inductive research  Logic of the research  
Applied or basic research Outcome of the research 
Source: (Hussay and Hussay, 1997.p.10) 
 
6.3 Research Philosophy 
The research procedure consists of a number of stages or events that should be taken 
to conduct research; each of these stages requires logical decision-making choices. 
The nature of the knowledge and its development was related by the term research 
philosophy. Saunders et al. (2007) reported the stages of research process could be 
viewed as layers of a research onion. The research onion consists of six layers; 
research philosophies, approaches, strategies, choices, time horizons, techniques and 
procedures (see figure 6.1). Before deciding about data collection and data analysis 
you need to have peeled away the layers of the research onion to arrive there. 
Under the research philosophy adopted by researchers, the research philosophy can 
influence the way in which the research is undertaken. In social sciences, like 
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accounting, when undertaking research, it is important to consider assumptions about 
the nature of social science and the nature of society. 
Figure 6.1: The research onion 
 
Source: from Saunders et al. (2007, p.102) 
6.3.1 The nature of social science  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four sets of assumptions that inform social 
science research, namely: ontological, epistemological, human nature, and 
methodology. One’s conception of social reality (ontology) determines one’s beliefs 
about the most appropriate ways of knowing (epistemology), which in turn 
determine one’s assumptions about free will and determinism (human nature), and 
ultimately the methods and tools one adopts to answer the research question 
(methodology). Under each of these assumptions there are two positions (see figure 
6.2). The objective subsumes realism, positivism, determinism and the nomothetic 
approach, whereas the subjective dimension contains the nominalist, anti-positivist, 
voluntarist and ideographic perspectives (Burrell and Morgan, 1979.p.3). 
Objectivism means the perspective of where social entities occur in a reality outside 
of social actors (Saunders et al., 2007). Bryman (2004) clarifies this meaning by 
stating that: 
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“Objectivism is an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and 
their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors It implies 
that social phenomena and the categories that we use in everyday discourse 
have an existence that is independent or separate from actors” (p.16). 
The subjectivist believes in free will: everyone has the freedom to make decisions 
that change the path of their lives (May, 2005). In addition, Blaikie (1993) argued 
that these aspects are very relevant to Social Science since the humanistic factor 
introduces an element of ‘free will’ that adds a complexity beyond that seen in the 
natural sciences and others. In sum, objectivists look at social entities as objective 
entities held in a reality outside of the social factor, while the subjectivists see 
themselves as social constructions built up from social factor perceptions and 
activities (Bryman, 2004). 
Figure 6.2 The subjective–objective dimension 
 
Source: from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.3) 
6.3.1.1 Ontology 
The first set of assumptions is ontological, ‘ont-’ means ‘being’ or ‘existence’ while 
‘-ology’ means ‘knowledge’ or ‘theory’, In other words, it is the theory of being 
(Marsh and Stoker, 2002). It focuses on understanding ‘what is’ and what about the 
nature of reality. Blaikie (1993) reported that ontology is concerned with 
assumptions about what represent social reality. In ontology, two contrasting 
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positions can be classified, Realism and Nominalism. Realism is explaining about the 
social world by real, factual and tangible structures, because objects have a being 
independent of human mentality (Saunders et al., 2007). Meanwhile, nominalism 
means using names, concepts and labels in order to give a structure to reality. In 
other words, nominalism believes the social world to be external to individual 
recognition (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The construction of research objectives is an 
ontological position (Iskander, 2008). 
6.3.1.2 Epistemology 
The second set of assumptions is epistemological. Epistemology considers visions 
about the most suitable ways of investigating the nature of the world (Easterby-smith 
et al., 2008). Most questions in epistemology are concerned with what awareness is 
and what the sources of awareness are (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). In other 
words, the theory of knowledge is epistemology (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). The 
research method is the beginning of questions of epistemology (Blaikie, 1993). The 
methods associated with this study’s particular epistemology are explained further 
below. In general, on epistemological positions, two contrasting positions can be 
classified, Anti-positivism and Positivism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Positivist epistemology means illustrate and guess of natural science; it is 
characterised by seeking for regularities and causal relationships among its elements 
by using the hypothesis testing (deductive or theory testing). Positivism depends on 
the values of reason, truth and validity, and a focus on facts by direct observation and 
experience and using quantitative methods, such as surveys, experiments and 
statistical testing (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Blaikie, 1993; Saunders et al., 2007). In 
other words, the hypotheses are generated by using theories, Therefore, the research 
is a testing and developing of theories (Saunders et al., 2007). Therefore, positivism 
tends to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for 
relationships and patterns. That means hypotheses are developed then tested (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). 
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Anti-positivism means that the researcher should understand the differences between 
humans as social factors, by involvement in the activities that are under study. As 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) say, “One has to understand from the inside rather than 
the outside” (p.5). Anti-positivism tends to reject that observation of behaviour can 
help people to understanding; thus, Social Science rejects the notion that science can 
create objective knowledge of any kind (ibid.).  
In sum, positivism uses methods such as experiments, surveys, and statistical testing, 
from which the research can produce generalisations; while anti-positivism uses 
other methods, such as observation and interviews, and generalisability is not of 
crucial importance (Saunders et al., 2007).  
6.3.1.3 Human nature 
The third set of assumptions about the nature of social science is around human 
nature, which concerns the relationship between human beings and their 
environment. In social science, one should understand human activities to help in any 
assumption about human nature. There are two contrasting positions that can be 
classified, voluntarism and determinism. Voluntarism holds that a human is 
completely autonomous and free-willed; on the other hand, determinism claims that 
humans and their activities are products of the environment in which they are located 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
6.3.1.4 Methodology 
The last set of assumptions about the nature of social science is the methodology, 
which means to discuss which methods are used to examine and gain knowledge of 
the social world. There are two contrasting positions that can be classified, 
ideographic and nomothetic (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The ideographic approach 
assumes that beliefs in the social world can only be understood by obtaining first-
hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. In addition, the ideographic 
methodology implies the analysis of subjective accounts “by “getting inside” the 
situations, and involving oneself in the everyday flow of life” (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979.p.6). On the other hand, nomothetic methodology indicates conducting research 
based upon systematic protocols and techniques; the nomothetic approach adopts 
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standards of scientific rigour to achieve its goals, like testing research hypotheses, 
and uses quantitative methods of data analysis (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
6.3.2 The nature of society 
According to the nature of society, two positions on or approach to sociology may be 
distinguished, sociology of radical change and sociology of regulation. The first 
position uses radical change to illuminate society. “It looks towards potentiality as 
much as actuality; it is concerned with what is possible rather than with what is; 
with alternatives rather than with acceptance of the status quo”, according to Burrell 
and Morgan (1979, p.17). On the other hand, the second position is the sociology of 
regulation that looks to illuminate society in terms of its unity and consistency. It 
relates the demand for regulation in human affairs with some questions. In contrast to 
sociology of radical change, it is more concerned with problems of change, conflict 
and regulation and is concerned with the actuality and the present situation (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979; Saunders et al., 2007). 
6.4 Research Paradigm 
Regarding the nature of social science, there are two poles of assumptions, the 
objective and subjective dimensions. In addition, regarding the nature of society 
there are two assumptions, radical change and regulation dimensions. Saunders et al. 
(2007) reported the paradigm’s term is a method to investigated social phenomena by 
which explanations and understandings can be obtained. One can use research 
paradigms to discern between different accounting research visions (Belkaoui, 2004). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) set a matrix to distinguish between four research 
paradigms in order to analyse social theory, radical humanist, radical structuralist, 
interpretive, and functionalist. 
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Figure 6.3 Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Science 
 
Source: from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.22) 
The radical humanist paradigm represents the radical change and subjective 
dimensions; this paradigm is used for a critical perspective on organisational life and 
is concerned with changing the situation. Radical humanists assume societal change 
comes by vision and ideas. Moreover, it involves a subjective approach to social 
science: nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic. On the other hand, 
the radical structuralist paradigm seeks fundamental change to the state’s 
existence; however, it tends to the objectivist approach to social science: realist, 
positivist, determinist, and nomothetic. 
The interpretive paradigm applies the regulatory approach that tries to interpret the 
social order and organisational affairs in order to provide suggestions for 
improvement by discovering irrationalities. It is interested in understanding and 
explaining to what has happened but not to achieve change. Moreover, this paradigm 
implies a subjective approach to social science: nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist 
and ideological positions. On the other hand, the functionalist paradigm represents 
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both approaches, regulatory and objectivist. Saunders et al. (2007) reported that the 
functionalist paradigm supposes that organisations have rational existence. In 
addition, this paradigm seeks to clarify the existing state of social order, the facts and 
reasons of the social phenomena. Moreover, it involves an objective approach to 
social science: realist, positivist, determinist, and nomothetic. 
6.5 Research Approach 
Saunders et al. (2007) indicated that the second layer in the research onion is the 
research approach; it divided into deductive and inductive. Deduction is, “the process 
by which we arrive at a reasoned conclusion by logical generalization of a known 
fact”, while induction is, “a process where we observe certain phenomena and on 
this basis arrive at conclusions”, according to Sekaran (2003, p.27). The deductive 
approach entails, according to Woolfolk (2001, p.286), “drawing conclusions by 
applying rules or principles, that is, logically moving from a general rule or 
principle to a specific solution”. This, in turn, leads to needing to collect quantitative 
data or qualitative data in order to test the hypotheses developed by using a 
structured methodology to assist in replication of the results (Gill and Johnson, 
2002). On the contrary, the inductive approach begins by collecting data that is 
relevant to the topic of interest, and after that conducts analysis of data, from which 
the findings will help to formulation of a theory that could explain those patterns 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
In addition, Bryman and Bell (2003) indicated that the deductive approach (testing of 
theory) is associated with quantitative research that follows objectivism, thus, 
realism and positivism as ontological and epistemological positions, respectively. 
While, the inductive approach (generation of theory) is associated with qualitative 
research that follows constructionism, thus, nominalism and interpretivism as 
ontological and epistemological positions, respectively. 
6.6 Methodological Choices  
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the objective approach is located at the 
extreme side of a matrix to distinguish between four research paradigms, where the 
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nomothetic methodology is a result of realist ontology and positivist epistemology. 
Proponents of the objective approach are realists. They assert that the world exists 
before human consciousness, it consist of hard tangible and relatively immutable 
structures, and is separate from the cognitive efforts of individuals (Gill and Johnson, 
1997). The positivist epistemology underpins this approach. Therefore, valid 
knowledge about a concrete reality, in what happens in the social world, can be 
discovered through searching for causal relationships, and rules and regularities 
between its constituent elements (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 
1980). On the nature of humans, objectivists assert that the relationship between 
humans and society is deterministic, which means it determines humans and their 
activities by environment or position in which they are existing; thus, reality should 
be measured objectively instead of subjectively examined. Therefore, according to 
the nomothetic methodology, the research should be separate from the phenomena 
being examined. Generally, business research is a more moderate, objective position 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
All of the assumptions of a nomothetic methodology normally lead to the 
employment of quantitative methodologies where the researcher tries to find 
measurable observations to examine things (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Creswell, 
1998). Consequently, the researcher is able to obtain second-hand knowledge or 
secondary data for the phenomena being examined and, in general, the work on 
quantitative research is deductive (Creswell, 1998). 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the subjective approach is located at the 
extreme left side of a matrix to distinguish between the four research paradigms 
where the ideographic methodology is a result of nominalist ontology and anti-
positivist epistemology. Accordingly, in an ideographic methodology, things do not 
have meaning, but concepts are imposed on objects by a human (Pfuhl, 1980) in 
order to give things structured reality. The nominalist ontology assumes that humans 
use labels and names to structure in order to add meaning to the external world. 
Words do not mean empirical entities; they are just purely conceptual and exist only 
in the mind of the participants. From this perspective on the opposite side to the 
realist position, Creswell (1998) reported that the external world exists only in the 
self-consciousness of the human who is located socialized in the world. The anti-
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positivist epistemology emphasizes the researcher to be aware of the differences 
between humans and social actors. Burrell and Morgan (1979) accordingly note it 
can be identify knowledge through contributions by the participants. For Morgan and 
Smircich (1980), voluntarism is considered the ideographic methodology that 
supports the human nature assumption: humans as active agents who interact with 
their environment, where humans are completely autonomous and free-willed 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Therefore, following ideographic methodology, which 
focuses that the observation should be detailed of society, thus the researcher is not 
separate from the phenomena being examined (Creswell, 1998). 
All of the assumptions of an ideographic methodology normally lead to the 
employment of qualitative methodologies where the researcher tries to rely on and 
examine things from the participants’ own viewpoints (Creswell, 1998; Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997). Consequently, the researcher is able to obtain first-hand knowledge 
or primary data of the phenomena being examined. However, the researcher is 
interested in the meaning and interpretation that is obtained by the participants, 
instead of measuring the subject under examination. In general, the work on 
qualitative research is inductive (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Laughlin (1995) reported that there is no presence of the extreme or pure forms of 
the philosophical assumptions of ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology. They also indicated the selection of some form of “middle-range” 
methodological position, instead of following one of the extreme forms. A middle-
range position allows the researcher to use the range of research methods, 
quantitative and qualitative methods, to undertake empirical investigations. 
According the assumption of the nature of society, the critical perspective on 
organisational life adopted the radical change dimension in the area of business and 
management. It involves a judgment about how organisational affairs should be 
conducted and provides avenues in which these affairs will be selected by it in order 
to make fundamental changes to the natural order of things. Saunders et al. (2007) 
state that: 
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“Regulation seeks to explain the way in which organisational affairs are 
regulated and offer suggestions as to how they may be improved within the 
framework of the way things are done at present. In other words, the radical 
change dimension approaches organisational problems from the viewpoint of 
overturning the existing state of affairs; the regulatory dimension seeks to work 
within the existing state of affairs” (p.112). 
As mentioned previously, the radical structuralist paradigm is consistent with the 
radical humanist paradigm in looking for fundamental change to the status quo. The 
status quo in this present study is LVD in the annual reports of the Kuwaiti listed 
companies. It does not seek to achieve fundamental change; therefore, both 
paradigms are irrelevant to the present study. 
In accounting, the aim is to understand the subjective experience of people 
participating in the preparation, verification, communication, or use of accounting 
information. Riahi-Belkaoui (2002) indicated some limitations that afflict the 
interpretive paradigm. It supposes that an observer can comprehend the social action 
by sheer subjectivity and without interference. However, Saunders et al. (2007) 
indicated the functionalist paradigm is the prevailing paradigm in business and 
management research. Riahi-Belkaoui (2002) states that: 
“The functionalist view in accounting focuses on explaining the social order, in 
which accounting plays a role, from a realist, positivist, determinist and 
nomothetic standpoint. It is concerned with effective regulation on the basis of 
objective evidence” (p.259) 
The functionalist paradigm supposes the separation between theory and observations, 
which are used to test the theory, employing the hypothetic-deductive approach and 
use quantitative methods in data collection and analysis (Belkaoui, 2004). A number 
of authors reported that there is no existence of a uniquely correct perspective. Gioia 
and Pitre (1990) and Jackson (1999) criticized the separate and mutually exclusive 
discrimination between the four research paradigms; they faced the difficulty of 
identifying a single paradigm. Therefore, transition zones can be seen among the four 
paradigms, in Figure 6.4, for achieving some sort of comprehensive view (Gioia and 
Pitre, 1990 and Jackson, 1999). These transition zones constitute multi-paradigm 
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approaches, and due to the lack of clarity of the nature of these transition regions, it 
is possible to build bridges that connect apparently disparate concepts together in 
these areas. Gioia and Pitre (1990) state that:  
“multiparadigm approaches offer the possibility of creating fresh insights 
because they start from different ontological and epistemological assumptions 
and therefore can tap different facets of organizational phenomena and can 
produce markedly different and uniquely informative theoretical views of 
events under study” (p.591) 
Figure 6.4: The transition zones (shaded areas) between the four paradigms 
 
Source: from Gioia and Pitre (1990): the shaded areas represent the blurred transition 
zones 
The objective of the present study is to examine the existing status of LVD in the 
annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies. Specifically, it attempts to explain the 
variation in LVD by a number of potential determinants. In particular, it examines 
the relationship between LVD and each of CG mechanisms, ownership structure, and 
firm characteristics. As previously mentioned, this study does not aim to achieve 
fundamental change. Thus, the transition zone linking radical structuralist and radical 
humanist paradigms, which consist of the value for activism and change (Gioia and 
Pitre, 1990) would be unrelated to the present study, while the other transition zone, 
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which links both functionalist and interpretive paradigms, provides an opportunity to 
benefit from the broader theoretical framework indicated in chapter 3. Moreover, it 
allows presenting a descriptive analysis to LVD in annual reports of Kuwaiti listed 
companies (see chapter 7). In addition, the interpretivist–functionalist transition 
zone, it possible to use a deductive approach in order to develop and test the research 
hypotheses (see chapter 8). 
In corporate governance studies, the generally popular approach is quantitative 
approaches. In addition, to what has been reviewed in the research approach section, 
the deductive approach is considered more appropriate to the current study; this 
approach was used largely in the disclosure literature, e.g. Eng and Mak (2003), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005); Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al. (2008); Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Allegrini and Greco, (2013). Based on what was discussed above, it was decided to 
use the interpretivist functionalist transition zone as a multi-paradigm approach: it is 
the research philosophy suitable for the present study; also, it was decided to use the 
deductive approach in this study 
6.7 Qualitative research versus Quantitative research 
It should be noted that the debate concerning whether to choose a qualitative method 
(also called the interpretive method and behavioural method) or a quantitative method 
(also called scientific, positivism and mainstream) in social science fields has been an 
important issue for some time (Kvale, 1996: 68). The qualitative method involves 
mainly exploratory research; it has tended to place emphasis and value on the human, 
interpretative aspects of knowledge about the social world. It is used to gain an 
understanding of causal reasons, motivations and beliefs. The qualitative method 
allows the researcher to study chosen subjects in depth and in detail (Patton, 
1990:13). Qualitative research requires the researcher to rely on interpretive or 
critical social sciences, where the research follows a largely non-linear path using 
practical logic and emphasises cases and contexts (Neuman, 2006: 151). The 
researchers look for answers to inquiries that emphasise how social experience is 
created and provides meaning. Collis and Hussey (2003: 353) define qualitative 
research as:  
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“a subjective approach which includes examining and reflecting on perceptions in 
order to gain an understanding of social and human activities”.  
On the other hand, quantitative research is widely applied by social scientists 
(Liebscher, 1998). It includes surveys and questionnaires, which use structured 
questions. It is concerned with numerical data and samples are larger than in 
qualitative research. The measurement is quantitative, objective and statistically 
valid. It is used to develop and test the hypotheses of the study. Creswell (2003) 
reported that "Researchers sometimes advance theory to test, and they will 
incorporate substantial reviews of the literature to identify research questions that 
need to be answered". “Quantitative research is a formal, objective, systematic 
process in which numerical data are used to obtain information about the world. This 
research method is used: to describe variables; to examine relationships among 
variables; to determine cause-and-effect interactions between variables” (Burns & 
Grove 2005: p. 23). Neuman (2006: 151) reported "Quantitative researchers 
emphasize precisely measuring variables and testing hypotheses that are linked to 
general causal explanations". 
In determining whether a qualitative or quantitative research approach is appropriate, 
qualitative research is considered subjective; the researcher is part of a process and 
the reasoning in this research is dialectic and inductive. While in quantitative 
research, it is considered objective; the researcher is separate and the reasoning in 
this research is logic and deductive. There are some problems with qualitative 
studies; for example, it more difficult to code the data, it consumes more time, there 
is a lot of data to transcribe, the risk of researcher bias and it is applicable only in a 
case study with limited applicability to other cases (Ritchie et al., 2013). 
Case study research is considered as a form of qualitative descriptive research. Many 
researchers have tried to define the term case study, such as Yin (1984) - "case study 
method is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (p. 23). 
Furthermore, Thomas (2011) offers another definition of case study “case studies are 
analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or 
other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods" and ''The case 
that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that 
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provides an analytical frame — an object — within which the study is conducted and 
which the case illuminates and explicates" (p. 513).  
In recent years, several researchers have tended to use more than one approach in 
their studies. "Mixing methods therefore offers enormous potential for exploring new 
dimensions of experience in social life, and intersections between these. It can 
encourage researchers to see differently, or think `outside the box', if they are willing 
to approach research problems with an innovative and creative palette of methods of 
data generation" (Mason, 2006 p, 13). Collis and Hussey (2003: 78) argued that 
triangulation, sometimes called ‘multi-methodology’ can help overcome the possible 
bias and deficiencies when using a single method approach. Also, Stange et al. 
(2006) stated that it “Involved integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
generate new knowledge and can involve either concurrent or sequential use of these 
two classes of methods to follow a line of inquiry” Moreover, Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 41) commented on the role of qualitative data in helping the quantitative side 
as follows "During analysis they can help by validating, interpreting, classifying and 
illustrating quantitative findings, as well as through strengthening and revising 
theory". 
There are many ways of categorizing data. A general categorization is based upon 
who collected the data (secondary data and primary data). The first kind of data is 
primary data; it is data collected by the investigator for a particular purpose. While 
the second kind of data is secondary data, which refers to data collected by someone 
else and which was collected for other studies. Some researchers tend to use 
secondary data because of its advantages, such as it saves effort, time and expense 
(economical), it assists in improving the understanding of the problem and it allows 
comparison of the data that is collected by the researcher. 
In this study, considered the first study, employs quantitative and qualitative methods 
(triangulation) in order to explore and measure the level of voluntary disclosure in 
Kuwait. Quantitative methods will be employed to develop and test the hypotheses of 
the study, while qualitative methods will be employed to understand why the 
managers of listed companies in Kuwait release more voluntary information in 
annual reports. 
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6.8 Research Design 
Any research should be has a meaning and a value. Planning details and execution of 
the research are critical components of research design, and are therefore presented 
in this section. According to Hussey and Hussey (1997), the overall approach to the 
research process is the research design, starting from the theoretical framework, then 
to the collection and analysis of the data.  
6.8.1 The purpose of study 
The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to investigate LVD practices in the annual 
reports of Kuwaiti listed companies over a period of four years; second, to identify 
the causal factors affecting LVD in the Kuwaiti context. The time period is that since 
the observed Kuwaiti companies (banks, financial companies and insurance 
companies) adopted the CG codes for the first time in 2004. It also entails 
investigating LVD practices during those four years and how those practices 
developed over the period. The study reviews the most recent literature on 
disclosure, with a particular focus on the relationship between LVD and each of CG 
characteristics, ownership structure and firm characteristics. A deductive approach is 
used for the formulation and examination of hypotheses. Therefore, this study will 
adopt positive accounting theory (PAT), which has been the dominant accounting 
research method since the mid-1960s. The objective of this theory is seeking to 
“explain and predict phenomena” (Watt and Zimmerman, 1986, p.13). The term 
“positive research” was used to differentiate between research, which sought to 
explain and predict, and research that sought to offer prescriptions (normative 
research) (Watt, 1995). The normative research focus is on “what should to be” 
questions while the positive research focuses on “what is” questions, and uses 
hypotheses to express positive theories (Ryan et al., 1992). The current disclosure 
studies argument is based on positive accounting theory (descriptive theory), 
contrary to normative accounting theory (prescriptive theory) (Gaffikin, 2005). 
6.8.2 Time Horizons 
As previously mentioned, the present study focuses on one country, Kuwait. The 
majority of disclosure studies focus on one country, as well focusing on a specific 
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point of time, while there are few disclosure studies over a period. This study is 
considered a longitudinal study because it investigates LVD in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti listed companies over a period of four years, from 2007 to 2010. LVD is 
determined by analysing historical data over the four-year period. Due to varying 
LVD between 2007 and 2010, both cross-sectional and time-series analyses are used. 
In addition, these methods are useful for determining the variables that influence 
both LVD and its categories among the companies under investigation. Such analysis 
is useful to those interested in voluntary disclosure matters, particularly in emerging 
capital markets and developing countries like Kuwait. It will be helpful to know 
which kinds should be highlighted and appear in the annual report. 
6.8.3 The unit of study 
The unit of analysis is defined as the type of data you need to collect during the 
subsequent data analysis stage (Sekaran, 2003). The Kuwaiti listed companies are 
used in this study as the unit of analysis. Although the Kuwait stock market includes 
foreign companies, they have excluded from the sample, because the objective of this 
study is investigate LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies. In passing, it is worth noting 
that the annual reports for Kuwaiti companies are more available than those of 
foreign companies; many companies were visited in order to get the annual reports. 
6.8.4 Data collection and study sample  
This section discusses the sources of the data, which are used for the analysis of the 
relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables in this study. 
There are various sources of data related to the Kuwaiti companies listed on the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), which form the sample of the present study. The 
KSE sets disclosure requirements to which every listed company must adhere in their 
annual report. A quantitative approach has been used to gather the relevant data. 
Frankfort et al. (1996) argued that using a quantitative approach facilitates analysis 
of figures in terms of operationalisation, manipulation, prediction, testing of 
variables and statistical measures of validity. 
The first source of empirical data is the annual reports of some 170 companies listed 
on the KSE. English versions of these reports were used to gather information about 
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LVD (the dependent variable) and some of the independent variables (CG, 
ownership structure, and firm characteristics). The second source of data is the 
websites of Kuwaiti companies, which provide information about their boards of 
directors. This information is necessary for determining one of the independent 
variables, namely CG mechanisms. The third source of data is documents and reports 
issued by the KSE, The ministry of trade and industry and financial consultancy 
organisations, which issue reports and analyses of listed Kuwaiti companies. 
The population for this study is all the Kuwaiti companies listed on the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange; the Kuwait Stock Exchange Companies Guide contained 179 companies 
as of December 2007. The study sample was from these companies. All new 
companies – those listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange since 2008 – were excluded 
from sample because this study covers the period from 2007 to 2010; the newly 
listed companies could still be developing their disclosure strategy. This approach 
has been followed in previous studies of accounting disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 
1998); see table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 The total number of companies year ended- 2007  
No Sector Number 
1 Bank sector 9 
2 Investment sector 43 
3 Insurance sector 7 
4 Real estate sector 34 
5 Industrial sector 27 
6 Services sector 53 
7 Food sector 6 
 Total 179 
 
After completion of the collection of annual reports, the sample reached 155 
companies. A number of companies were excluded due to the inability to get the 
annual report or lack of continuity in the Kuwaiti stock market. This concerned seven 
companies from the investment sector, six companies from each of the real estate and 
services sectors, three companies from the industrial sector, and one company from 
each of the insurance and food sectors; see table 6.3, final sample.(see Appendix 2) 
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Table 6.3 The final sample  
No Sector Number 
1 Bank sector 9 
2 Investment sector 36 
3 Insurance sector 6 
4 Real estate sector 28 
5 Industrial sector 24 
6 Services sector 47 
7 Food sector 5 
 Total 155 
 
 
6.8.5 Reasons for choosing annual reports 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the methodology followed to achieve the 
first objective of this study (1.2.1). There are many ways for companies to disclose 
information, including annual reports, conferences, analyst lists, investor relations, 
interim reports, prospectuses, press releases, the Internet, and others. The annual 
report is a very important official disclosure for stakeholders, but it is not enough 
(Hope, 2003). Despite that, financial reporting is still the main source of value 
information on firms (Meyer, 2007). However, Adams et al. (1998) and Botosan 
(1997) indicated the annual report is considered the most important method used by a 
company to release information to stakeholders. Previous disclosure literature 
reported many justifications for using the annual report to examine the disclosure 
level: it has a high degree of credibility (Neu et al., 1998; Tilt, 1994); and it is 
characterized by availability, accessibility and extensive distribution (Wilmshurst 
and Frost, 2000). 
Many previous studies have investigated the usefulness of annual report information 
and the relative importance of different sources of information for investment 
decisions, e.g. Chang and Most (1981) sent a questionnaire to individual investors, 
institutional investors and financial analysts in three countries, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand. The findings found the annual report was 
considered the most important source of information. Lee and Tweedie (1981), in the 
UK, indicated that the annual report is very important source of information for 
institutional investors and stockbrokers.  
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There are three sources for the regulation of corporate financial reporting in Kuwait. 
The main resource is Commercial Company Law No. 6 of 1960, which was issued to 
organise the accounting profession, then was amended by Law No. 3 of 1965, to 
require listed companies to provide the financial report at every year end, include the 
comparative financial statements, the profit and loss statement and the cash flow 
statement. The second resource is the Practice of Auditing Profession Law No. 5 of 
1981. The third resource is Law No 7 of 2010 of the Capital Markets Authority, 
which regulates the activity of securities. Based on these, it was decided to use the 
annual report in order to measure LVD of Kuwaiti listed companies to achieve the 
first objective of this study. 
6.8.6 Measuring LVD 
According to Hassan and Marston (2010), the measures of disclosure can be 
classified into two approaches depending on the vehicle (instrument). The first 
approach is proxies for disclosure without recourse to the original disclosure vehicle. 
The second approach is disclosure proxies based on examining the original 
disclosure vehicle. 
 The first approach includes four types. 
The first type is disclosure survey (questionnaires and interviews), for example, 
using a disclosure survey such as the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) / the 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) which have been 
employed as proxies for disclosure quantity and quality in a number of prior studies. 
The FAF/AIMR reports, which provide practices of disclosure for big publicly traded 
companies by a comprehensive measure and compared this practices with their 
industry peers. 
The 2003 World Federation of Exchanges Disclosure Survey, which examines 
systems for disclosure of information about listed companies at fifty-two members of 
the World Federation of Exchanges, and other example of disclosure surveys, which 
provide by the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), that employ financial 
analysts’ perceptions in emerging markets about effect of GC at companies. The 
second type is the existence of American Depositary Receipts for proxy for 
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disclosure quality, dummy variable which has used in this type , will take the value 
of one if the company applied ADR otherwise will be zero. The third type is 
Attributes of analysts’ forecasts (AAF), and the number of analysts following the 
company, which are used as proxies for the information environment. The fourth 
type is other proxies for disclosure, which do not depend on examining the disclosure 
instrument, where the level of measurement differs from a discrete to a continuous 
variable. For example, Clarkson and Thompson (1990) used the period of listing 
(continuous variable) as a proxy for firm disclosure and Bailey et al. (2006) used a 
dummy variable (discrete variable). 
 The second approach includes five types. 
The first type is content analysis that used the sentences, the number of words or 
pages to measure the amount of information disclosed, for example (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). There are two types of content analysis, conceptual content analysis 
and relational content analysis. The first type is a research method that employed to 
find out the frequency or the existence of concepts or certain key words within texts, 
while the second type is investigative of the relationships among concepts in a text. 
Content analysis can be divided into partial or comprehensive. Hussainey (2004) 
stated, “In a partial content analysis, researchers identify a list of disclosure topics, 
they then text-search the annual report for the presence of these topics. In a holistic 
content, analysis researchers investigate the whole annual report to construct their 
disclosure index” (p.48) Content analysis can be undertaken either manually or 
automatically or using both methods. The second type gives a disclosure index; it is a 
list of selected items that may be disclosed in the corporate report (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). This list could contain mandatory or voluntary items of information. 
Cerf (1961) was the first to use this type of index. According prior studies explain a 
great difference in the construction of a disclosure index, the reasons for the 
difference being degree of researcher involvement in constructing the index, the 
number of items of information, the type of information, the measurement approach 
and the range of industries or countries covered by the index. Tai et al. (1990) 
reported there is no theory to determine the type of information or the number of 
items to be included in the index. The third type is management forecasts; this type is 
forward-looking information, which can appear voluntarily in an annual report, 
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interim report or elsewhere. In addition, it could be quantitative or qualitative, such 
as management earnings forecasts. The fourth type is disclosure of good (/bad) news; 
some prior studies employ earnings data for develop a measure of voluntary 
disclosure of good (/bad) news. For example, the company could signal the public 
about how well the company is doing by point or range estimates of annual earnings, 
whereas bad news disclosures could be qualitative (Skinner, 1994). The fifth type is 
disclosure frequency that means more frequent disclose lead to increased private 
information acquisition by investors (Buskirk, 2012). 
However, Gray and Haslam (1990) stated that there is: 
“No one single, agreed framework within which to conceptualise, articulate 
and collect empirical evidence about the external reporting activity of 
organisations” (p.53) 
In addition, they reported that to make a systematic enquiry into the contents of 
annual reports, they suggested the content analysis approach. However, Patton and 
Zelenka (1997) suggested four possible approaches to develop such theoretical 
concepts and an operational measure of the extent of disclosure: 
 “Evaluating the extent and quality of a company’s disclosed information 
based on the decision usefulness of information items as determined by a 
normative decision model, 
 Evaluating a company’s quality of disclosure based on a group of 
knowledgeable analysts’ evaluation of the annual report, 
 Assessing the extent of the market reaction to the disclosure of information, 
and 
 Assessing the Extent of compliance with a set of legal or GAAP 
requirements” (p.606) 
They mentioned the first three of these approaches are problematic; in the first 
approach, there is no generally accepted valuation. In the second approach, Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) noted that it is “based on analysts’ perceptions of disclosure rather 
than direct measures of actual disclosure” (p.247); and in the third approach, 
“unresolvable issues in selecting an event window for the analysis”, according to 
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Patton and Zelenka (1997, p.607). Therefore, they choose to adopt the fourth 
approach. 
Gruning (2007) pointed out in content analysis one must face the problem of 
analysing the content of oral and written communication in measuring a firm’s 
disclosure quality, depending on who is concerned in a content analysis approach, 
and indicated there are three types of who is involved in the content analysis 
approach. The first type is a sender approach, when managers are asked to self-
evaluate for disclosure; the second type is a receiver approach, when financial 
analysts and other agents are asked to evaluate disclosure; and the third type is when 
someone who is neither addresser nor addressee is asked. The sender approach could 
be effective for mandatory disclosure. The examples of receiver approaches are 
AIMR, CIFAR analysts’ and Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Rating 
(see Hassan and Marston, 2010), with potentially questionable data validity because 
of sample bias in the receiver ratings (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
However, Gruning (2007) reported the third type is the dominant method to measure 
the extent of corporate disclosure. However, the disclosure index methodology faced 
serious criticized because of limited validity (e.g. subjective criteria, subjective 
weighting) and reliability (e.g. subjective coding) (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Many scholars indicated that the third-party evaluation of corporate disclosure still 
dominates in disclosure studies. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) noted, as previously 
mentioned, that content analysis can be undertaken manually or automatically or 
using both methods: examples of using the automatic method being Hussainey 
(2004) and Aljifiry and Hussainey (2007), which employed the Nudist program. 
Gruning (2006) indicated computerized content analysis would replace both 
disclosure index approaches and ratings in the future, if it were to be conducted with 
better reliability and validity. 
Therefore, LVD is defined as those items of information that are not stipulated by the 
Kuwaiti statutory regulations and laws. Many previous scholars adopted such a 
definition. Marston and Shrives (1991), Bradbury (1992) and Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan (2010) are worth noting here. This disclosure index provides an approach for 
measuring LVD of Kuwaiti companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange, which 
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disclose more information voluntarily. Voluntary disclosure is considered the first 
and important step in solving the alleged problems of traditional financial reporting 
(Leadbetter, 2000). 
In sum, the present study investigates LVD in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. Thus, it was decided to use a disclosure index in this study, with manual 
analysis, and focusing on the overall annual report (holistic content). As indicated 
previously, a disclosure index is considered one of the research instruments that have 
been used in prior disclosure studies, and extensively in research, such as Barako 
(2007), Rouf (2011) and Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010). Coy and Dixon (2004) 
indicated that a disclosure index is generally employed in accounting research, 
especially in studies that investigate annual reports; they stated: 
“Disclosure indices are an oft applied method in accounting research, 
particularly in studies of annual reports, being used to provide a single figure 
summary indicator either of the entire contents of reports of comparable 
organization or of particular aspects of interest covered by such reports (e. g. 
voluntary disclosure and environmental disclosure)” (p.79) 
The other methods as mentioned above are not suitable for the environment of 
Kuwait, for example, the analysts’ ratings are not available in the Kuwait context. 
With regard to the analysis approach, Hussainey (2004) stated: 
“One way to mitigate the inherent problems in subjective ratings is to use self-
constructed disclosure indices that are based on a list of disclosure items in 
evaluating the quality of corporate disclosure” (p.47) 
6.8.7 Construction of the disclosure index 
Actually, there is no a direct method to measure level disclosure, because financial 
disclosure is an abstract concept, which it difficult to measure directly (Cooke and 
Wallace, 1989) According to the majority of previous disclosure studies which 
investigated financial disclosure, they employed a predetermined list of information 
items (Cooke, 1989). The worth and usefulness of the disclosure index as a measure 
of disclosure depends on the process of selecting the items that are included in the 
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disclosure index, but the disclosure index involves researcher subjectivity in terms of 
judgement (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
According to Hussainey (2004), there are typically three stages that must be taken in 
the construction of a disclosure index. The first step is “selecting the preliminary list 
of disclosure topics”; the second step is “selecting the final list of disclosure topics”; 
the third step is “measuring the quality of disclosure”. 
Selecting the preliminary list of disclosure topics is considered the first and most 
important step to construct the disclosure index. However, Wallace and Nasser 
(1995) and Hooks et al. (2000) reported that there is no certain theory about the 
process to select the items for inclusion in the disclosure index. Hussainey (2004) 
stated, “The selection of the preliminary list of disclosure topics is usually based on 
reviewing the literature and on reading a sample of corporate annual reports” 
(p.48). The focus of the researcher in construction of the index plays the important 
role to determine the content and the number of items included in the index (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995). Where the disclosure index is different from one study to another, 
these studies depend for their selection of the content and number of items on various 
sources, e.g. related previous studies, rules and regulations governing the issuance of 
financial reporting in their country, and recommendations issued by financial 
analysts. Reviewing a large number of disclosure topics to establish the preliminary 
list will improve and enhance the process of selecting the content and items and 
reduce the subjectivity and bias of the researcher (Hussainey, 2004). Marston and 
Shrives (1991) reported that it was useful to use existing indexes in order to establish 
the disclosure index for their study through comparison with previous studies. 
Selecting the final list of disclosure topics is considered the important and crucial 
step in determining the final list of disclosure index. Hussainey (2004) reported that 
most disclosure studies ask a particular user group in order to help to determine the 
final list of the disclosure index. There are different methodologies employed in the 
literature to select the final list, “sending out questionnaires to the users of financial 
reports, conducting interviews and relating to recommendations provided by the 
accounting profession and accounting standards” (p.49) 
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For the first two steps of construction of the disclosure index, this study follows the 
same structure of previous disclosure studies, such as Cooke (1989) and Meek et al. 
(1995), in order to develop a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index to 
investigate LVD in annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies.  
Firstly, review previous disclosure studies to prepare the checklist including 
disclosure items as the preliminary checklist, then screening the preliminary checklist 
to eliminate any mandatory disclosure requirements, which were mentioned by laws 
regulating disclosure in Kuwait, such as Law No.3 of 1965, Law No. 32 of 1970, 
Law No. 15 of 1981, and IFRSs and stock exchange listing requirements. Second, the 
screened checklist was compared with the internal mandatory checklist used by a Big 
Four auditing firm in order to eliminate any mandatory items. Third, the screened 
checklist was sent to two academics and two experienced Kuwaiti accountants who 
work for one of the Big Four audit firms to refine it; to achieve validity in the 
research method. Finally, before starting to use the final checklist in this study, the 
final checklist was used in a pilot study applied on 30 companies selected from 
different sectors to check validity of the checklist for the Kuwaiti environment. Table 
6.4 shows the number of items and the percentage of each sub-category in the Index 
of LVD and evidence for inclusion. 
Table 6.4  Index categorization of LVD 
 Index categorization Items % Evidence for inclusion 
General corporate information 10 20% Singhvi, 1967, Ahmed & Nicholls, 
1994, Wallace et al., 1994 
Board of Directors and 
Management   
11 22% Cooke, 1989, Chau and Gray, 2002, 
Rodriguez & LeMaster, 2007 
Specific corporate strategy 9 18 % Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Chau and 
Gray, 2002 
Employee information 7 14% Cooke, 1991, Cooke, 1992, Ghazali 
& Weetman, 2006 
Corporate social disclosure   6 12 % Hossain et al., 1994, Meek et al., 
1995 
Others 7 14 % Firth, 1979 
 Total 50 100%  
 
Measuring disclosure is considered the final step in constructing a disclosure index. 
Several previous studies have used different approaches to build a scoring scheme to 
measure the disclosure level of annual financial reports; the first is a weighted 
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approach, such as in Cooke (1991, 1992), Karim (1995), Hossain et al. (1994) and 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994). The second is an unweighted approach, such as Cooke 
(1989), Meek et al. (1995), Street and Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001), and 
Chau and Gray (2002). The third used both weighted and unweighted approaches, 
e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) and Wallace and 
Naser (1995). Table 6.5 shows the previous studies and methods employed. 
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Table 6.5   Approaches to scoring disclosure items 
Study Year Weighted approach Unweighted 
approach 
Both 
Buzby 1975 Used by 144 financial analysts   
Firth 1979 Used by 46 financial analysts   
Chow & Boren 1987   Used both 
Wallace 1988  dichotomous  
Cooke 1989a  dichotomous  
Cooke 1989b  dichotomous  
Cooke 1992  dichotomous  
Malone et al  1993  Used 115 financial analysts   
Ahmed &Nicholls 1994  dichotomous  
Hossain, et al  1994  dichotomous  
Wallace &Naser 1994  dichotomous  
Raffournier 1995   dichotomous  
Hossain et al 1995  dichotomous  
Zarzeski 1996   Used both  
Inchausti 1997  dichotomous  
Naser 1998   dichotomous  
Owusu-Ansah 1998  dichotomous  
Abd-Elsalam 1999  dichotomous  
Hossain 2000  dichotomous  
Depoers 2000   dichotomous  
Street & Bryant 2000  dichotomous  
Ho & Wong 2001  dichotomous  
Street & Gray 2001  dichotomous  
Ferguson et al 2002  dichotomous  
Chau & Gray, 2002  dichotomous  
Haniffa & Cook 2002  dichotomous  
Naser et al 2002  dichotomous  
Nasser & Nuseibeh 2003   Used both  
Al-Shiab 2003  dichotomous  
Barako etal 2006 Used by loan officers    
Hossain 2008  dichotomous  
Aljifri 2008  dichotomous  
Rouf & ALharun 2011  dichotomous  
Nandi & Ghosh  2012   Used both  
Bhayani  2012  dichotomous  
Ibrahim &Jaafar  2013  dichotomous  
Al-Janadi et al  2013  dichotomous  
Soliman  2013  dichotomous  
Uyar et al 2013  dichotomous  
 
The weighted approach is based on the ranking the user who surveyed the annual 
report attaches to the information disclosure item, using a point scale methodology 
(for example from 1-10); this approach is advocated by Copeland and Fredericks 
(1968). For example, Malone et al. (1993) employed a scale of 0-2; 0 implies the 
item is not important, 1 implies the item is important, while 2 implies the item is very 
important. Under a weighted approach, weights are either given “subjectively by the 
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researcher(s) alone or by the researcher(s) using weights elicited from surveys of 
users’ perceptions” (Wallace et al., 1994, p.42). This approach also helps to 
determine the quality of disclosure, and not only its extent (Botosan, 1997; Hodgdon, 
2004). 
In an unweighted approach, dichotomous scores are used, where zero is given if a 
disclosure item is not disclosed and one is given if the disclosure item is disclosed 
(Cooke, 1992). Cooke is the first to suggest the unweighted model. For example, 
Xiao et al. (2004) employed an unweighted score and each item was assigned a score 
of 1 if disclosed and zero if it is not disclosed. This approach assumes that each item 
of disclosure is equally important (Hossain et al., 1995). Ferguson et al. (2002) 
reported that the unweighted approach eliminates the subjectivity of the user in 
evaluating the relative importance of each disclosure item across all user groups. In 
addition, it provides a neutral assessment of items. In this approach, all disclosure 
items are of the same importance (Cooke, 1989; Hodgdon, 2004). 
In this study, the un-weighted approach was used, which is followed by the majority 
of disclosure studies. The reasons for adopting this approach in this study were: 
 The weighted approach is considered appropriate when the study focuses on a 
certain group while an unweighted approach is considered appropriate when 
the study does not focus on a certain group. Bonsón and Escobar (2002) 
stated that the use of a weighted approach, “demands the determination of the 
relative importance of items to different users. Therefore, to avoid the 
arbitrariness inherent to this process” (p.35), this study focuses on all users 
of the financial annual reports, thus, the unweighted approach is considered 
appropriate. 
 This study is considered a longitudinal study, covering seven sectors. Hassan 
et al. (2006) reported that the relative importance of each item might change 
over time. In addition, Abd-Elsalam (1999) pointed out that the importance of 
each disclosure item varies from industry to industry and time to time. Thus, 
assigning different weights for each disclosure item in the disclosure list may 
be misleading. 
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 Usually the weighted approach was used with perceptions of investment 
analysts or the analysts’ ratings, while an un-weighted approach is more 
suitable when the study focuses on stakeholders (Cooke, 1989; Wang et al., 
2008). 
 Through the weighted approach there is emphasis on particular items; also, it 
may impact the reliability of the disclosure index, and in addition it suffers 
from subjectivity (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Belkaoui, 1994; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007).  
 From the viewpoint of some respondents, there are some items have high 
assigned value, because these items are not currently released by companies 
(Suwaidan, 1997). 
 Previous disclosure studies reported substantially identical results when using 
both weighted and unweighted approaches (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Xiao et al., 2004). 
 As shown in table 6.5, most of the previous disclosure studies employed an 
un-weighted approach. 
Un-weighted scoring method 
This current study adopts a disclosure model based upon the un-weighted approach, 
in addition, applying the dichotomous approach (Cooke, 1989), in which each 
company that disclosed an item of information that is included in the index on the 
annual report is scored as follows: 
 A score of one (1) is awarded to the company if the disclosure item is 
disclosed within the annual report. 
 A score of zero (0) is awarded if the disclosure item is not disclosed within 
the annual report. 
In order to calculate LVD for each company, this study adopted the equation of 
Chavent et al. (2006) by dividing the actual scores for disclosure items awarded for 
each company by the maximum number of disclosure items. Therefore, the 
disclosure index (LVD) for each firm was calculated as follows: 
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Where d = one if item di is disclosed and zero if item di is not disclosed. 
m = number of items disclosed 
n = maximum number of disclosure items possible. 
LVD is a ratio comparing the actual level of disclosure and the possible level (ibid., 
p.5). The same equation is applied to compute the LVD score for each of the six sub-
categories in the disclosure index. 
6.8.8 Assessing the reliability and validity of the disclosure 
Previous studies, such as Lang and Lundholm (1993), Marston and Shrives (1997), 
Botosan (1997), Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Collis and Hussey (2003) and Hussinay 
(2004) indicated the importance of the validity and reliability of the disclosure 
method. Hussinay (2004) stated:  
“Corporate disclosures are not easy to evaluate because the construction of a 
disclosure index requires subjective assessments by the researcher(s). As a 
result, it is essential to assess the reliability and the validity of the disclosure 
measure”. (p.50)  
Reliability refers to “the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same 
results on repeated trials” (Carmines and Zeller, 1991, 17 as cited in Hassan and 
Marston, 2010, p.27). While validity refers the crucial relationship between concept 
and indicator, in other words; it refers to if the thing is measured by the correct 
approach or not, i.e. the intended concept (Sekaran, 2003). Chapter 7 discusses these 
concepts (reliability and validity) in more detail with different sets of analyses 
employed in order to assess the reliability and validity of the self-constructed 
disclosure index. 
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6.9 The Independent Variables 
To achieve the third objective of this research, namely whether there are statistically 
significant relationships between LVD and its categories with the CG mechanisms, 
ownership structure and firm characteristics, it is important to measure the 
explanatory variables and to determine whether there are any associations between 
these variables and LVD. According to the theories that were discussed in chapter 3 
and previous disclosure studies, discussed in chapter 4, the independent variables’ 
data was collected for each of the four years from the different resources as 
mentioned in chapter 1. Table 6.6 summarizes the definition and measurement of the 
dependent variable and independent variables examined in this study. The next 
section presents the model used in this study, and in addition, the hypotheses tested 
for each variable. 
 
Table 6.6 Summarizes the definition and measurement of variables 
Definition Variable Measurement 
LVD The ratio of the total of items appear in the report to total score  
NEDs Ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of 
directors on the board 
Board Size The total number of the members on the board 
Role Duality Coded 1 if CEO IS the chairman and 0 if otherwise. 
Audit Committee Coded 1 if board audit committee exists and 0 otherwise 
Audit Firms Coded 1 if the auditor has a partnership with one of the big 
four audit firm and 0 if otherwise 
Ownership Structure  (Ownership concentration)An investor owned (direct or 
indirect) more than 20%  =1 or 0= otherwise  
Firm Size  Total assets  
Firm Age Measured in years 
Liquidity Current assets / Current liabilities 
Leverage Total debt  /  Total assets 
Profitability Net profit  / Total shareholders’ equity 
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6.9.1 Model 
The following model has been employed to investigate the relationship between 
LVD and each of CG, ownership structure, and firm characteristics: 
 
 LVD = β0 +β1 NEDs+β2 Board Size+β3 Role Duality+β4 Audit 
Committee+β5 Audit Firms+β6 Ownership Structure+β7 Firm Size+β8 Firm 
Age+β9 Liquidity+β10 Gearing +β11 Profitability +ε 
 
6.10 Statistical Tests 
This section presents an overview of the statistical methods used in the empirical 
section. The statistical package STATA is used to perform the statistical analyses. It 
starts by assessing the reliability and validity of the disclosure index, and then 
analyses LVD, categories of LVD, and item-by-item (chapter 7). This chapter 
answers the first two research questions. Descriptive statistics of the data gathered 
are calculated for each of the dependent and independent variables. Several methods 
are used, such as Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, Regarding 
Spearman correlation coefficient, some previous studies applied Spearman’s rank 
correlation, because they think it is still more popular and was employed in some 
disclosure studies (e.g. McNally et al., 1982; Abd-Elsalam, 1999). Cronbach’s alpha, 
Descriptive statistics, Frequency, Kolmogorov-Smirnova and Shapiro-Wilk are used 
in chapter 8, tests for checking assumptions of OLS regression and multiple 
regression tests and other robust tests are used to answer the third research question. 
The following paragraphs provide a brief explanation of all statistical techniques that 
are used in this study. 
6.10.1 Parametric versus non-parametric tests 
Both parametric and non-parametric tests are used in this study. Field (2012) defines 
a parametric test as, “one that required data from one of the large catalogue of 
distributions that statisticians have described and for data to be parametric certain 
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assumptions must be true” (p.132), while non-parametric tests are “a family of 
statistical procedures that do not rely on the restrictive assumptions of parametric 
tests” (ibid., p.790). According to Collis and Hussey (2003), parametric tests are 
more powerful than non-parametric tests, and parametric tests can only be employed 
on populations that have normally distributed data. Moreover, Field (2012) 
mentioned other assumptions, i.e. homogeneity of variance, interval data and 
independence, which should be met when applying parametric tests (p.133). 
Kanji (1999) said non-parametric tests are sometimes called distribution-free tests, 
because they do not need to meet of assumptions about normal distribution. 
Therefore, they are applied on data that are not normally distributed. Pallant (2001) 
reported parametric tests are more sensitive than non-parametric ones, because non-
parametric tests detect differences between groups that actually do exist less than 
parametric tests; thus, he considered that is the major disadvantage of the non-
parametric tests. However, many previous studies used both parametric and non-
parametric tests, because both tests help: first, to minimize the possibility of 
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis; second, to check the results of parametric 
tests; and third, in the case of a large sample, both techniques can provide similar 
results (Cooke, 1989; Suwaidan, 1997; Al-Shiab, 2003).  
6.10.2 Univariate and multivariate analyses 
According to previous disclosure studies, such as Craswell and Taylor (1992), 
Hossain et al. (1994), Raffournier (1995), Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Barako et al. 
(2006), Uyar et al. (2013), Mathuva (2012), Soliman (2013), Dhouibi and Mamoghli 
(2013) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013), both univariate and multivariate analyses were 
used. 
Univariate analysis is used to examine the relationship between LVD and each 
independent variable. For continuous variables (i.e. NEDs, Board size, Firm size, 
Firm age, Liquidity, Gearing, Profitability) correlation coefficients were used. 
Pearson correlation, as parametric test, was used when the normality assumption was 
satisfied, while Spearman rank correlation, as non-parametric tests, was used if the 
assumption of normality was violated. As discussed in section 6.9.1, both parametric 
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and non-parametric tests are used in this study. However, for nominal independent 
variables (i.e. Role duality, Audit committee, Audit firm, Ownership structure and 
Industrial type) both T-test as parametric test and Mann-Whitney U-test as non-
parametric were used to examine the effect of these nominal independent variables 
on LVD. For further analysis, Friedman and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests were used 
to investigate whether there is significant difference between LVD scores over the 
period under investigation. 
On the other hand, multivariate analysis is applied to several explanatory variables 
simultaneously. Previous disclosure studies used different statistical methods to test 
the relationship between level of disclosure and the independent variables. Cooke 
(2002) stated, “Multiple regression is used to assess the extent to which variability in 
the extent of LVD is explained by the various CG, cultural and firm-specific 
characteristics” (p.334). Wallace et al. (1994) reported that there is no theoretically 
correct method for investigating the relationship between the dependent (LVD) and 
the independent variables (p.47). However, Al-Mulhem (1997) argued that the 
majority of recent disclosure studies, starting with Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
have employed multiple regression analysis, e.g. some studies used standard multiple 
regression (Ordinary Least Squares method), some other studies used stepwise 
regression analysis, and are studies used both standard and stepwise regression. In 
this study, the Ordinary Least Squares method was used to investigate the 
relationship between LVD and each of CG mechanisms, Ownership structure and 
Firm characteristics. Further tests are used, such as GLS regression, Tobit regression 
and quantile regression; for more information for these tests see chapter 8. However, 
problems often arise when applying multiple regression, such as normality of 
residuals and linearity; in addition, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity are 
discussed in the following section. 
6.10.2.1 Normality of residuals and linearity 
Field (2012) stated the normality is, “a probability distribution of a random variable 
that is known to have certain properties. It is perfectly symmetrical (has a skew of 0) 
and has a kurtosis of 0” (p.790). Normality of residuals means that errors (residuals) 
should be normally distributed. Statistically, several methods can be used to assess 
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normality, such as normality plots and normality tests. Normality plots include Q-Q 
plot, P-P plot, histogram, and density estimate. Field (2012) stated a Q-Q plot is “a 
graph plotting the quantiles of the variable against the quantiles of the particular 
distribution (often a normal distribution)” (p.792), while a P-P plot is “a graph 
plotting the cumulative probability of a variable against the cumulative probability 
of particular distribution (often a normal distribution)” (p.792). A histogram is a 
frequency distribution of the variable; it may take many forms depending on the data 
distribution (ibid.). Liu and Shell (2012) stated that density estimation “is a 
technique for constructing an estimate of an unobservable underlying probability 
density function (p.d.f.) based on limited observations” (p.828). The normality tests 
include skewness-kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk, which are employed for both the 
residuals and the dependent variable. Bai and Ng (2005) stated skewness-kurtosis 
“tests can be used to make inference about any conjectured coefficients of skewness 
and kurtosis” (p.49). The Shapiro-Wilk test is considered one test for normality10.  
6.10.2.2 Homoscedasticity  
Field (2012) stated homoscedasticity is “an assumption in regression analysis that 
the residuals at each level of the predictor variables(s) have similar variance” 
(p.787). It is best examined graphically (Hair et al., 1998). This study uses both 
graphical and numerical methods. The graphical method plots residuals and predicted 
values, while the numerical method uses two tests: the first is Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg and White’s tests, and the second is Cameron and Trivedi’s decomposition 
of IM (information matrix) test; both tests are conducted with STATA. 
6.10.2.3 Multicollinearity 
Field (2012) stated that multicollinearity is “a situation in which two or more 
variables are very closely linearly related” (p.790). Two methods are employed in 
this study to detect multicollinearity. The first method is the matrix of bivariate 
correlations coefficients; parametric (Pearson) and non-parametric (Spearman) are 
the common methods used in previous studies to test for multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity is present when there is high correlation between all pairs of 
                                                 
10
 It was published in 1965 by Samuel Sanford Shapiro and Martin Wilk 
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explanatory variables examined. Some scholars suggest that multicollinearity will 
exist when the correlation coefficient between two or more explanatory variables 
exceeds 0.80 (Judge et al., 1985; and Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). The second 
method is variance inflation factor (VIF), which is estimated by this equation: 
VIF = 1 / (1 – R2)11 
However, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) reported that there is no need to be 
concerned with a variance inflation factor less than 10. 
6.11 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the main purpose was to present the methodology methods used in 
this study to answer the research questions, starting by providing an overview of the 
research process, then an explanation of research philosophy in general. A multi-
approach paradigm was thus conducted in this study that represents the 
interpretivist–functionalist transition zone. In addition, this study seeks to examine 
empirically the association between LVD and each of CG mechanisms, ownership 
structure and firm characteristics. The deductive approach was undertaken to 
developing hypotheses based on a theory. A multi-approach theoretical framework 
was applied to integrating a number of disclosure theories in order to explain the 
study results. Data was collected for the fiscal years corresponding to 2007-2010 to 
provide the most recent investigation; many sources were used to gather data from 
both primary and secondary sources, such as annual reports, textbooks, articles, 
journals, Kuwaiti legislation, publications and the website of the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange, magazines, and newspapers relevant to the Kuwaiti business environment. 
The final sample is 155 Kuwaiti listed companies with 620 firm–year observations. 
A self-checklist of voluntary disclosure items was constructed in order to measure 
LVD and its categories in Kuwaiti companies’ annual reports; it consisted of 50 
disclosure items. Therefore, this study is considered to be a quantitative study. An 
unweighted approach was applied based on the previous disclosure studies. The 
                                                 
11
 Where R
2
 is estimated by regressing each independent variable on all other independent variables 
(Gujarati, 1999, p.325) 
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model was developed to investigate the relationships between LVD and each of CG 
mechanisms, ownership structure and firm characteristics. The importance of 
assessing the reliability and validity of the disclosure index was explained. 
Formulation of testable hypotheses was presented. The most appropriate statistical 
methods were selected for this study, such as parametric tests, non-parametric tests, 
univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. Assumptions of OLS regression, such 
as normality of residuals and linearity, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were 
presented with methods of calculations for these assumptions. The next two chapters 
provide the empirical analysis used to answer the research questions. 
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Chapter 7: The First Part of the Empirical Work 
7.1 Introduction 
In previous disclosure studies, a disclosure index is used as a reliable measurement 
instrument to measure the extent of LVD and its categories, as indicated in chapter 5. 
Marston and Shrives (1991) reported a disclosure index is used to measure the extent 
of total voluntary disclosure as a reliable measurement device and has been used in 
previous studies of voluntary disclosure, such as Cooke (1989, 1991), Meek et al. 
(1995) and Al-Shammari (2008). This chapter is the first part of the empirical work; 
it presents the findings related to Research Questions 1and 2: 
1. What is the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Kuwaiti listed 
corporate? 
2. To what extent did voluntary disclosures of Kuwaiti listed companies 
change over the period 2007-2010? 
To answer these questions, a self-constructed index was developed as a research 
instrument in order to measure LVD and its categories in Kuwaiti listed companies. 
In order to understand voluntary disclosure practice, the disclosure index should be 
divided in subgroups as mentioned in the literature review. The disclosure index used 
in this study consists of 50 information items divided into six groups. 
By detailed analysis of the outcomes of the disclosure index, these questions are 
answered, starting with the credibility of the research in section 7.2. Then in section 
7.3, statistical tests are used to evaluate the reliability and validity of the disclosure 
index used to measure LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies. Subsection 7.3.1 presents 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient as a measure of the internal consistency between items 
in each group and their total group score. Reliability and validity of the disclosure 
score is presented in subsection 7.3.2. In section 7.4, the extent and trend of LVD is 
discussed. The significant increase in LVD during 2007-2010 is presented in section 
7.5. The amount of variation between LVD categories during the period of study is 
clarified in section 7.6. The analysis and assessment of LVD by items disclosed in 
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each category in company annual reports is provided in section 7.7. Finally, section 
7.8 provides a concluding summary. 
7.2 Credibility of the Disclosure Index 
In general, all observations and measurements include error; to reduce the risk of 
obtaining error in answers for research questions, it is important to guarantee the 
credibility of the research findings of two main aspects of the research design of this 
study, namely, the voluntary disclosure index’s reliability and validity (Saunders et 
al., 2007). 
Reviewing the literature reveals the importance of the goodness of fit in the 
disclosure index as a measure. The goodness of fit of a measure could be improved 
by considering the reliability and validity of the results, before starting to conduct the 
statistical analysis. In general, reliability refers to “the extent to which a measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Hassan and Marston, 2008, 
p.27). While validity refers to the crucial relationship between concept and indicator; 
in other words, it refers to if the thing is measured by the correct approach or not, i.e. 
the intended concept (Sekaran, 2003).  
7.2.1 Assessing the reliability of the disclosure index 
The reliability of a measure is established by testing for both stability and 
consistency with which the instrument measures the concept, and assists in 
evaluating the goodness of that instrument’s measure. Stability indicates the 
measure’s ability to give the same results if the same individuals in the same 
circumstances repeat it. Consistency refers to homogeneity of the items (whether 
they hang together as a set) to measure a concept (Sekaran, 2003). 
Test–retest reliability and parallel-form reliability are used to examine stability. 
Test–retest reliability means obtaining the reliability coefficient when the same 
measure is repeated on a second occasion (Sekaran, 2003). That means the same 
people do the same test at different times. However, parallel-form reliability is 
gauged by two comparable tests that have the same content and same response 
format, but with different words and different sequence of the questions. All 
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observations and measurements include error, so this form of reliability focuses on 
the error variability resulting from phrasing and arrangement of the questions. In 
other words, different people do different tests at the same time. 
Consistency can be examined through the inter-item consistency reliability and 
split–half reliability tests. Inter-item consistency is used to test the consistency of 
participants’ answers to all items in an instrument. In other words, the same test by 
different people at the same time, On the other hand, split–half reliability tests are 
used to measure the reliability by splitting a test into two components and an 
individual’s answers on both halves are compared. In addition, internal consistency 
reliability can be used to test the consistency of a measurement instrument by 
Cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficients. Item-to-total correlation assists assessing 
the internal consistency reliability.  
Test-retest reliability: The researcher started by reading the content of the annual 
report for each company in 2007 to know which voluntary items were not disclosed, 
and then read each again to identify the score for each company. All annual reports 
of all companies for each of the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 were read twice in the 
same way. The researcher then re-started with year 2007 and re-examined the annual 
reports, allowing a suitable time between the first and second examinations. This 
procedure was repeated for the other years. The correlation coefficients between the 
first and second examinations confirm the stability of the voluntary disclosure index.  
Internal consistency reliability means the degree to which all items hang together 
and measure the same attribute. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is the most commonly 
used measure for reliability through correlation coefficients. Values range between 
zero and one; greater reliability is indicated by higher values (Pallant 2001). 
According to Pallant (2001), internal consistency reliability results for any variables 
are shown when their Cronbach’s alpha is positive and has a value more than 7. See 
Tables 7.7 and 7.8.  
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7.3 Assessment of the Reliability and validity 
As indicated previously, the voluntary disclosure index includes 50 items distributed 
over six categories. The reliability of these categories was tested statistically. 
According to Nielsen (2000), reliability means, “how free it is from random error” 
From the above discussion, test–retest reliability is used to examine stability, while 
internal consistency reliability is used to examine consistency in the study. 
7.3.1 Item to sub-total (group score) correlations 
Table 7.1 shows correlation coefficients and significances between Items and Total 
Group Score of (GCI). All items have significant correlation with their group score at 
1% significance level, except Brief narrative history of company item, which has 
insignificant correlation with its subgroup: this item scored 619 from the total score 
of 620. 
Table 7.2 shows correlation coefficients and significances between Items and Total 
Group Score of (BMD). All have significant correlation with their group score at 1% 
significance level, except Age of the directors, which has insignificant correlation 
with its subgroup.  
All items of (SCS) have significant correlation with their group score at 1% 
significance level by both Pearson and Spearman tests, as can be seen from table 7.3. 
Table 7.4 shows correlation coefficients and significances between Items and Total 
Group Score of (EI). All items have significant correlation with their group score at 
1% significance level, except Identification of senior management and their 
functions. It has insignificant correlation with its subgroup in both Pearson and 
Spearman tests.  
 
 
 
 
158 
 
Table 7-1 Correlation Coefficients and Significances between Items and Total Group Score (GCI) 
Item X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 
Pearson .061 .452** .148** .545** .331** .317** .579** .494** .629** .616** 
Spearman .065 .442** .142** .531** .225** .283** .586** .483** .647** .595** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
Table 7-2 Correlation Coefficients and Significances between Items and Total Group Score (BMD) 
Item X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21 
Pearson  .343** .022 .546** .522** .674** .620** .623** .520** .553** .537** .490** 
Spearman .386* .035 .572** .585** .717** .613** .524** .340** .374** .365** .335** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 7-3 Correlation Coefficients and Significances between Items and Total Group Score (SCS) 
Item X22 X23 X24 X25 X26 X27 X28 X29 X30 
Pearson. .226** .632** .735** .766** .676** .652** .535** .562** .515** 
Spearman .273** .588** .832** .768** .664** .646** .364** .363** .297** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.5 shows correlation coefficients and significances between Items and Total 
Group Score of (CSD). All items of corporate social disclosure have significant 
correlation with their group score at 1% significance level by both Pearson and 
Spearman tests.  
Table 7.6 shows correlation coefficients and significances between Items and Total 
Group Score of (O). All items of other category have significant correlation with 
their group score at 1% significance level, except Information on ISO certification 
item, which has insignificant correlation with its subgroup. This item scored 617 
from the total score of 620. 
Based on the foregoing, it can be seen from these tables that most items have 
significant correlation with their category score at 1% significance level, except 
some items as interpreted above. Before taking action to exclude these items, one 
should calculate the correlation coefficients between the total score of the voluntary 
disclosure index and each item. After calculating the correlation coefficients, the 
findings indicate most items have correlation coefficients at 1% and 5% with the 
total score of the voluntary disclosure index and some have no significance with the 
total score of the voluntary disclosure index; even so, they have correlation 
coefficients with their category score. As such, all items in the index have significant 
correlation, either with their category score or with the total score. Therefore, by the 
above explanation, there is no reason to exclude any item from the voluntary 
disclosure index, so all items are kept in the index. 
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Table 7-4 Correlation Coefficients and Significances between Items and Total Group Score (EI) 
Item X31 X32 X33 X34 X35 X36 X37 
Pearson .778** .529** .018 .686** .300** .616** .770** 
Spearman .885** .326** .049 .518** .248** .379** .672** 
           **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
           *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 7-5 Correlation Coefficients and Significances between Items and Total Group Score (CSD) 
Item X38 X39 X40 X41 X42 X43 
Pearson .623** .534** .693** .707** .624** .706** 
Spearman .463** .482** .812** .602** .380** .645** 
            **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
            *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
Table 7-6 Correlation Coefficients and Significances between Items and Total Group Score (O) 
Item X44 X45 X46 X47 X48 X48 X50 
Pearson .581** .041 .479** .314** .720** .733** .253** 
Spearman .435** .029 .535** .306** .677** .713** .145** 
                   **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
                  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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 7.3.2 Total reliability of the disclosure index  
Hail (2000) said the assessment of financial reporting is a difficult process because it 
depends on a person’s subjective perception for the development and application of a 
disclosure score. The current study is similar with previous studies because it 
depends on the subjective judgement of the researcher for the development and 
application of the disclosure index 
There is a variety of approaches used to assess the reliability of the instrument 
measure. The first approach is Pearson correlation, which is calculated on the mean 
inter-correlations among the items. The correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to 1, 
where correlation coefficient = 1 means two coders provide the same findings, but 
where correlation coefficient = -1 this that means a negative relationship; however, if 
correlation coefficient = 0 that means different findings between the first item and 
the second item. The second approach is Cronbach’s alpha, which refers to the 
degree of positive correlations among items of one set to another. The range of 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is from 0 to 1, which means if Cronbach’s alpha is 0, 
there is no consistency between items. Based on the above, before starting to use this 
index in the current study, the reliability of LVD categories should be tested. 
Table 7.7 shows the mean inter-correlations among the items measured; the 
reliability of these categories was tested statistically. The findings show that all 
categories are correlated with LVD score. In addition, Cronbach’s alpha is 0.825, 
which meets Pallant’s (2001) criteria for variable reliability: Cronbach’s alpha is 
both positive and greater than 0.7. This result shows LVD has a high degree of 
internal consistency reliability. 
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Table 7.7 Reliability tests – categories 
Category No of 
items 
group-test 
correlation 
Chronbach's 
Alpha 
Alpha if group 
Deleted 
GCI 10 .554  
 
 
0.825 
.809 
BDM  11 .572 .810 
SCS 9 .651 .785 
EI 7 .678 .795 
CSD 6 .666 .785 
O 7 .627 .799 
 
7.3.3 Assessing the validity of the disclosure index 
Validity concerns the crucial relationship between concept and measuring instrument 
(Kerlinger, 1986), which means the research results are representative of the real 
situation (Collis and Hussey, 2003). There are several types of test for validity of 
goodness of the measuring instrument. According to Neuman (2006), four types of 
validity are applicable to this study.  
1) Face validity: ensures whether the disclosure index appears to measure LVD for 
Kuwaiti listed companies; the disclosure index in this study was reviewed by 
academics and experienced Kuwaiti accountants who work for one of the Big Four 
audit firms. 
2) Content validity: ensures whether the measure “voluntary disclosure index” 
includes all the aspects of disclosure in this study and captures all of an adequate and 
representative set of items that tap the concept (Sekaran, 2003). According to 
Nunnally (1978), content validity is not assessed by using statistical methods. 
Several approaches can be employed to attest content validity, such as definition of 
the research through the literature review and using a panel of judges. This study 
depended on the disclosure indices of previous studies, which were modified to suit 
Kuwaiti companies by comparing the items of the voluntary disclosure index with an 
internal mandatory checklist, issued from Kuwaiti regulations and used by a Big 
Four auditing firm, in order to remove any mandatory items from the voluntary 
disclosure index. The disclosure index was reviewed by academics and experienced 
Kuwaiti accountants to assess validity as mentioned above in Face validity. 
Therefore, LVD in this study includes all the aspects of LVD items for the Kuwaiti 
companies.  
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3) Criterion-related validity: considers if any standards or criteria were used in the 
disclosure index to measure voluntary disclosure. There are two kind of criterion-
related validity, concurrent validity and predictive validity. Concurrent validity 
means ensuring whether the voluntary disclosure index agrees with pre-existing 
indices or not. Predictive validity means whether the voluntary disclosure index can 
predict future aspects related to voluntary disclosure issues in Kuwait. However, 
Hassan (2006) reported that in social science criterion-related validity is not often 
used. 
4) Construct validity: means “how well the results obtained from the use of the 
measure fit the theories around which the test is designed” (Sekaran, 2003, p.207). In 
addition, Sekaran reported that the correlation coefficient is a way to investigate 
construct validity. This method is used in previous disclosure studies in order to 
assess the validity of disclosure scores, such as Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Botosan 
(1997), and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). Table 7.8 presents both Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients, and significances between categories and LVD. 
The results show highly-correlated categories and LVD at the 1% significance level.  
Table 7.8 Correlation analysis of LVD scores and categories 
   Spearman 
Pearson 
LVD GCI BMD SCS EI CSD O 
LVD 1 .702
**
 .723
**
 .753
**
 .588
**
 .636
**
 .627
**
 
GCI .724
**
 1 .357
**
 .357
**
 .310
**
 .406
**
 .360
**
 
BMD .750
**
 .404
**
 1 .431
**
 .351
**
 .330
**
 .380
**
 
SCS .791
**
 .442
**
 .469
**
 1 .524
**
 .396
**
 .426
**
 
EI .754
**
 .375
**
 .490
**
 .621
**
 1 .455
**
 .337
**
 
CSD .769
**
 .507
**
 .426
**
 .505
**
 .599
**
 1 .401
**
 
O .719
**
 .422
**
 .445
**
 .496
**
 .503
**
 .559
**
 1 
       **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
       Where: LVD    The level of voluntary disclosure Index,  GCI Corporate Information Category, 
     BDM Board of Directors and Management, SCS Specific Corporate Strategy, EI Employee Information 
CSD, Corporate Social Disclosure  , O Others 
As previously mentioned in chapter 4, firm characteristics are associated with 
disclosure level; and explain the variation in disclosure level. For example, Al-
Shammari (1998) examined voluntary disclosure in Kuwait company annual reports. 
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He found size, gearing and industry type were important in determining disclosure 
levels regardless of a company’s country. Thus, the correlation between firm 
characteristics and LVD is presented in the table 8.2. From this table, from the 
reliability tests and the validity test of LVD, the findings confirm the high degree of 
internal consistency reliability between categories and LVD, and also the high 
correlation between categories and LVD (validity). 
7.4 The Extent and Trend of LVD 
A voluntary disclosure index is constructed to measure and present insights about the 
relative sufficiency of LVD published in annual reports issued by 155 companies 
listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange; 620 annual reports of 155 companies listed for 
the years 2007 to 2010 have been analysed using this disclosure index. This index 
instrument consists of 50 voluntary disclosure items segmented into six groups, 
containing between 6 and 11 items each. 
Disclosure lists are extensive sets of selected items (Marston and Shrieves, 1991). 
The selection of voluntary disclosure items used in the index of voluntary disclosure 
is an important step. Although the selection of these items is a subjective judgment, 
Marston and Shrives (1991) reported the effectiveness of the disclosure index, as a 
measure of disclosure, depends essentially on the selection of items for disclosure 
inclusion. 
To arrive at the operation of selecting of a list of voluntary items of information in 
order to construct the voluntary disclosure index in the current study, there were 
many steps, as mentioned in chapter 4. In short, the first step is ensuring these items 
reflect what Company Law No. 15, IFRSs and stock exchange listing requirements 
required. The second is, scanning all items to exclude any compulsory disclosure 
requirements of company law, IFRSs or stock exchange listing requirements. The 
third is, asking two academics and two experienced Kuwaiti accountants to refine the 
index to ensure its validity. The fourth and final is, reviewing academic literature 
related to studies that basically focused on voluntary disclosure in developed and 
developing countries.  
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Table 7.9 Index categorization of LVD 
 Index classification Items % 
General corporate information 10 20% 
Board of Directors and Management   11 22% 
Specific corporate strategy 9 18% 
Employee information 7 14% 
Corporate social disclosure   6 12% 
Others 7 14% 
Total  50 100% 
 
 
This section presents and discusses the descriptive statistics of LVD and its 
categories for each year and for all four years together, by using the research 
methods discussed in the methodology chapter. Table 7.10 indicates the mean of the 
LVD score.  
This disclosure index has been used to analyse 620 annual reports of 155 companies 
for the years from 2007 to 2010. The dependent variable in the current research is the 
LVD scores over the four years; the percentage awarded disclosure score to the 
applicable score represents LVD and that provides the trend of LVD practice in the 
annual reports. 
Table 7.10 Descriptive Statistics of LVD  
  N Mean Min  Max  Std. deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
LVD 2007 155 10.483 4 39 6.607 2.144 4.750 
LVD 2008 155 10.554 3 39 7.002 2.187 4.633 
LVD 2009 155 13.709 5 39 6.291 1.916 3.816 
LVD 2010 155 16.864 7 40 5.9055 1.393 2.231 
Pooled 620 12.90 3 40 6.977 1.473 2.190 
 
Table 7.10 presents the descriptive statistics of the total of LVD for each year and for 
all four years together. In 2007, the mean was 10.48; in 2008 and 2009, the mean 
grew steadily to around 13.70; but in 2010, it increased dramatically to around 16.86 
with a range of 7 to 40 items. Even though this suggests that there has been some 
improvement in LVD, still the average LVD is lower than in other studies. Alsaeed 
(2006) pointed out the low level of disclosure could be explained by the absence of 
implementation to disclose and their nature. In addition, this supports this 
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researcher’s decision to focus in the current study on investigating which factors will 
enhance LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies.  
While the minimum of LVD in 2008 is three items, the maximum is 40 from 50 
items for 2010. The wide variation in the range of LVD can be observed also in each 
year of the period studied. Although the minimum level LVD increased from three 
items in 2008 to seven items in 2010, on the other hand, the maximum level of LVD 
has shown a slight increase over the years. It was 39 items for the years 2007, 2008 
and 2009, but in 2010 was 40 items from 50 items. This finding indicates the 
presence of large variations in LVD practices in Kuwait. 
Table7.11 Frequency of LVD Score 
LVD  2007  2008  2009  2010  Pooled  
  NO % NO % NO % NO % NO % 
<4 5 0.032 6 0.039 0 0.000 0 0.000 11 0.018 
5--9  92 0.587 93 0.600 32 0.206 5 0.032 221 0.356 
10--14  31 0.200 32 0.206 79 0.510 51 0.329 193 0.311 
15-19 14 0.097 8 0.052 28 0.181 63 0.406 114 0.184 
20-24 4 0.026 5 0.032 2 0.013 21 0.135 32 0.052 
25-29 4 0.026 6 0.039 6 0.039 6 0.039 22 0.035 
30-34 3 0.019 2 0.013 6 0.039 7 0.045 18 0.029 
35-39 2 0.013 3 0.019 2 0.013 1 0.006 8 0.013 
>40 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.006 1 0.002 
Pooled 155 100 155 100 155 100 155 100 620 100 
 
In addition to the above, table 7.11 sheds more light on LVD in the annual reports of 
Kuwait listed companies. Table 7.11 displays the frequency distributions of the 
disclosure scores of LVD between the Kuwaiti listed companies. As can be noted 
from table 7.11, in 2007, 146 of 155 companies (94.19%) disclosed less than 50% of 
LVD, and the remaining nine companies (5.81%) disclosed more than 50%. In 2008, 
144 companies (92.90%) disclosed less than 50% of LVD, and the remaining 11 
companies (7.10%) disclosed more than 50%. In 2009, 141 companies (90.96%) 
disclosed less than 50% of LVD, and the remaining 14 companies (9.03%) disclosed 
more than 50%. In 2010, 140 companies (90.32%) disclosed less than 50% of LVD, 
and the remaining 15 companies (9.68%) disclosed more than 50%. 
The above analysis shows, the number of companies that disclosed more than 50% of 
the voluntary index increased during the years of study, starting in 2007 with 9 
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companies (5.81%) and then increasing to reach 15 companies (9.68%) in 2010. In 
other words, there is a trend for more Kuwaiti companies to provide more voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
Figure 7.1 Extent of LVD 2007-2010 
Although the average of LVD is low, there is an increasing extent of LVD over the 
period of study, as indicate in figure 7.1: 20.69% in year 2007 then 21.10% in 2008,  
increasing dramatically in 2009 to 27.41%, and continuing to increase dramatically 
also in 2010 to reach 33.72%. The average of LVD over four year is 25.80%, but 
comparing the average of LVD during study years with previous studies – Ho and 
Wong (2001) found in Hong Kong 29%, Leventis and Weetman (2004) in Greece 
37%, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in Malaysia 31% – shows that LVD by Kuwaiti 
listed companies is lower. However, one must pay attention to differences of 
economic environment, sample size, components of the index disclosure and time of 
the study, when making comparisons with previous studies.  
In addition, figure 7.2 shows the trend of LVD over the four years. This outcome can 
be explained by recent developments to understanding the concept of voluntary 
disclosure by regulators and companies in Kuwait, because after the global financial 
crisis in 2008, awareness of the importance of transparency and CG was increased in 
many companies around the world, as well as in Kuwait. 
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Figure 7.2 Trend of LVD 2007-2010 
Recently, CG has received more focus in Kuwait generally. Many conferences and 
publications were organised to discuss the importance of CG and its characteristics 
and the need for it to be applied; hence, the Central Bank of Kuwait has made an 
effort to develop control and monitoring methods for banking and financial 
institutions in accordance with the best international standards and practices. 
In 2004, the Kuwait Central Bank issued comprehensive instructions (Basel 
Committee) to banks and investment companies (conventional and Islamic) only to 
cover standards of CG and enhance accountability, transparency and integrity of the 
data and information in order to protect shareholders, employees, customers and the 
public. In addition, the Kuwait stock market’s Capital Market Commission obliged 
all banks to apply some of the principles of CG, which would increase transparency 
and disclosure, such as particular instruction on disclosure of percentage of 
ownership of major shareholders. 
Moreover, as noted from table 7.11, the number of companies that have the highest 
scores of LVD is small, only 49 reports from 620 reports during 2007-2010 disclosed 
more than 50% of LVD; particularly, 22 reports disclosed 60% of LVD, 18 reports 
disclosed 70% of LVD, eight reports disclosed 80% of LVD and one report disclosed 
90%. However, it is expected that these companies will urge other companies – 
which may be called leading companies – to launch more disclosure. The next 
chapter discusses the motivation and characteristics of these companies. 
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It is better to look at the type of information, which components of LVD, indicate 
which type of information of these components had a significant impact on voluntary 
disclosure. In addition, it may be useful to look at the Industrial type of this LVD 
score. Section 7.4 explains these categories of information in detail, while section 7.5 
explains the industrial types in detail.  
Figure 7.1 illustrates the contribution of these different components of LVD to the 
LVD score over the period of study (2007-2010). The pie chart in figure 7.3 
illustrates that the items of (GCI) have the largest contribution to LVD with average 
score 37.20% over the four-year period. It is without doubt that these items are 
deemed to be a of degree of importance to investors, because it is a key entrance to 
investing in listed companies. In addition, the second largest contribution comes 
from items of (BDM) with average score 22.40%, items about (O) with average score 
15.40%. Then come in descending order each of (SCS) and (CSD) with averages 
scores 12.55% and 8.26% respectively. (EI) has the lowest proportion in the total 
voluntary index with average score 4.19%. The low level of (EI) is considered 
reasonable because Kuwaiti listed companies consider this information useless for 
investors. Although this detailed information about employees, such as geographical 
distribution of employee, categories of employees by gender and others mentioned in 
the section on employees information in voluntary disclosure is important for 
government agencies, it can be obtained by other means. 
 
Figure 7.3 Extent of LVD categories 2007-2010 
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7.5 The Significant Increase in LVD during 2007-2010 
The results in table 7.2 (Descriptive statistics of LVD) ,while in figure 7.1 show that 
there is a progressive increase in LVD over the study years (2007-2010). Secondly, 
there is significant increase in the number companies that release more voluntarily 
disclosure during this period. Finally, the average number of sub-groups of voluntary 
disclosure has increased during the study period, more than double in total sum 
between 2007 and 2010. However, it may be helpful to use the research methodology 
and specific research methods discussed in chapter 6, to determine whether there is a 
significant difference between LVD scores over the period. In addition, for the 
longitudinal nature of this study, surely there needs to be data for multiple periods. In 
summary, the examination of the number of firms disclosing voluntary information 
indicates that listed companies in the Kuwaiti stock market responded positively to 
the changed disclosure environment over the study period, when the Kuwaiti 
government issued regulations in order to enhance financial reporting and disclosure.  
This section combines and compares between LVD for four years. In addition, it 
investigates whether there are significant differences between LVD scores over the 
four years. Table 7.10 shows descriptive statistics of LVD (dependant variable). A 
series of statistical tests has been conducted before starting to test whether the 
changes in voluntary disclosures are statistically significant or not. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test and the Shapiro-Wilk Test are two well-know tests of normality. In 
this study, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test is used because it is more appropriate for 
large sample size (> 50 samples), while the second test is more appropriate for small 
sample sizes (< 50 samples), but can also handle a large sample for assessing 
normality; in addition, skewness-kurtosis is also used.  
Table7.12 Tests of Normality of LVD 2007-2010 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
LVD 2007 .215 155 .000 .750 155 .000 
LVD 2008 .241 155 .000 .727 155  .000 
LVD 2009 .216 155 .000 .796 155 .000 
LVD 2010 .149 155 .000 .889 155 .000 
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Table 7.12 clearly show the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk 
statistics used to assess the normality of the distribution of LVD over four years; 
results of both tests indicate that there is non-significant difference between LVD 
over the four years. (sig. value is .000) suggesting violation of the assumption of 
normality. In addition, an analysis of the statistics on the skewness and kurtosis 
normality test for normality, assumption of normality when the skewness value is ± 
1.96 and the kurtosis value is within ± 3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), suggests 
results, as in table 7.10, that the assumptions of normality were not met for LVD 
2007, LVD 2008, LVD 2009 or LVD 2010. 
Determination of the type of test to be used (parametric or non-parametric tests) 
depends on testing for normality of variables. Accordingly, the results show that 
LVD scores are not normally distributed, so it is appropriate to use non-parametric 
test techniques when as there is violation of the assumption of normality. Friedman 
and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests are used to investigate whether there is significant 
difference between LVD scores over the period under investigation.  
Table 7.13 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests of LVD 2007-2010 
Ranks  N Mean Rank Sum of 
Ranks 
Z Sig.(2-tailed) 
LVD 2007 – 
LVD 2008 
Negative 
Ranks 
63 63.40 3386.5 -0.88 0.424 
 Positive 
Ranks 
58 58.39 3386.5   
LVD 2008 – 
LVD 2009 
Negative 
Ranks 
21 45.43 954 -8.471 0.000 
 Positive 
Ranks 
122 76.57 9342   
LVD 2009 – 
LVD 2010 
Negative 
Ranks 
18 38.42 691.5 -8.635 0.000 
 Positive 
Ranks 
118 73.09 8624.5   
 
As shown in the results in table 7.13, there is no statistically significant difference 
between LVD 2007 and LVD 2008 (p = .424). This means no change in voluntary 
disclosures scores between LVD 2007 and LVD 2008. On the other hand, there is a 
statistically significant difference between LVD 2008 and LVD 2009, and also 
between LVD 2009 and LVD 2010 (p = .000 for each), this means change in 
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voluntary disclosures scores between LVD 2008 and L VD 2009, and also between 
LVD 2009 and LVD 2010. These results investigate differences between each pair of 
years. Additionally, the Friedman test was employed in order to examine whether 
there are significant differences between LVD scores over the four years. Table 7.14 
shows there are statistically significant difference scores over the four years.  
Table 7.14 Friedman test of LVD 2007-2010 
 Ranks Mean Rank 
LVD 2007 1.72 
LVD 2008 1.73 
LVD 2009 2.85 
LVD 2010 3.71 
N 155 
Chi-Square 273.572 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 
 
In sum, although there was increasing in LVD during the four years (2007-2010), as 
is clear from the results of both Wilcoxon Signed Ranks and Friedman tests, this 
increase was not sufficient to ensure that these are statistically significant. In order to 
explain further these statistically significant difference scores over four years, the 
next section shows descriptive analysis of the level and the trend of each category of 
LVD over the four years. 
7.6 LVD and its Categories over Four Years 
Table 7.15 shows the mean scores of each category in each year over the period of 
four years, to clarify the amount of variation between categories during the period of 
study, in order to analyse the extent and trend of each category. This analysis is 
useful to understand disclosure policy and the changes that Kuwaiti listed companies 
prefer to disclose under this policy. 
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Table 7.15 Extent of LVD and its categories 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
GCI 41.48 39.10 48.32 63.10 48.00 
BDM 22.7 21.94 25.81 34.66 26.28 
SCS 13.33 14.48 19.5 24.66 17.99 
EI 6.45 6.64 8.76 9.03 7.72 
CSD 8.71 11.61 24.41 26.34 17.77 
O 23.78 25.25 31.52 33.00 28.39 
LVD 20.96 21.10 27.41 33.72 25.80 
 
 
Therefore, as illustrated in table7.15, there are changes in the mean scores of each of 
the six groups. The changes differ among the categories, some of them positively and 
some negatively. The category of (GCI) was 41.48% in 2007, but in 2008, there was 
a decrease to 39.10%. In 2009 the (GCI) increased until it exceeded what it was in 
2007 to 48.32% with rate equals 6.84%, in 2010 the rate increased dramatically by 
14.78% over 2009 year. In addition, the category of Board of Directors and 
Management (BMD) decreased in 2008 but with small rate (0.76%), the change 
increased from 21.94% in 2008 to 25.81% in 2009. In 2010, this percentage 
increased dramatically to 34.66%. While the category of (SCS) did not have any 
decrease through the study period, the rate increased by 1.15% from 2007 to 2008, 
but with high increase of 5.02% from 2008 to 2009; also, there is high increase in 
rate from 2009 to 2010 by 5.16%. The increasing rate in (EI) was little changed in 
the year 2008 by 0.19%, but in 2009, there was an acceptable increase by 2.12%; but 
there was a slight increase by 0.27% in 2010. The (CSD) category was 8.17% in 
2007 and the rate increased by 2.9% in 2008, dramatically increasing in 2009 by 
12.8%, but in 2010, the increase was a slight 1.93%. The (O) category was 23.78% in 
2007 and increased by rate 1.47% in 2008, dramatically increasing in 2009 by 
6.27%, but for the year 2010, the change was 1.48%.  
As seen in figure 7.4, the bar chart of the six categories over the study period 
indicates continuous increase in LVD during the period, especially after the year 
2008. From table 7.10, which illustrates descriptive statistics of LVD, the mean is 
12.90 with standard deviation equal 6.977, maximum score 40, minimum score 3, 
which indicates there is significant variation between the Kuwaiti listed companies 
during the study period (2007-2010). In addition, the average increase from 10.48 in 
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year 2007 to 16.86 in year 2010 is clear evidence that managements in Kuwaiti 
companies are seeking to further voluntary disclosure, in addition to their 
commitment to mandatory disclosure.  
However, figure 7.4 indicates all categories of the index increased during the study 
years, except GCI and BDM, which decreased, though only slightly, in 2008. Also 
noted from the chart, disclosure by type of information varies considerably, for 
example (GCI) was 63.10% in 2010, whereas (EI) was 9.03% in the same year. In 
general, the chart suggests a trend toward more voluntary disclosure and 
transparency by Kuwaiti companies, because voluntary disclosure is useful for 
different stakeholders, and provides different types of information to them. In 
addition, investors may use voluntary disclosure to understand Kuwaiti listed 
companies better. 
 
Figure 7.4 Extent of LVD categories 2007-2010 
In summary, explaining and interpreting these findings should be undertaken with 
caution. This is because of the disclosure index not fully including the 
comprehensiveness of LVD, because the process of selecting items took into account 
the privacy of the Kuwaiti environment. These findings are both of interest and value 
to all interested parties. It may encourage them, in the Kuwait stock market, to 
provide relevant incentives to help listed companies to adopt best practices to 
increase the confidence of existing investors, because they need more voluntary 
disclosure. The purpose of the index is to satisfy the needs of stakeholders for more 
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information. It is necessary to analyse the index according to the components of each 
category; the next section presents and discusses the results of each item in the 
different categories of LVD. 
7.7 The Extent and Trend of LVD Categories 2007-2010 
This section analyses and assesses the voluntary disclosure index by items disclosed 
in each category in company annual reports. It also provides an opportunity to 
investigate why some items have been disclosed more than others by Kuwaiti listed 
companies. As indicated before, the voluntary disclosure index composed of 50 
information items categorized into six groups. The following paragraphs analyse 
descriptive statistics for the items disclosed in each category of the voluntary 
disclosure index. 
7.7.1 General Corporate Information (GCI) 
The (GCI) is the first category of the voluntary disclosure index. It contains ten 
voluntary information items. Table 7.16 shows the disclosure extent of this category 
and presents descriptive statistics of each item in the category. The average of (GCI) 
is 48%. It can be observed from the table that the mean of the (GCI) category in 2008 
decreased by 2.38%, then in 2009 increased to 48.32%, and in 2010 increased to 
63.1%. Note the extent of fluctuation over the four years. 
 
Figure 7.5 Extent and trend of GCI category 2007-2010 
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Table 7.16 shows the frequency of each item disclosed in the (GCI) category. It can 
be noted from the table that both the item Brief narrative history of company and the 
item Description of organisational structure overall, have the highest averages, 
99.84% and 92.26%, respectively. This implies that Kuwaiti listed companies are 
providing a brief about outline of the nature of their business, as well as describing 
the organisational structure for current and potential investors, which means they 
have provided an abbreviated way for investors to know the nature and 
organisational structure of their business. 
The second highest scores were Official address/ registered address/ address for 
correspondence and Date of establishment of the company. The averages of these 
items are 50.97% and 49.35%, respectively. The reasons for disclosing the item 
Official address/ registered address/ address for correspondence are to increase 
investor confidence. That means giving intimation to investors that they have a good 
history and heritage in the market and they continue in business. According to the 
first percentage, 50.97% (about 79 of 155) of companies investigated in this study 
included this item in their annual reports over the four years. Date of establishment 
of the company item may be believed as a signal to stakeholders about the 
willingness of the company to continue and grow in the future. According to the 
second percentage, 49.35% (about 77 of 155) of companies investigated in the 
present study included this item in the annual reports over the four years. 
About 40% of companies investigated in the present study disclose Information 
about products (services), General descriptions of business activities and Dividend 
policies. This is a good average, compared with the lower ones of other variables, 
implying the soul of competition is weak between Kuwaiti listed companies, so if 
managers promoting goods and services would create a kind of competition within 
their sectors, thereby they help to attract potential investors. Although Dividend 
policies have a fairly good average, it still does not meet user needs for information 
about dividend policies. This can be attributed to the existence of other sources for 
this kind of information such as, financial analyses published in newspapers, 
announcements of dividend issued by the Kuwait stock market, and Internet sites 
specializing in the analysis of the Kuwait stock market. Managers may believe these 
sources are sufficient resources to meet user needs and they do not want to repeat this 
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published information in the annual report, which leaves room to report other 
information that may be useful to users. 
Web address of the company/ email address is second from bottom at 29.52%; this 
finding reveals a large number of companies do not rely on the Internet in the 
definition of themselves for shareholders, and as well is not used in correspondence 
inasmuch that the users of the financial statements lack of awareness of the Internet. 
However, the lowest score relates to Majority shareholders information at 1.77% 
(about 11 of 620) of annual reports investigated in the present study that include this 
item over the four years.  The reason for the low disclosure of this item may be 
attributed to unwillingness of detection of large owners.               . 
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Table 7.16 Frequencies of GCI category 
NO Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
  sum average sum average sum average sum average sum average 
1 Brief narrative history of company 155 100% 154 99.35% 155 100% 155 100% 619 99.84% 
2 Date of establishment of the company 79 50.97% 60 38.71% 74 47.74% 93 60.00% 306 49.35% 
3 Description of organisational structure 153 98.71% 147 94.84% 132 85.16% 140 90.32% 572 92.26% 
4 General descriptions of business activities 54 34.84% 46 29.68% 53 34.19% 97 62.58% 250 40.32% 
5 Majority shareholders information 3 1.94% 3 1.94% 3 1.94% 2 1.29% 11 1.77% 
6 Information about products (services) 83 53.55% 79 50.97% 41 26.45% 43 27.74% 246 39.68% 
7 Dividend policies 27 17.42% 30 19.35% 73 47.10% 113 72.90% 243 39.19% 
8 Statement of corporate general objective 52 33.55% 43 27.74% 63 40.65% 72 46.45% 230 37.10% 
9 Official address/registered address/address for 
correspondence 
26 16.77% 33 21.29% 108 69.68% 149 96.13% 316 50.97% 
10 Web address of the company/email address 11 7.10% 11 7.10% 47 30.32% 114 73.55% 183 29.52% 
 Total 643 41.48% 606 39.10% 749 48.32% 978 63.10% 2976 48.00% 
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7.7.2 Board of Directors and Management (BDM)  
The category of (BDM) contains eleven voluntary information items;, one can call 
this category as CG items because it contains most of the terms of CG. Companies 
listed in the Kuwaiti stock market are not enforced to disclose about CG; as indicated 
before, Kuwait has not had a CG code until now for all companies, only 
comprehensive instructions (Basel Committee) for bank (conventional and Islamic) 
and financial companies.  
 
Figure 7.6 Extent and trend of BDM category 2007-2010 
The average of this category over four years is 26.28%, although there was gradual 
rise in average over the study period, the average decreased in 2008 by about 0.76% 
from the 2007average. Overall, the average of this category increased about 11.96% 
over the four years. The reason for the low level of this percentage may be due to 
lack of understanding and cognition of Kuwaiti companies of the concept of 
governance; also, there is no code issued by the government, and therefore there is 
no enforcement to follow it. Table 7.17 provides a closer analysis of the frequencies 
of disclosure items under this category. 
The average of Name of the directors has fluctuated during the four years; in 2007, 
the average was about 97%, the highest score item in category (BDM), and then 
decreased to about 67% in 2008, but in 2010 increased to 79.35%. The item Picture 
of all directors/board of directors has the second highest score over the four years. 
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The average score is 59.19%; there was gradual rise of the average over the four 
years. There is significant variance of this item during the study period; in 2007, the 
average was about 38%, which then increased significantly to 85.81% in 2010. Some 
conclusions can be drawn directly from the dramatically increase in the Picture of all 
directors/board of directors average over four years: the administration’s desire to 
strengthen their managerial reputation and promote an atmosphere of familiarity 
between them and the investors. However, the Picture of all directors/board of 
directors’ average does not exceed the average of Name of the directors during the 
period, because it is not normal to put a person’s picture in the report without 
mentioning his/her name. 
However, the third rank in this category is for Picture of chairperson that has mean 
46.77%. The average of Picture of chairperson increased gradually in 2007, the 
average was 36.77%, then increased about 5% in 2008, and continued to increase 
until reaching 57.42% in 2010. This supports the researcher’s interpretation about 
Picture of all directors/board of directors, which Kuwaiti listed companies try to 
break barriers between investors and themselves, to promote an atmosphere of 
familiarity and to reassure investors about their investment. Also, note the average of 
Picture of chairperson does not exceed the average of Picture of all directors/board of 
directors over the four years, because some companies suffice to put only pictures of 
managers. 
As shown in table 7.17, the average of each of item List of senior managers (not on 
the board of directors)/senior management structure and item Composition of board 
of directors was 35.16% and 34.68%, respectively. The average of each of these 
items gradually increased; the results imply that managers started to understand and 
recognise the CG code. 
The item Number of BOD meetings held and date averaged over the four years is 
16.13%; despite its low percentage, the item kept steadily increasing during the study 
period. Starting from 9.68% in 2007, it reached 25.16% in 2010; perhaps the reason 
for the low percentage is due to Kuwaiti companies seeing that information such as 
this is of non-value to stakeholders, because what matters are the annual results and 
profits. 
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As for these items, Educational qualifications (academic and professional), 
Background information about members of the audit committees and Directors’ 
remuneration
12
 have averages 6.13%, 6.13% and 6.94%, respectively, which are 
considered components of CG; the average of all these items keeps approximately 
the same percentage over the four years. The reason for these low percentages may 
be, as mentioned before, due to lack of awareness of the users of the financial 
statements of the CG concept, as well the management who also lack knowledge of 
the benefits of such information. 
Information about the board of directors has an average 4.35% over the four years; 
this average is a small percentage compared to the rest of the voluntary disclosure 
items. About 7 companies of 155 companies investigated in the present study 
included this item in the annual reports over the four years. This result is similar with 
previous items demonstrated in the preceding paragraph, but here is a different 
justification for this low average. As is well known, competition to attract qualified 
people is present in the business environment. As such, this item may be considered 
as a way to discover the qualifications by other companies. The company may fear 
losing these qualifications, so do not disclosed them in the annual report. as Also, 
they may be considered private and confidential, so there is no need to include them 
in the annual report. 
Interestingly, the item Age of the directors has 0.16% average during the four years. 
This result may be attributed to the company’s fear of the reaction of some investors 
when they know the age of directors, and link that age with company performance; 
with the knowledge that the passage of time hones experience, or some investors 
may believe that young managers are inexperienced. However, in fact, it may be that 
young directors have significant qualifications to manage the company. 
 
                                                 
12
 Paragraph(E) of the seven rule of principle (2-2) of corporate governance rules that issued in 2013 
refer to " Prepare an annual report detailing for all remuneration granted to members of the Board of 
Directors and Executive Management...  then displays on Annual General Meeting for approval" 
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Table 7.17 Frequencies of  BDM category 
NO Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
  sum average sum average sum average sum average sum average 
11 Name of the directors 151 97.42% 104 67.10% 77 49.68% 123 79.35% 455 73.39% 
12 Age of the directors 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.65% 0 0.00% 1 0.16% 
13 Picture of chairman 57 36.77% 65 41.94% 79 50.97% 89 57.42% 290 46.77% 
14 Picture of all directors/board of directors 59 38.06% 72 46.45% 103 66.45% 133 85.81% 367 59.19% 
15 List of senior managers (not on the board of 
directors)/senior management structure 
41 26.45% 41 26.45% 49 31.61% 87 56.13% 218 35.16% 
16 Composition of Board of Directors 36 23.23% 39 25.16% 62 40.00% 78 50.32% 215 34.68% 
17 Number of BOD meetings held and date 15 9.68% 18 11.61% 28 18.06% 39 25.16% 100 16.13% 
18 Information about board of directors 4 2.58% 5 3.23% 7 4.52% 11 7.10% 27 4.35% 
19 Educational qualifications (academic and 
professional) 
9 5.81% 10 6.45% 10 6.45% 9 5.81% 38 6.13% 
20 Background Information about member of the 
audit committees 
7 4.52% 10 6.45% 11 7.10% 10 6.45% 38 6.13% 
21 Directors’  remuneration 8 5.16% 10 6.45% 13 8.39% 12 7.74% 43 6.94% 
 Total  387 22.70% 374 21.94% 440 25.81% 591 34.66% 1792 26.28%  
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7.7.3 Specific Corporate Strategy (SCS)  
Under the category of (SCS), which one can call Forward-looking Information items 
because most items in this category indicate information about will happen in the 
future, nine voluntary information items are identified. As shown in table 7.18, the 
average of this category of the voluntary disclosure index is about 18%. The mean 
score of this information ranges from 13.33% in 2007 to 24.66% in 2010. This 
category was ranked fourth in the voluntary disclosure index. The extent and trend of 
the category of (SCS) is shown in Figure 7.7. The mean gradually increased during 
the four years, although the findings indicate a low level of disclosure related to this 
type of information. To understand more of this type of disclosure, table 7.18 gives 
the frequency of (SCS) items disclosed by investigated companies over the study 
period. 
 
Figure 7.7 Extent and trend of SCS category 2007-2010 
The findings indicate that the item Impact of strategy on future results disclosed 
ranks first amongst the category’s items, with average 46.94%. This means, 72 
companies from 155 companies over the four years applied this item. As seen from 
table 7.18, the average started at 39.35% in 2007 and increased continuously during 
the four years to 56.77% in 2010. Also, the item New products (services) 
development ranks second amongst the category’s items. About 31% of investigated 
companies include in their annual reports a statement about new products (services) 
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development; the extent of application being 15 companies in 2010 compared to 10 
in 2007. 
Whereas these two items above are types of information about the future which may 
be useful for investors, conversely, general information which does not refer to the 
future financial position of the company can be easy to acquire. As an increasing 
number of companies reveals these items in their annual reports over the four years, 
that may mean that managers are willing to disclose more information about the 
impact of strategy on future results and new products (services) development. It may 
be attributed to the manager’s desire to signal about the company’s ability to produce 
new products, meaning that there is possibility to continue and grow in the future, in 
addition to the current ability of company. 
The third rank in this group is for Forecast of sales (revenues) which has average 
about 25%. It can be seen from table 7.18 that the average of this item has gradually 
increased; it was about 19% in 2007 but in 2010 was 43.87%. That refers to sincerity 
of previous forecast of sales that allows managers to increase such forecast in annual 
reports to provide evidence for investors about ability of the company to increase 
sales. Also, it may be interpreted for strength of the Kuwaiti economy. 
The fourth highest score was Impact of strategy on current results. The average of 
this item is 21.77%. 34 companies of 155 companies’ observations disclose 
information about the Impact of strategy on current results over the four years. Table 
7.18 shows the average of this item decreased to 15.48% in 2008 from 16.77% in 
2007, but in 2010 reached 30.97%. Here, the fluctuating average may be noted 
during the study period, especially in 2008, which implies Kuwait’s economy was 
affected by the global crisis in 2008. It is obvious that those managers of Kuwaiti 
listed companies took into account effects of that crisis when they issued their annual 
reports. 
The item Specific statement of strategy and objectives (financial – marketing – 
social) averages 15.97%. The average increased in 2008 to 15.48% from 1.94% in 
2007, and then increased to 23.23% in 2010. In general, the average was low over the 
four years, possibly because there are frequently some Specific statement of strategy 
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and objectives that management does not want disclosed to financial analysts, 
shareholders or other users. It may be considered as secret information by the 
management of some companies.  
However, the item Forecast of profits, the item Forecast of cash flow and the item 
Forecast earnings per share have averages 7.74%, 5.81% and 4.84%, respectively. 
The findings indicate a low level of disclosure related to these types of information; 
these items are useful for the needs of several stakeholders in order to build their 
future expectations about the continuity of the company. According to signalling 
theory, this information is considered as a signal to the many stakeholders about the 
future and the possibility to continue in their business, and prosperously. 
The last rank in this category relates to Discussion of competitive position of the 
company; this item has average 2.90% during the study period. The low average of 
this item is expected result. The finding indicates managers want to avoid 
competitive disadvantage; also, the manager wants to avoid exaggeration of 
expectations that may have adverse effects on stakeholder confidence, in case that 
expectations are unfulfilled. 
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Table 7.18 Frequencies of SCS category 
NO Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
  sum average sum average sum average sum average sum average 
22 Specific statement of strategy 
and objectives (financial – 
marketing – social) 
3 1.94% 24 15.48% 36 23.23% 36 23.23% 99 15.97% 
23 Impact of strategy on current 
results 
26 16.77% 24 15.48% 37 23.87% 48 30.97% 135 21.77% 
24 Impact of strategy on future 
results 
61 39.35% 61 39.35% 81 52.26% 88 56.77% 291 46.94% 
25 New products (services) 
development 
39 25.16% 40 25.81% 51 32.90% 60 38.71% 190 30.65% 
26 Forecast of sales (revenues) 30 19.35% 24 15.48% 35 22.58% 68 43.87% 157 25.32% 
27 Forecast of profits 11 7.10% 11 7.10% 11 7.10% 15 9.68% 48 7.74% 
28 Forecast of cash flow 7 4.52% 8 5.16% 9 5.81% 12 7.74% 36 5.81% 
29 Forecast earnings per share 6 3.87% 6 3.87% 8 5.16% 10 6.45% 30 4.84% 
30 Discussion of competitive 
position of the company 
3 1.94% 4 2.58% 4 2.58% 7 4.52% 18 2.90% 
  Total  186 13.33% 202 14.48% 272 19.50% 344 24.66% 1004 17.99% 
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7.7.4 Employee Information (EI) 
As indicated before, the category of (EI) has the lowest average over the period of 
study, 7.72%. It also scored the lowest mean in each of the years of study, 6.45%, 
6.64%, 8.76% and 9.03% in the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. As 
can be seen in figure 7.8, which shows the extent and the trend of employee 
information disclosed in the annual reports over the four years, the results indicate a 
gradual increase over the study period. To further explanation such type of 
disclosure, table 7.19 shows the frequency of (EI) items disclosed by the companies 
investigated. 
As shown in table 7.19, the findings indicate that the item Geographical distributions 
of employees disclosed ranks first over the category items, with average 25.16% 
during the four years. 156 annual reports of 620 annual reports investigated in this 
study disclosed this item in the annual reports. However, it should be noted the 
second highest score was the item Recruitment policy, average 13.06%. Obviously, 
there is a significant difference in average between the first and second ranked. 
Disclosing such an item, Geographical distributions of employees, may reflect a 
manager’s desire in Kuwaiti companies to signal for geographic expansion for work. 
In other words, Kuwaiti companies have enough employees to cover a large part of 
the state. Disclosure of recruitment policy may be attributable to policy, for the 
company to attract potential employees who have higher qualifications, because 
employees with high qualifications will add value for business success.  
 
Figure 7.8 Extent and trend of EI category 2007-2010 
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However, the third rank in this category is for Names and salaries of senior 
management with mean 7.26%. Remarkably, no company disclosed senior 
management’s salary, just their names. This means managers may be willing to 
disclose names of senior management, only without mention of their salaries. 
Although this item has a low average in general, findings indicate a reasonable 
increase in the extent of Names of senior management disclosure over the examined 
period compared with other items remaining in this category. 
The item Policy of training and number of employees trained has average 3.55% 
during the four years. It may be noted the average dropped to half in 2008 to 2.58% 
from 5.81% in 2007, and then the average continued at the same percentage for the 
next two years. economic crisis in 2008 impacted on the policy of training for 
employees in Kuwait listed companies,  Aljored (2010) reported  the economic crisis 
in 2008 has affected on the training and development in a companies. This kind of 
information enhances corporate image and shows that companies have a clear policy 
and plan of training, and then reflects positively in stakeholder’s confidence about a 
qualified workforce in companies. In this case, companies should disclose more 
about this item in order to increase the confidence of stakeholders and appear 
obligation for training their staff according modern methods. 
The fifth ranked in this category is item Categories of employees by gender, with 
mean 3.06%. This is followed by item Number or percentage of Kuwaiti employees, 
with mean 1.77%. The last ranked in this category is for item Identification of senior 
management and their functions; this item has average 0.16% during the four years, 
meaning almost no company disclosed information about for Identification of senior 
management and their functions. This result is the same as item Age of the directors 
in the (BDM) category. From this result, it seems that corporate management has 
chosen to maintain silence in annual reports of any information regarding senior 
management and their functions. 
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Table 7.19 Frequencies of EI category 
NO Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
  sum average sum average sum average sum average sum average 
31 Geographical distributions of employees 31 20.00% 32 20.65% 45 29.03% 48 30.97% 156 25.16% 
32 Categories of employees by gender 4 2.58% 4 2.58% 6 3.87% 5 3.23% 19 3.06% 
33 Identification of senior management and 
their functions 
0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.65% 0 0.00% 1 0.16% 
34 Names and salaries of senior 
management 
8 5.16% 11 7.10% 14 9.03% 12 7.74% 45 7.26% 
35 Number or percentage of Kuwaiti 
employees 
1 0.65% 2 1.29% 4 2.58% 4 2.58% 11 1.77% 
36 Policy of training and number of 
employees trained 
9 5.81% 4 2.58% 5 3.23% 4 2.58% 22 3.55% 
37 Recruitment policy 17 10.97% 19 12.26% 20 12.90% 25 16.13% 81 13.06% 
  Total  70 6.45% 72 6.64% 95 8.76% 98 9.03% 335 7.72% 
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7.7.5 Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) 
As indicated before, the category of (CSD) ranks fifth in the voluntary disclosure 
index. With regard to the category of (CSD), six items are included under this type of 
information. As shown in table 7.20, the average in this category of disclosure is 
about 18%. The average of such information ranges from 8.71% in 2007 to about 
26% in 2010. As can be seen from figure 7.9, which shows the extent and trend of 
(CSD) disclosed in the annual reports over the four years, the results indicate a 
gradual increase over the study period. To obtain further explanation of this type of 
disclosure, table 7.20 shows the frequency of corporate social disclosure items 
disclosed by the companies investigated. 
 
Figure 7.9 Extent and trend of CSD category 2007-2010  
Community programmes (general) scored the highest average of disclosure under 
this category, 42.10%. Table 7.20 indicates a considerable increase in the disclosure 
extent in this item; the average was 14.19% in 2007, and then increased significantly 
until reaching about 70% in 2010. This result may be attributed to managers being 
more willing to disclose community programmes in general rather than the specific, 
as explained shortly. Interestingly, 261 Kuwaiti-listed companies from 620 
companies comply with social information disclosure recently. 
The second highest average was for item sponsoring educational conferences, 
seminars or art exhibits, 19.84%, which scored about 20% over the study period. It 
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can be seen from table 7.20 that the average was about 8% in 2007 and then 
gradually increased to 30.97% in 2010. The reason for disclosing such item may be 
attributed to the manager’s desire to improve the company’s image and to support 
educational conferences, seminars or art exhibits to demonstrate to the public that it 
bears part of the support for social activities according their social responsibility. 
Student employment was ranked third in this category, with average 16.61%. 26 
companies complied with the laws that were issued by the Government Manpower 
and Restructuring Program (GMRP). This program was established in 1997, based 
on the decision of the Council of Ministers No. 767 of 1997, in order to correct the 
imbalances in the local labour market and change employment paths among citizens 
from the government sector to the private sector. One of the goals of this program is 
to create students in schools, colleges and universities to enter the world of the 
private sector and build the skills and capabilities of their core business. 
The disclosure average of item Information on donations to charitable organisations 
is 14.19%.The mean of this item ranges from 4.52% in 2007 to 22.58% in 2010. The 
reason for this increase in average may refer to company compliance with Zakat law. 
Zakat Law No. 46 of 2006, which amended by No. 58 of 2007 under this law any 
Kuwaiti shareholding company, is deducted to 1% Zakat of net annual profits and 
pay to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In addition, this law allows Kuwaiti 
companies the right to expense disburse this amount through charitable 
organisations.  
The fifth ranked in this category was item Information on environmental protection 
programme, with average 9.03%, comprising just 56 annual reports from 620 annual 
reports investigated during the four years. It can be seen from table 7.20 the average 
was stable over the study years. It is an unsurprising result to get a low average for 
this item, because there are no laws organising environmental disclose. This may be 
an indicator that managers in companies investigated during four years have a 
tendency to disclose information about environmental protection programmes to give 
shareholders a clear picture of the company's commitment to protecting the 
environment. 
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The last rank in this category relates to item Sponsoring public health, sporting and 
recreational projects, with average 4.84%. It can be seen from table 7.20 the average 
decreased from 6.45% in 2009 to 3.87% in 2010. Given the results above, one might 
attribute the low average of this item to management desire to pay attention to items 
other than this one. In general, Kuwaiti listed companies have tendencies to increase 
(CSD). 
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Table 7.20 Frequencies of CSD category 
NO Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
    sum average sum average sum average sum average sum average 
38 Information on environmental 
protection programme 
13 8.39% 14 9.03% 14 9.03% 15 9.68% 56 9.03% 
39 Information on donations to charitable 
organisations 
7 4.52% 11 7.10% 35 22.58% 35 22.58% 88 14.19% 
40 Community programmes (general) 22 14.19% 34 21.94% 96 61.94% 109 70.32% 261 42.10% 
41 Student employment 20 12.90% 18 11.61% 33 21.29% 32 20.65% 103 16.61% 
42 Sponsoring public health, sporting and 
recreational projects 
6 3.87% 8 5.16% 10 6.45% 6 3.87% 30 4.84% 
43 Sponsoring educational conferences, 
seminars or art exhibits 
13 8.39% 23 14.84% 39 25.16% 48 30.97% 123 19.84% 
  Total  81 8.71% 108 11.61% 227 24.41% 245 26.34% 661 17.77% 
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7.7.6 Others (O) 
The last category in the voluntary disclosure index is the Others (O) category. As 
indicated before, the (O) category ranks second in the voluntary disclosure index. 
Under the category of Others, seven voluntary disclosure items are identified. As 
shown in table 7.21, the average of this disclosure category is 23.78%, 25.25%, 
31.52%, and 33% in the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. Figure 7.10 
explains the extent and trend of this type of information over the four years. It can be 
seen from the figure that the average has increased from 23.78% in 2007 to about 
33% in 2010. To obtain further understanding of this type of category disclosure, 
table 7.21 gives the frequency about (O) items disclosed by Kuwaiti listed companies 
during the study period.  
It can be seen from the table that the highest mean relates to item Information on ISO 
certification. Overall, the mean over the study period is 99.52%; 617 annual reports 
of 620 annual reports investigated in the current study include this item in the annual 
reports. The International Organisation issues this certification for Standardization; 
any company can obtain ISO certification for many goals, such as to meet client 
preferences, to help motivate employees, for contractual or regulatory obligations, 
and so on. In addition, there are many types of ISO certification, such as ISO 9000 - 
Quality management, ISO 14000 - Environmental management, ISO 26000 - Social 
responsibility, etc. The reason for the high disclosure of this item may be attributed 
to the manager’s desire to disclose applied standards according to ISO certification 
type, which have been granted to the company to enhance corporate image and 
increase stakeholders’ confidence about the company. 
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Figure 7.10 Extent and trend of O category 2007-2010 
The second highest score was for item Year of listing at KES. The average of this 
item is 31.61%; 196 annual reports of 620 annual reports investigated in the current 
study included this item. As can be seen from table 7.21, the average of this item has 
increased gradually over the four years. It was 12.26%, 12.90%, 41.29% and 60 % in 
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. The reason for disclosing such information 
may be the manager’s desire to give an image for stakeholders that the company is 
one of the oldest companies, even dating to the founding of the stock market; 
especially, the oldest companies disclosed this item in the current study. 
The average of item Shareholders owned 5%+ of shares is 28.39% over the four 
years. The average increased from 25.16% in 2007 to 30.32% in 2010. The disclosed 
item will lead to more transparency, “transparency is essential for sound and 
effective CG” (Basel Committee, 2010, p.29), in the annual reports. However, item 
Volume of shares traded trend averaged about 24% during the four years; 146 annual 
of 620 annual reports investigated in the current study included. This implies that 
managements of Kuwaiti listed companies are willing to inform stakeholders about 
the Volume of shares traded trend, because this information is important to 
stakeholders to study the share of company that they are or will be investing in.  
The fifth ranked in this category is for item Chairman’s/MD’s report which has mean 
7.74%; it was 6.45% in 2007, and then increased to reach 7.74% in 2010. The 
Chairman’s/MD’s report is important for stakeholders because it presents a general 
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idea of the previous year of operations, performance and how the business was in 
that time period. In addition, it provides future goals, a plan of company and new 
projects. 
Moreover, table 7.21 shows that 7.26% of reports investigated in the current study 
discloses about item Share price at the year-end. It can be seen from the table that the 
average of this item increased from 5.81% in 2007 to 8.39% in 2010. The reason to 
disclose such information is to provide stakeholders at a glance the direction of the 
price at the year-end; also, it is important for them to research possible investment 
opportunities. 
The last rank in this category is for item Type of shareholders (for example, 
institutions, individuals) which scored about 0.65% over the four years. The average 
was low during the entire period investigated. The importance of this item is to know 
who controls a company, in case of distracting ownership among shareholders, the 
company will be weak in face of aggressive takeover attempts.  
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Table 7.21 Frequencies of O category 
NO Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
    sum average sum average sum average sum average sum average 
44 Chairman's/MD's report/directors 
report 
10 6.45% 13 8.39% 13 8.39% 12 7.74% 48 7.74% 
45 Information on ISO certification 154 99.35% 155 100.00% 155 100.00% 153 98.71% 617 99.52% 
46 Year of listing at KES  19 12.26% 20 12.90% 64 41.29% 93 60.00% 196 31.61% 
47 Share price at the year-end 9 5.81% 10 6.45% 13 8.39% 13 8.39% 45 7.26% 
48 Volume of shares traded trend 26 16.77% 34 21.94% 47 30.32% 39 25.16% 146 23.55% 
49 Shareholders owned – 5 % + of shares 39 25.16% 41 26.45% 49 31.61% 47 30.32% 176 28.39% 
50 Type of shareholders (for example, 
institutions, individuals) 
1 0.65% 1 0.65% 1 0.65% 1 0.65% 4 0.65% 
 Total  258 23.78% 274 25.25% 342 31.52% 358 33.00% 1232 28.39% 
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Based on the foregoing, this chapter ends with table 7.22 which shows ranks of all 
voluntary disclosure items based on their mean scores. As illustrated through the 
extent and trend of LVD Items during the four years (2007-2010), the top five items 
are Brief narrative history of company, Information on ISO certification, Description 
of organisational structure, Name of the directors and Picture of all directors/board of 
directors, which scored averages 99.84%, 99.52%, 92.26%, 73.39% and 59.19%, 
respectively. The lowest five items are Identification of senior management and their 
functions, Age of the directors, Type of shareholders (for example, institutions and 
individuals), Majority shareholders information and Number or percentage of 
Kuwaiti employees, which scored averages 0.16%, 0.16%, 0.65%, 1.77% and 1.77%, 
respectively.
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Table 7·22 Total Voluntary disclosure by item 
No Information item N Items  Average Rank 
1 Brief narrative history of company 619 99.84% 1 
2 Date of establishment of the company 306 49.35% 7 
3 Description of organisational structure 572 92.26% 3 
4 General descriptions of business activities 250 40.32% 11 
5 Majority shareholders information 11 1.77% 47 
6 Information about products (services) 246 39.68% 12 
7 Dividend policies 243 39.19% 13 
8 Statement of corporate general objective 230 37.10% 14 
9 Official address/registered address/address for 
correspondence 
316 50.97% 6 
10 Web address of the bank/email address 183 29.52% 19 
11 Name of the directors 455 73.39% 4 
12 Age of the directors 1 0.16% 49 
13 Picture of chairman 290 46.77% 9 
14 Picture of all directors/board of directors 367 59.19% 5 
15 List of senior managers (not on the board of 
directors)/senior management structure 
218 35.16% 15 
16 Composition of Board of Directors 215 34.68% 16 
17 Number of BOD meetings held and date 100 16.13% 27 
18 Information about board of directors 27 4.35% 42 
19 Educational qualifications (academic and 
professional) 
38 6.13% 38 
20 Background Information about member of the 
audit committees 
38 6.13% 37 
21 Directors ’ remuneration 43 6.94% 36 
22 Specific statement of strategy and objectives 
(financial – marketing – social) 
99 15.97% 28 
23 Impact of strategy on current results 135 21.77% 24 
24 Impact of strategy on future results 291 46.94% 8 
25 New products (services) development 190 30.65% 18 
26 Forecast of sales (revenues) 157 25.32% 21 
27 Forecast of profits 48 7.74% 33 
28 Forecast of cash flow 36 5.81% 39 
29 Forecast earnings per share 30 4.84% 40 
30 Discussion of competitive position of the 
company 
18 2.90% 45 
31 Geographical distributions of employees 156 25.16% 2 
32 Categories of employees by gender 19 3.06% 44 
33 Identification of senior management and their 
functions 
1 0.16% 50 
34 Names and salaries of senior management 45 7.26% 34 
35 Number or percentage of Kuwaiti employees 11 1.77% 46 
36 Policy of training and number of employees 
trained 
22 3.55% 43 
37 Recruitment policy 81 13.06% 30 
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37 Recruitment policy 81 13.06% 30 
38 information on environmental protection 
programme 
56 9.03% 31 
39 Information on donations to charitable 
organisations 
88 14.19% 29 
40 Community programmes (general) 261 42.10% 10 
41 Student employment 103 16.61% 26 
42 Sponsoring public health, sporting and 
recreational projects 
30 4.84% 41 
43 Sponsoring educational conferences, seminars or 
art exhibits 
123 19.84% 25 
44 Chairman's/MD's report/directors report 48 7.74% 32 
45 Information on ISO certification 617 99.52% 2 
46 Year of listing at KES  196 31.61% 17 
47 Share price at the year-end 45 7.26% 35 
48 Volume of shares traded trend 146 23.55% 23 
49 Shareholders owned – 5 % + of shares 176 28.39% 20 
50 Type of shareholders (for example, institutions, 
individuals) 
4 0.65% 48 
 
 7.8 Conclusion  
This chapter examines LVD in Kuwaiti listed corporations evolving over time to 
provide answers for the first two research questions through a detailed analysis of the 
results of the voluntary disclosure index by employing a self-constructed index, 
starting with the total LVD, passing through its categories and then to information 
items (hierarchical analysis). 
The credibility of the disclosure index is presented to reduce the risk of obtaining 
error answers for the research questions. Statistical tests were used to evaluate 
reliability and validity of the disclosure index, such as correlation coefficients and 
significances between items and each total category score to measure reliability; 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .825. Correlation analysis of disclosure scores was 
used to measure validity. 
The extent and trend of LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies was measured, and the 
results indicate there is a gradual increase in LVD and its categories over the period, 
but the average was low compared with previous studies. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
tests were employed to test if there any change of LDV among the period study 
(2007-2010). The results indicate there is no statistically significant difference 
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between LDV 2007 and LDV 2008. On the other hand; there are statistically 
significant differences between LDV 2008 and LDV 2009, and between LDV 2009 
and LDV 2010. In addition, Friedman test was employed in order to examine 
whether there are significant differences between total voluntary disclosure scores 
over the four years: the result show that there are. 
The extent of categories of LVD was examined: category General corporate 
information (GCI) has the highest mean over the four years; its average is 48%. 
Category Employee information (EI) has the lowest mean over the four years; its 
average is 7.72%. All items based on their mean scores were ranked to show which 
items have the highest score. The results indicate the top five items are Brief 
narrative history of company, Information on ISO certification, Description of 
organisational structure, Name of the directors and Picture of all directors/board of 
directors. Conversely, the lowest five items are Identification of senior management 
and their functions, Age of the directors, Type of shareholders (for example, 
institutions and individuals), Majority shareholders information and Number or 
percentage of Kuwaiti employees. 
The next chapter discusses the second part of the empirical work for the current 
study to answer the third and fourth research questions, apply multivariate analysis 
between all factors with LVD and appropriateness of regression to check the 
assumptions of multiple regression, and then a regression diagnostic. It also presents 
the statistical results of the multivariate analysis.  
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Chapter 8: The Second Part of the Empirical Work 
8.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter answered the first two research questions of the present study: 
the first research question is: what is LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies? The second 
research question is: how do voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti listed companies develop over time? This chapter presents the empirical 
analysis for the study, to answer the third, fourth, fifth research questions, related to 
what extent do CG mechanisms, ownership structure, and corporate characteristics 
affect LVD. Particularly, the research hypotheses are tested for relationships with 
these factors. It starts with descriptive analysis of the continuous independent 
variables included in the study in section 8.2, and then applies bivariate analysis 
which investigates the relationship between each factor with LVD in Kuwaiti listed 
companies in section 8.3, including continuous independent variables, nominal 
independent variables and categorical independent variables. In section 8.4, 
multivariate analysis is applied between all factors and LVD, including 
appropriateness of regression by checking the assumptions of multiple regression in 
section 8.4.1, and the regression diagnostic summary in section 8.4.2. In section 
8.4.3, transformation of data is discussed. In section 8.5, the statistical results of 
multivariate analysis (regression analyses) are presented. Section 8.6 summarizes the 
different models used in this study. Section 8.7 summarizes the regression results 
related to the categories of voluntary disclosure. The chapter concludes in section 
8.8. 
8.2 Description of Continuous Independent Variables 
Table 8.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables in 
the current study. As indicated in the table, the average of the proportion of NEDs 
over the four years is about 78%, the minimum was 0.70 in 2007 and the maximum 
was 0.88 in 2010, which ranges from 28.5% to 100%. According to the higher 
average here, this shows the interest of Kuwaiti listed companies to place NEDs on 
their board. The mean Board size over the four years is about 6.30 members, with 
minimum 3 and maximum 11 members; in general, whereas some studies have 
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concluded that the average board size was small and yet others found a large size, in 
this study, the size was in middle, which gives a wider field for comparison with 
previous studies.  
Table 8.1  Descriptive Continuous Variables 
  Mean Min Max S.D Skewness Kurtosis 
NEDs 0.781 .285 1 0.1708 -0.635 -0.239 
Board size 6.30 3 11 1.454 0.375 0.005 
Firm Size 
(million KD)  
496.157 3.109 12907.26 1536.832 5.694 36.65 
Firm Age 23.45 1 58 13.208 0.285 -0.979 
Liquidity 1.877 .018 14.01 2.2137 2.610 7.799 
Gearing 0.473 .011 4.325 0.2969 3.815 45.78 
Profitability 0.0161 -.822 53.20 0.1854 -1.325 3.037 
 
Firm size ranges widely from 3.109 (million) Kuwaiti Dinar to 12,907.26 (million) 
Kuwaiti Dinar with the average 496.157 (million) Kuwaiti Dinar over the four years. 
Firm age ranges from 1 year to 58 years, with an average 23.45 years; about 50% of 
the companies have been listed for 24 years. Liquidity ranges from .018% to 14.01%, 
with average 1.87%. Gearing ranges from 0.011% to 4.325%, with average 0.473% 
over the four years. Profitability has mean 1.61% and ranges from -82.2% to 53.2%. 
As is clear from table 8.1, most continuous independent variables were not normally 
distributed, because most variables have highly skewness, except NEDs, Board size 
and Firm age. The high skewness is considered a violation of one of the assumptions 
of OLS, according to Cook (1998). Thus, section 8.4 discusses the issue of violations 
and how to treatment, such as different types of transformations to correct both 
kurtosis and skewness. 
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8.3 Bivariate Analysis 
To begin the analysis, bivariate analysis is used to illustrate the nature, direction and 
significance of the bivariate relationships of LVD and each continuous independent 
variable and categorical independent variable in this current study. 
8.3.1 Continuous independent variables 
As mentioned in section 7.6, Pearson correlation coefficient, as a parametric test, and 
Spearman’s rank correlation, as a non-parametric test, are applied in order to 
measure the association between voluntary disclosure and the continuous 
independent variables. Table 8.2 provides the correlation coefficients calculated 
based on the actual data. 
Table 8-2: Correlation coefficients between LVD 
and continuous independent variables 
Variable Pearson Spearman 
NEDs .506** .610** 
Board size .276** .211** 
Firm Size(million KD)  .601** .322** 
Firm Age .260** .245** 
Liquidity -.147** -.199** 
Gearing .297** .244** 
Profitability -0.019 -0.035 
            ** Significant at 1% 
According to the Pearson correlation coefficients (r), all continuous independent 
variables are significantly associated with LVD in the annual reports of the 
companies investigated at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), except Profitability. Both NEDs 
and Board size as CG mechanisms are positively associated with LVD, for NEDs r = 
0.506, and for Board size r = 0.276. As for firm characteristics, all factors are 
positively associated with LVD, except Liquidity, which is negatively associated. 
The results indicate a positive significant correlation between LVD and Firm size r = 
0.601 p (two-tailed) < 0.01. Also Firm age is also positively significantly correlated 
with LVD r = 0.26 p (two-tailed) < 0.01; Gearing is positively significantly 
correlated with LVD r = 0.297 p (two-tailed) < 0.01. However, Liquidity is 
negatively significantly correlated with LVD r = -0.147 p (two-tailed) < 0.01.  
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Profitability is the only variable that is not significantly correlated to LVD. The 
Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients support the results of the Pearson 
correlation coefficients. While Firm size is found to be significant at the 1% level 
under the Pearson test r = 0.601, it was to be significantly associated with total 
voluntary disclosure under Spearman’s rho = 0.322 p (two-tailed) < 0.01. 
Profitability in both Pearson and Spearman’s tests is not significantly correlated to 
voluntary disclosure. 
Overall, these correlation results provide initial support for the majority of the 
hypotheses.  
8.3.2 Nominal independent variables 
Two statistical tests have been used to test the relationship between LVD as the 
dependent variable and the binominal variables in the current research. These are T-
test (parametric test) and Mann-Whitney test (non-parametric test). Table 8.3 shows 
the results of both tests on LVD and the independent variables (dummy). The results 
show important differences (at the 1% level) in the mean of LVD between groups in 
each of the binominal independent variables. Both the T-test and Mann-Whitney 
tests gave the same result. 
Table 8-3 T test and Mann Whitney test for binominal independent variables 
Variable T test Mann Whitney test 
  N Mean S.D t-Value P Mean Z-value P 
Role duality    -13.97 0.000  -14.53 0.000 
Duality 368 .201 .108   224.16   
 No Duality 252 .340 .138   436.85   
Audit 
Committee 
   8.155 0.000  8.717 0.000 
 YES 315 .300 .150   372.09   
 No 305 21.3 .111   246.90   
Audit firm    18.450 0.000  15.39 0.000 
 Yes 4 big 232 .365 .152   453.41   
 No 4 big 388 .193 .0791   225.05   
Ownership    -5.292 0.000  -5.205 0.000 
 Diffusion 131 .202 0.088   238.29   
Concentrated 489 .273 1.467   329.84   
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From table 8.3, it may be noted that 368 companies have role duality. As mentioned 
in the literature review, there are two points of view about what the best situation is 
in order to launch more disclosure, recalling that role duality is where the roles of 
chairman and CEO are held by one person. The first viewpoint said it could play an 
important role in the improvement and enhances the individual power of the 
chairman, giving the chairman more freedom and control to exercise more disclosure 
(e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The second viewpoint 
said role duality may led to weakening the role and control of the board, thus 
adversely affecting disclosure. Some previous studies find a negative relationship 
between role duality and level of corporate disclosure (e.g. Forker, 1992; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004) 
With regard to Audit committee, 79 companies have one and 155 do not. The 
presence of an audit committee is related to a confident financial statement. Rouf 
(2011) indicated that the presence of an audit committee will reduce the rate of 
errors, irregularities, and external financial reporting has a confirmation function also 
(Ho and Wong, 2001; Bliss and Balachandran, 2003). However, Abbott et al. (2004) 
found a negative relation between audit committee independence and the financial 
reporting statement. Forker (1992) also found no significant relationship between the 
existence of an audit committee and disclosure. Akhtaruddin et al. (2009, p.15) found 
“the percentage of audit committee members to total members on the board has 
proven to be not unrelated to voluntary disclosure”. 
As for the Audit firm variable table 8.3, shows 388 companies have not been audited 
by a big four audit firm. Also here there are contradictory viewpoints. Some studies 
indicate that a company audited by a big international audit firm will release more 
information. They also mitigate the conflict between directors and shareholders. 
Consequently, this reduces agency conflict, as, for example, in Hossain et al. (1994), 
Wallace and Naser (1995), Ahmed (1996), Suwaidan (1997), Patton and Zelenka 
(1997), Inchausti (1997), Naser et al. (2002). Nevertheless, some researchers found 
no association between disclosure level and audit firm size, e.g. Barako et al. (2006), 
Owusu-Ansah (1998), Ahmed and Courtis (1999). In contrast, Wallace and Naser 
(1995) found a negative relationship between audit firm and disclosure level. 
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As noted in table 8.3, for Role duality, Audit committee and Audit firm the 
binominal variables (CG mechanisms) have significant difference between the mean 
of LVD of Kuwaiti listed companies, as is clear from the T-test. This result is 
supported by the non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney test). The significant correlated 
of Role duality providing strong evidence that the Kuwaiti companies listed sought 
to separate the functions of chairman and chief executive officer, because they found 
benefits from this. As well the significant correlated of audit committee indicate the 
importance of audit committee in Kuwaiti listed companies over 50% from Kuwaiti 
listed companies established audit committee in board. Although the audit firm has 
significantly correlated with LVD but 37.41% of the Kuwait listed companies deals 
with Big Four Audit firm. 
Regarding ownership structure, Ownership structure was tested by two tests. There 
are 122 companies with ownership concentration and the remaining ones with 
ownership diffusion. The results of both tests; parametric and non-parametric, for 
ownership, show there is a significant relationship between LVD of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. 
Many previous studies have looked at the effect of several types of ownership on 
LVD, such as Suwaidan (1997), Naser et al. (2002), Arcay and Vázquez (2005), 
Barako (2007), Laidroo (2009), Bokpin and Isshaq (2009), Hashim and Devi (2008). 
Some of them concluded that there is a significant relationship of ownership 
structure with level of disclosure, whether positive or negative, yet others did not 
find any relationship. In short, the findings from prior studies are mixed. For 
example, Laidroo (2009) and Rouf (2011) found ownership concentration was 
negatively related with disclosure, but Tsamenyi et al. (2007) found ownership 
structure positively related with disclosure, yet further, Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008), Bozzolan et al. (2006) and Woodcock and Whiting (2009) did not find any 
relationship of ownership structure with disclosure. According to Klein et al. (2005), 
each ownership type has pros and cons; no ownership type is better than another 
kind. 
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8.3.3 Distribution of Industrial type 
The Kuwaiti stock market consists of seven Kuwaiti sectors, non-Kuwaiti 
companies, and investment funds; this study is limited to only the seven Kuwaiti 
sectors.  
Table 8-4  Industrial type * ownership Cross tabulation 
 Total Non-Financial type Financial type 
Diffusion ownership  33 26 7 
Concentrated  
ownership 
122 78 44 
Total 155 104 51 
 
The study sample includes 155 companies, shown in table 8.4,. The first type is non-
financial companies; it consisted of 104 companies, 26 of them belong to diffusion 
ownership and 78 to concentrated ownership. The second type is financial 
companies; it consisted of 51 companies, 7 of them belong to diffusion ownership 
and 44 to concentrated ownership. From table 8.4, the concentrated ownership 
represents about 78% of the study sample. This result was very close to that found by 
AL-Deehani and Al-saad (2007), who found around 74%. The Kuwait stock market 
could classify to concentrated ownership market, this percent (78%) include the 
government (agencies), dominant families and institutional investors, which have 
substantial equity ownership in companies listed in the Kuwait Stock market. 
8.4 Multivariate Analysis 
Multivariate regression analysis considered as one of the most common and widely 
applied techniques, especially in the disclosure literature (Cooke, 1998). It requires 
the simultaneous analysis of data with three or more variables (multivariate) 
(Bryman, 2004). It is used in this research because the data in this study is composed 
from observations on several variables for many individuals or objects. Afifi et al. 
(2004) reported that, in general, without multivariate analysis one could not obtain 
the findings for data with multiple variables. It is commonly used in cases where 
there are one or more independent variables that could affect one or more dependent 
variables. In this study, multivariate analysis is used to test the impact of CG 
mechanism, Ownership structure and Firm characteristics as independent variables 
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on the LVD index as dependent variables. For that reason, a multiple regression is 
assumed relevant for the current study. 
The relationships between the dependant and independent variables were measured 
using different statistical methods, and the relationships’ result may take many 
shapes. These shapes may be linear or non-linear relationships. As indicated before, a 
multiple regression is assumed relevant for this research because the current study 
has one dependent variable and more independent variables (both dummy and 
continuous variables); in the case where the analysis includes both dummy and 
continuous variables, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimators are 
considered to be a suitable method. Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) argued that: 
“...OLS regression is one of the most popular statistical techniques used in the 
social sciences. It is used to predict values of a continuous response variable 
using one or more explanatory variables and can also identify the strength of 
the relationship between these variables” (, p.55) 
They also stated that: 
“OLS regression is a powerful technique for modelling continuous data, 
particularly when it is used in conjunction with dummy variables coding and 
data transformation.” (, p.56) 
However, before applying the OLS approach, some assumptions must be fulfilled, 
i.e. normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, independence of error terms and 
multicollinearity. The following sections address the multiple regression model 
suggested in the present study, followed by checking the assumptions of multiple 
regression to select the related statistical technique to analyse the collected data in 
the present study. 
A linear model is a description of the expected value of the outcome of the dependent 
variables depending on the known states of the independent predictor variables. The 
results may be misleading if the data’s fulfilment of the assumptions of OLS 
regression are not verified. 
 
 
210 
 
A multiple linear regression model is an extension of a simple linear regression 
model; it is used when incorporating two or more explanatory variables in order to 
form a prediction equation for a response variable.  
Simple regression: Yi = βo+ β1x  
Multiple regressions: Yi = βo+ β1f1 (Xi1) +β2f2 (Xi2) +.......+ βk fk(Xik)+ε i (i= 1,2,..,n) 
Where: 
Y:  dependent variable 
X1..... Xk : independent (explanatory) variables 
βo........ βk : regression model coefficients (parameters). 
f1....... fk : functions (transformations) of independent variables 
ε :  random error. 
8.4.1 Appropriateness of regression 
OLS, random effects and fixed effects are used as options in the panel data in most 
previous studies. Generally, OLS is more suitable and dependable for more accurate 
estimates if all assumptions are met, in particular, when all variables used in the 
analysis are measured on an interval scale (Judge et al., 1985). The data used in this 
study are a combination of time series (2007-2010) and cross-sectional data. The 
impact of non-normal distribution problems in disclosure studies should be assessed 
by highlighting detailed data screening (Cooke, 1998). Before running the analysis of 
multiple regressions in this study, many tests were used to assess the data 
compatibility with assumptions of the regression model. 
Gujarati (2003) reported these assumptions are: the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables should follow a normal distribution (normality); the 
relationship between both the dependent and independent variables should be linear 
(linearity); no relationship exists among independent variables (no multicollinearity); 
and the variance of the errors for each observation is constant over all values of Xi 
(homoscedasticity). However, autocorrelation means “correlation between members 
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of observations ordered in time (as in time series data) or space (as in cross 
sectional data)” (Gujarati, 1995, p.378), i.e. there is no variable that affects others in 
their relationship with LVD. 
The following paragraphs examine these assumptions based on the data, any 
violation of one of these assumptions, the findings of regression model may be 
misleading, useless or acutely biased. For that, any violation should be removed 
before dealing with the regression model. The following sections present how these 
violations are tested and how their treatment. 
8.4.1.1 Normality  
Normal distribution is an assumption which should exist in each variable and all 
linear combinations of the variables (Field, 2012). The process of studying all linear 
combinations of all variables needs a large number of tests, so this process is not 
always considered practical (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). In addition, the error 
(residuals) of LVD (dependent variable) should be normally distributed. It is possible 
to test the linearity and variances of variables together with the residuals, instead of 
examining each variable alone. Residuals may provide further information about the 
normality assumption via combinations of explanatory variables.  
Hair et al. (1998) reported the linearity of the relationship among (dependent and 
independent) variables means the degree to which the change in the dependent 
variable should be linearly related with the independent variable. By residual plots, 
one can examined the linearity of residuals. Normality can be investigated by several 
methods; Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) reported among these methods, the 
graphical method and numerical methods. The most common methods from the 
graphical method are Q-Q plot, P-P plot and frequency histogram, while the most 
common methods to examine the degree of symmetry of the variable are numerical 
methods, including the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic, Shapiro-Wilk W statistic, 
and skewness and kurtosis test.  
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov D (K–S test) is a non-parametric test for the equality of 
continuity, which can be used to compare a sample with a reference probability 
distribution or to compare two samples. It is said the K–S test tends to suggest 
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accepting the null hypothesis for a small sample and rejecting when the sample size 
is large. The Shapiro-Wilk W statistic suggests having a good power especially in a 
wide range of non-normal distributions; the data may not have normal distribution 
when the value of P is small. Both the graphical method and Shapiro-Wilk W 
statistic as numerical method test have been employed to investigate the linearity and 
normality for LVD (dependent variable) and residuals in the present study. 
Graphical methods 
P-P Plot of LVD (dependent variable ) and P-P Plot of residuals 
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Figure 8.1 P-P Plot of LVD 
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Figure 8.2 P-P Plot of residuals 
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Q-Q plot of LVD (dependent variable) and Q-Q plot of Residual.  
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Figure 8.3 Q-Q Plot of LVD 
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Figure 8.4 Q-Q Plot of residuals 
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The frequency histogram of LVD (dependent variable) and of Residual  
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Figure 8.5 Histogram of LVD 
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Figure 8.6 Histogram of residuals 
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Numerical methods of normality testing of LVD (dependent variable) and of 
residuals 
Table 8.5 Tests of Normality 
              Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
          Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
LVD .142 620 .000 .868 620 .000 
r .081 620 .000 .895 620 .000 
 
From figures 8.1 and 8.2 of P-P plots of LVD and residuals, respectively, and from 
figures 8.3 and 8.4 of Q-Q plots of LVD and residuals, respectively, it be seen from 
previous figures that LVD and residual are not normally distributed. These are the 
inevitable result of a variable such as LVD, because it is a non-negative variable, the 
mean of LVD (dependent variable) is located between zero in the case of non-
disclosure to 50 in the case of full disclosure. Therefore, skewness of the distribution 
will exist in this case. 
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show the histograms of LVD and residuals, respectively. The 
histogram of LVD is a right-skewed distribution (positively skewed); as previously 
mentioned, LVD cannot have a negative value. However, the histogram of residuals 
was apparently close to the normal distribution. On the other hand, table 8.11 shows 
the result of the tests of normality; Kolmogorov-Smirnova is recommended for large 
sample and Shapiro-Wilk W test, as known in research Shapiro-Wilk is 
recommended for small and medium sample, if Sigis insignificant (p > 0.05) the 
variable’s distribution is not different from normal, and vice versa. The result 
suggests LVD and residuals are not distributed normally. 
8.4.1.2 Checking homoscedasticity of residuals 
Homoscedasticity, sometimes-called homogeneity of variance, is an assumption of 
OLS regression models: homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that the outcome 
variable (dependent variable) exhibits similar values of variance across the range of 
amounts for input variables (independent variable). In other words, the variance of 
the distribution of the outcome variable must be the same for all values of the input 
variables. OLS assumed all variables have the same variance in order to run the 
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linear regression function or the problem of heteroscedasticity will exist if the error 
variance is heterogeneous.  
There are two methods to assess whether homoscedasticity exists or not. The first 
method is graphical and the second numerical. The graphical plot (i.e. rvfplot) 
provides a picture of residuals versus predicted values and assesses where 
heteroscedasticity exists.  
Graphical tests of heteroscedasticity  
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Figure 8.7 The relationship between residuals and predicted values 
Numerical tests of heteroscedasticity 
Numerically, two tests were used to assess homoscedasticity. The first test is 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White’s tests. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg, 
which tests whether the estimated variance of the residuals from a regression is 
dependent on the values of the independent variables; a and a special case of the 
Breusch-Pagan test, White’s tests, which test whether the residual variance of a 
variable in a regression model is constant: this tests an estimate for homoscedasticity 
consistent standard errors (White, 1980). The second test is Cameron and Trivedi’s 
decomposition of IM (information matrix) test. These tests were conducted with the 
STATA programme. 
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Table 8.6 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's 
tests for Heteroscedasticity 
Test  Chi-square Prob>chi2 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 104.93 0.000 
White's 185.44 0.000 
 
 
Table 8.7 Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of 
1M test for Heteroscedasticity 
Source Chi-
square 
df Prob>chi2 
Heteroskedasticity 185.44 85 0.000 
Skewness 25.56 12 0.0105 
Kurtosis 4.33 1 0.0375 
Total 215.33 98 0.000 
 
 
As shown by both the graphical and numerical tests, both results indicate that errors 
have non-constant variance. All chi-squared test statistics are significant at the 1% 
confidence level, so the null hypothesis that there was no heteroscedasticity is 
rejected; i.e. there are problems with heteroscedasticity in the current dataset. Then 
the assumption of homogeneity of variance between variables had rejected, The OLS 
estimators will not have the minimum variance of all unbiased estimators that means 
the variances are not constant. In light of above results, the dataset of this study 
suffers from problems of heteroscedasticity. 
8.4.1.3 Checking for multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is an assumption of OLS regression models; the presence of 
multicollinearity will cause problems in interpreting the results of multiple regression 
analysis. Multicollinearity means that there is strong correlation between two or 
more independent variables; because of multicollinearity, it will be difficult to 
differentiate among the individual effects of explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable. It may be that problems will appear when estimating the coefficients of 
regression and estimators may be biased (Murray, 2006) Moreover, in the case of 
strong linear relationship between the selected explanatory variables, it is very 
difficult to compute the estimates for a regression model correctly and uniquely.  
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Field (2012) reported the existence of multicollinearity and its threat to multiple 
regression, for the following reasons: first, the variance of regression coefficients 
will be increased which results in unstable equations. Second, the overall variance 
which is a result of two highly-related independent variables is little more than if one 
independent variable is used. Third, it is difficult to know which independent 
variable has a more important effect on the dependent variable, especially if there are 
highly related independent variables. Finally, type II error will exist, which means 
the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis will occur.Statistically, the possible 
presence of multicollinearity between independent variables is tested by two 
common methods, which have been used widely in the disclosure literature: the first 
method is variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance values, and second method 
is correlation coefficients. Both methods are employed in the present study, to test 
whether the independent variables or the model might have suffered from 
multicollinearity. 
Table 8.8 VIF test result 
Variable VIF Tolerance  (1/VIF) 
 NEDs 1.442 .693 
 Board size 1.301 .768 
 Role duality 1.504 .665 
 Audit committee 1.207 .828 
 Audit firms 1.485 .673 
 Ownership   1.093 .915 
Firm size 1.305 .766 
Firm age 1.223 .817 
Liquidity 1.333 .750 
Gearing  1.405 .712 
Profitability 1.070 .935 
Mean VIF 1.306 
 
 
As shown in table 8.15, the maximum VIF is 1.504, the minimum VIF is 1.07, and 
the mean VIF is 1.306. Both Gujarati (2003) and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) 
reported that there is no need to be concerned with a variance inflation factor less 
than 10. Therefore, multicollinearity between the independent variables in this 
regression analysis is considered non-harmful. Based on the results in table 8.15, 
there is no unacceptable level of multicollinearity in the present study. 
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8.4.1.4 Autocorrelation  
Table 8.16 shows the correlation coefficients matrix (Pearson and Spearman) among 
independent variables. Dancey and Reidy (2002) mentioned that it is important to 
develop a correlation matrix before running the multiple regression. Although the 
correlation matrix is considered as one of the powerful tools to investigate whether 
there is any a relationship among predictors, there was no full agreement among 
researchers on the minimum correlation percentage acceptable (Alsaeed, 2006). As 
mentioned by Dancey and Reidy (2002), if the variables have correlations of 0.8 and 
above, that means they are highly correlated with each other. However, Tabachnick 
and Fidell (1996) suggest 0.7 as minimum correlation percentage acceptable. From 
table 8.16, the correlations (Pearson and Spearman) are less than 0.7, thus this data 
does not face a serious Autocorrelation problem. 
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Table 8.9 Pearson Correlation between independent variables 
 NEDs Board size Firm size Firm age Liquidity Gearing Profitability 
NEDs 1       
Board size 0.2229** 1      
Firm size 0.1659** 0.3210** 1     
Firm age 0.1680** 0.3635** 0.3053** 1    
Liquidity -0.0183 -0.2139** -0.1713** -0.1000* 1   
Gearing 0.0721 0.1736** 0.2881** 0.1060** -0.4511** 1  
Profitability -0.0072 0.0313 0. 1205 0.0635 0.1123** -0.0376* 1 
 
Table 8.10 Spearman Correlation between independent variables 
 NEDs Board size Firm size Firm age Liquidity Gearing Profitability 
NEDs 1       
Board size 0.2775** 1      
Firm size 0.1947** 0.4357** 1     
Firm age 0.2261** 0.3524** 0.2916** 1    
Liquidity -0.0397 -0.2569** -0.5711** -0.1486** 1   
Gearing 0.1337** 0.2212** 0.5835** 0.1347** -0.5564** 1  
Profitability -0.0018 0.0603 0.0482 0.0477 0.1207** -0.0192 1 
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8.4.1.5 The effects of outliers 
Outliers are values far from the average, such as by three or four standard deviations, 
and are thus significantly higher or lower than other values in the data set 
(inconsistent with other values.) These outliers may have a noteworthy influence on 
the correlation coefficient especially in small samples (Pallant, 2001, p.111). Outliers 
are considered sensitive for multiple regressions because some outliers’ points will 
have more influence on the regression than others, creating under- or over-estimation 
of the value of the correlation coefficient (r). Unusual observations should be 
checked to see how they different, in order to identify possible errors in data entry. 
Types of unusual observation are regression outliers. An observation that is unusual 
unconditionally in either its Y or X value is called a univariate outlier (it is not 
necessarily a regression outlier). 
There are several statistical ways to examine a data set for unusual outliers; one of 
them is leverage (called hate values): it is an easy and fast way, “which gauges the 
influence of the observed value of the outcome variable over the predicted values” 
(Miles and Field, 2010, p.191). Cases may have leverage when the observation has 
an unusual X value – i.e., it is far from the mean of X, but regression coefficients 
may be not influenced by high leverage. Influential observations, in the case where 
they have high leverage and are outliers in terms of Y-value, will significantly 
influence the regression line, and if removed, would significantly change the 
estimated coefficients (Jacoby, 2005). In STATA, leverage can be calculated by 
using the Ivr2plot command. 
The Stata12 manual says, “The lines on the chart show the average values of 
leverage and the (normalized) residuals squared. Points above the horizontal line 
have higher-than-average leverage; points to the right of the vertical line have 
larger-than-average residuals” (p.17) as shown in figure 8.8, the horizontal line 
indicates the mean for the leverage, while the vertical line indicates the mean for the 
normalized residual squared. It is worth noting that there are a few clearly extreme 
points. It is usual in this case, as known, that the outliers have more influence if the 
sample size is small, as well as if the statistic examined is less robust (Cousineau and 
Sylvain, 2010). 
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Figure 8.8 Leverage vs. residuals scatter plot 
The key point to stress here is: should these observations be dropped or not. One 
more point should be mentioned here: the elimination of data points can be 
hazardous. Although elimination will always improve the “fit” of regression, it may 
end up destroying some of the most significant information in data. In addition, Afifi 
et al. (2004) reported differing opinions among statisticians for dealing with these 
points; some of them said to eliminate these outliers; some said that it is unethical to 
eliminate outliers because it may end up having bias or produce undesirable results; 
and others said they should be kept.  
8.4.2 Regression diagnostic summary 
The intention of using regression analysis is to fit equations to observe which 
independent variables have significant effect on the dependent variable, but in the 
case of existence of outliers, these may have caused a dangerous threat to standard 
OLS analysis and the results may be not an expression of fact (Rousseeuw, 1987). 
According to the findings of the above graphical and numerical methods, 
assumptions of multiple regression were not met. The dependent variable and 
residuals were non-linear, and for independent variables the problem of 
heteroscedasticity existed. In addition, there was a problem of outliers, but the 
findings of VIF and correlations coefficients confirm that there is not an 
unacceptable level of multicollinearity in the present study.  
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To solve these violations of OLS assumptions, Draper (1988), as cited in Cooke 
(1998, p.209), “identified four approaches to deal with the violations of OLS:  
The do-nothing approach.  
The data-analytic approach investigates influential observations 
and transformations. 
The model expansion approach focuses on departures from 
assumptions once found and departures are modelled directly on the raw 
data scale by broadening the parametric model. 
The robust approach, which uses non-classical techniques so that 
deviations from the classical assumptions are not crucial, e.g. M - , R - , 
L – estimators” 
The first approach may be considered unethical because it may end up having bias or 
producing undesirable results. The second approach (the data analytic approach) is 
commonly used within the context of linear regression. The transformation considers 
the most widely used tools to deal with violations of assumptions of regression 
analysis. Cooke (1998, p.210) reported that data transformation is beneficial if there 
any violations of assumptions of OLS, such as linearity, normality, homoscedasticity 
problems and non-independence of the error of variance.  
The third approach (the model expansion approach) is that “in which the data are 
examined as in approach 1, to describe the ways in which they depart from the 
standard off-the-shelf model, the difference being that when departures are found 
they are modelled directly on the original data scale through a broadening of the 
parametric model” (Draper, 1988, p.240). The fourth approach is the robust 
approach, that uses non-classical techniques, which should be sufficiently sensitive 
to any violations of the assumptions of classic regression, and data may be analysed 
on the raw scale without any additional modelling or any modification modelling. 
Robust regression could be used instead of OLS regression when data suffer from 
outliers or influential observations; also, it may be used usefully to detect influential 
observations (See: UCLA)
13
. 
                                                 
13
 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/dae/rreg.htm 
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Based on the foregoing, this study follows the approaches of Draper (1988), but 
without the first approach. As the study data is very important, it was decided to keep 
all data and employ transformation to deal with the problems of non-linearity of the 
dependent variable and residuals, as well as also the problem of heteroscedasticity. 
Robust analysis other than OLS regression is employed, namely, GLS, Tobit and 
Quantile regression to avoid the violation of OLS regression assumptions. 
8.4.3 Transformation of data  
It is important to screen data to evaluate the impact of distribution problems of 
skewness and kurtosis and problems of outliers and non-linearity, as well as for any 
violation of OLS regression assumptions, because significantly non-normal data can 
distort the findings of regression technique (Cooke, 1998; Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). Scholars in many disclosure studies face these problems. Transformation of 
data is used to deal with such problems (Cooke, 1998, p.209). Transformation of data 
is useful in the case of violation of OLS regression assumptions, OLS is undesirable 
for statistical analyses when there is non-normality of distribution of most dependent 
and independent variables as well as for any violation of OLS regression 
assumptions (Cooke, 1998, p.210). However, Cooke (1998) uses Rank Regression 
instead of conventional OLS, which is a recent development for dealing with such 
problems in a number of accounting disclosure studies. According to the rank 
regression approach, data is transformed based on its ranking from the smallest one 
to the largest one (Iman and Conover, 1979), which means data is transformed into 
ranks and then the regression technique is used. Examples of previous disclosure 
studies that used rank transformation include Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996), 
Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), Cooke (1998), Owusu-Ansah 
(1998), Abd-Elsalam (1999) and Abd-Elsalam and Weetman. 
Rank transformation is beneficial for these reasons. Firstly, it provides distribution-
free test statistics (Cooke, 1998). Second, is relatively insensitive to outliers (Cheng 
et al., 1992). Third, it mitigates the effect of measurement errors, heteroscedasticity, 
outliers and residuals on the results of regression (Wallace et al., 1994). Fourth, it 
disperses the concentration when there is non-linearity (Cooke, 1998) fifth, its 
findings are like those obtained from ordinal transformation (Wallace et al., 1994) 
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finally it can be applied to develop tests of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
(Cheng et al., 1992; Cooke, 1998). 
Beside all the advantages of rank regression, Cooke (1998) reported rank regression 
has weaknesses, for example: the regression coefficients (βj) are difficult to interpret 
for most values; it is difficult to interpret the significance of the F-test and T-test; the 
structure of errors cannot be normal; and the transformed data are ordinal which 
means the tests are non-parametric. It is certainly weaker than parametric tests. 
Cooke (1998) suggested using normal scores rather than ranks as an extension of the 
rank approach for the following reason: normal scores is done by distribution by 
dividing the distribution into the number of observations plus one region on the basis 
that each region has equal probability. Cooke pointed out that replacing the ranks by 
normal scores is beneficial for the following reasons. It removes some of the 
weaknesses of the rank transformation approach, but also keeps the advantages, such 
as significance levels are meaningful and has more power than when using the rank 
transformation, because significance levels can be determined; also, the F-test and t-
test are powerful and meaningful and may be used. The coefficients of regression 
derived using normal scores are meaningful, and normally distributed dependent 
variables have the same property for the distribution of the errors. Examples of 
previous disclosure studies that employed normal score transformation include 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and Abd-Elsalam (1999). 
From the above discussion, different transformations have been used with both 
dependent and independent variables, which suffer from the problem of assumption 
violations. For the regression model, used in the study, according to what is 
mentioned for advantages and disadvantages above of both approaches, rank 
approach and normal scores, it has been decided to employ the normal scores to deal 
with the problem of assumption violations in the current study. According to what 
was reported by Cooke (1998), use of normal scores instead of the rank approach 
removes some of the weaknesses of the rank transformation approach and keeps the 
advantages. In addition, to avoid disturbing the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables and changing the error distribution, all 
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independent variables should be transformed similarly when transforming the 
dependent variable (Cooke, 1998). 
8.5 Regression Analyses 
8.5.1 OLS regression model and normal scores model 
Table 8.18 shows the results of OLS regression and normal scores models. The 
independent variables explained around 59.88% of the OLS regression of LVD, 
measured by adjusted R-squared with an F-ratio of 85, which is significant p < .001. 
The independent variables explained around 59.88% of the normal scores regression 
of LVD, measured by adjusted R-squared with an F-ratio of 83.61, which is 
significant with a probability less than .001. The value of R-squared of the second 
model (normal score) is lower than prior studies: 65% by Depoers (2000); 86.3% by 
Hassan et al. (2006); and 0.695 by Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013). However, it was 
higher than these were: 55.9% by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009); 47.9% by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002); 42% by Ho and Wong (2001); 36% by Leventis and Weetman (2004); 
and 36% by Ghazali and Weetman (2006); 34% by Ferguson et al. (2002); 33% by 
Meek et al. (1995); or 20% by Eng and Mak (2003). 
The coefficients of the independent variables illustrate the nature, direction and 
significance of the relationship with the dependent variable (LVD). From table 8.18, 
The CG mechanisms, based on results of the first model (OLS regression), indicate 
all independent variables were found to be positively significant associated at the 1% 
level, except Role duality that was found to be negatively significant associated at 
1% levels and Board size was found to be negatively insignificant associated with the 
dependent variable. On the other hand, results of the second model (normal scoring) 
indicate all independent variables were found to be positively significant associated 
with LVD at the 1% level, except Board size duality that was found to be negatively 
significant associated at 1% levels and Board size was found to be negatively 
insignificant associated with the dependent variable. The OLS model and normal 
score model have the same results.  
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 Table 8 .11 Results of regression analyses 
 OLS Normal score 
Variable Coef p>t Coef p>t 
NEDs .1497421 0.000 .3011183 0.000 
Board Size -.3246163 0.147 -0.05112 0.12 
Role Duality -.0425706 0.000 -0.46563 0.000 
Audit Committee .0196739 0.000 .214554 0.000 
Audit Firm .0578993 0.000 .608016 0.000 
Ownership .0080914 0.168 .079961 0.214 
Firm size .1189364 0.000 .175024 0.000 
Firm Age .000198 0.302 .054904 0.050 
Liquidity .0773387 0.029 .079831 0.016 
Gearing .0565295 0.283 .020799 0.545 
Profitability -.0128292 0.262 -.034362 0.192 
 Constant 2.045021 0.004 .550374 0.011 
F 85 83.61 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.6060 0.6020 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5988 0.5948 
 
Based on results of the first model (OLS regression), Ownership structure was found 
to be insignificant associated with LVD; also, the result of the second model (normal 
scoring) was insignificant associated.  
However, with regard to the Firm characteristics there are mixed results: in the first 
model (OLS), some independent variables were found to be significant associated at 
the 1% and 5% levels. Firm size was found to be positively significant associated 
with LVD at the 1% level, while Liquidity was found to be positively significant 
associated with LVD at the 5% level. Firm age and Gearing were found to be 
insignificant with the dependent variable. However, Profitability was found to be 
negatively insignificant associated with LVD. While the results in the second model 
(normal score) were found to be different from the results of the first model (OLS). 
Firm size was found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% level, 
while Liquidity was found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 5% 
level. Firm age was found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 
5%. However, Profitability was found to be negatively insignificant associated with 
LVD. 
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8.5.2 Generalised Least Squares (GLS) 
Through what was discussed in section 8.2 checking the assumptions of multiple 
regression, especially in the checking homoscedasticity of residuals and 
autocorrelation sub-sections, it became clear that the current dataset for the current 
study suffers from homoscedasticity and serial correlation between independent 
variables. Homoscedasticity means the variance of the error term should be constant; 
if the error terms do not have constant variance, they are said to be heteroscedastic. 
In this case, it is advisable to assign less weight for population observations with 
greater variability than the weight given to population observations with smaller 
variability; the OLS model does not allow for this because OLS appoints equal 
weight to each observation, so it cannot use the information contained in the unequal 
variability of the dependent variable. Generalised Least Squares (GLS) is as OLS 
with transformed variables; it transforms the variables with a company weight that 
fits the standard least-squares assumptions. It is simply the same method using 
transformed data, in case of a non-linear dataset, to fit the assumptions of OLS, but 
here uses transformed data with weights to help heteroscedastic data meet the 
assumptions of OLS. See Gujarati (2005), and Clarkson et al (2005) Shan (2009). 
In other words, the OLS model minimizes the sum of the squared errors, while the 
GLS model minimizes a weighted sum of the residual squares. Therefore, the GLS 
estimator is more precise than the OLS estimator is. Generalised Least Squares 
(GLS) is used to correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in regression 
(Gujarati, 1995, 2003), GLS is adopted in this study to correct for autocorrelation 
and homoscedasticity in the current dataset. The GLS model was employed in many 
previous disclosure studies, such as Clarkson and Walker (2005). 
 As seen in table 8.18, the results of GLS indicate all independent variables of the 
CG mechanisms were found to be significant associated at 1% with LVD, except 
Board size was found to be insignificant associated with LVD.  NEDs, Audit firm 
and Audit committee were found to be positively significant associated with LVD at 
the 1% level. However, Role duality was found to be negatively significant 
associated with LVD at the 1% level.  
 
 
229 
 
Table 8 .12 Results of GLS regression analyses 
Number of observation  620 Wald chi2(11) 953.45 
Number of groups  37 Prob. > chi2 0.000 
LVD Coef z P>z 
NEDs .149742 9.34 0.000 
Board Size -.32462 -1.47 0.143 
Role Duality -.04257 -7.5 0.000 
Audit Committee .019674 3.94 0.000 
Audit Firm .057899 10.14 0.000 
Ownership .008091 1.4 0.163 
Firm size .118936 5.65 0.000 
Firm Age .000198 1.04 0.297 
Liquidity .077339 2.2 0.028 
Gearing .05653 1.09 0.278 
Profitability -.01283 -1.13 0.257 
Constant 2.04502 2.94 0.003 
 
 
 
With regard to the ownership structure, it was found to be insignificant with LVD 
However, the results of the GLS model for the Firm characteristics had mixed as 
found in all regression models, two independent variables were found to be 
significant associated at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Firm size was found to 
be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% level, while Liquidity was 
found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 5% level. However, 
Firm age and Gearing were found to be positively insignificant associated with LVD, 
while Profitability is the only variable from Firm characteristics found to be 
negatively insignificant associated with LVD.  
8.5.3 Tobit regression 
The Tobit model is a statistical model suggested by James Tobin (1958). To explain 
the relationship between a non-negative dependent variable and an independent 
variable, the Tobit model assumes that there is a latent variable (unobservable) and 
this variable linearly depends on the independent variable via a parameter (beta); this 
beta determines the relationship between the independent variable and the latent 
variable. Verbeek (2004) reported Tobit regression is suitable in the case when the 
dependent variable is continuous but its range is constrained. The dependent variable 
of the current study, namely LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies, is a positive variable. 
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All results of LVD have non-negative values. That means the dependent variable is 
limited, the range of these values is between 0.075 and 0.8 (censored sample), and 
none of the companies sampled has score zero. In addition, the assumption of 
normality may be violated, so the findings of OLS estimates may be inefficient and 
inconsistent. 
In the case of variables limited as in this study, there may be bias in the findings 
when using OSL regression even after transformation variables, especially when 
there are outliers. Cooke (1998) reported on using generalised maximum likelihood 
estimators, M–estimators (See: Wikipedia )14, to place less emphasis on outliers. The 
Tobit model is used here because it is usually estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimators; M and coefficients have dual interpretations (Verbeek, 2004). The Tobit 
model provides pseudo- R-squared, which is like R-squared in regression, but in 
Tobit regression produces a model which predicts an outcome variable to be within a 
certain range (See:UCLA)
15
.  
The Tobit model was used in previous studies, such as Trabelsi et al. (2008) and 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011). However, pseudo R-squared can be computed by 
many formulas, such as Efron, McFadden, Cox and Snell, and Count. STATA 
software provides pseudo R-squared based on McFadden’s formula, so that is used 
here. When using the Tobit model estimates, the results are expected to be robust. 
 Table 8.19 shows the results of Tobit regression. All independent variables of the 
CG mechanisms were found to be significant associated at 1% levels with LVD, 
except Role duality that was found to be negatively significant associated at 1% 
levels and Board size was found to be negatively insignificant associated with the 
dependent variable. The results of Tobit model regarding the CG mechanisms 
supported the results for both OLS model and normal score models. 
 
                                                 
14
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-estimator 
15
 For more details see http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/multpkg/faq/general/PsuedoRSquareds.htm 
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Table 8 .13 Results of Tobit regression analyses 
Tobit regression Number of obs = 620       Pseudo R2 = -0.4762 
LR chi2(12) =  576.31 Log likelihood= 893.23803                            
   Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
LVD       Coef. t P>t 
NEDs  .149649 9.31 0.000 
Board Size  -.32262 -1.45 0.147 
Role Duality  -.04268 -7.5 0.000 
Audit Committee  .019737 3.94 0.000 
Audit Firm  .057913 10.12 0.000 
Ownership .008039 1.38 0.167 
Firm size  .119582 5.67 0.000 
Firm Age  .000205 1.08 0.282 
Liquidity  .077029 2.19 0.029 
Gearing .056324 1.08 0.281 
Profitability  -.01301 -1.15 0.252 
Constant 2.038271 2.92 0.004 
/sigma .0567555  
Obs. summary:  1 left-censored observation at LVD< = 1.4239255 
618 uncensored observations 
                            1 right-censored observation at LVD > =  1.9086028 
 
 
With regard to Ownership structure, it was found to be positively insignificant 
associated with LVD. Ownership structure has the same result during all regression 
models employed in this study. 
However, the Tobit regression results for Firm characteristics were mixed, as found 
in the OLS, normal scoring and GLS models; some independent variables were 
found to be significant associated at the 1% and 5% levels. Firm size and Liquidity 
were found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% and 5% level 
respectively, while Firm age and Gearing were found to be positively insignificant 
associated with LVD. However, Profitability was found to be negatively insignificant 
associated with LVD. Almost results are same as found in the OLS and GLS models. 
 
 
 
 
232 
 
8.5.4 Quantile regression  
The Quantile model is a type of regression analysis which is considered useful; it is 
widely used in empirical work by previous studies. As is well known, the classical 
linear regression is used to estimate the average value of a dependent variable for the 
given level of the explanatory variables. In other words, classical linear regression is 
looking to minimize the sum of squared residuals while the quantile model is looking 
to estimate the relationship of explanatory variables at different points (i.e. quantiles) 
in conditional distribution of the dependent variables. In other words, the quantile 
model is designed to look to minimize the sum of the absolute residuals (Koenker 
and Hallock, 2001). That means the quantile model has more power than classical 
linear regression, because the quantile model creates separate estimates for all 
conditional quantiles of a response variable’s distribution (Ramdani and 
Witteloostuijn, 2010). Koenker and Bassett (1978) are considered the first to have 
used quantile regression. Quantile regression is a useful method to explore predictive 
relationships among variables when there is a weak relationship or no relationship 
among the averages of such variables (Cade and Noor, 2003). 
According to Koenker and Hallock (2001), 
“Just as we can define the sample mean as the solution to the problem of 
minimizing a sum of squared residuals, we can define the median as the 
solution to the problem of minimizing a sum of absolute residuals. The 
symmetry of the piece wise linear absolute value function implies that the 
minimization of the sum of absolute residuals must equate the number of 
positive and negative residuals, thus assuring that there are the same numbers 
of observations above and below the median” (p.145). 
That means all the classical regressions techniques and M estimators for analysing 
longitudinal data, like the dataset of the current study, use the average as the measure 
of centrality, while the quantile regression uses the median. Quantile regression is 
more robust against the existence of outliers, skewed tails and unequal variance 
(heteroscedasticity) because it provides a way to investigate sources of heterogeneity 
in the response that are related with the covariates (Koenker, 2005, p.25). 
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Therefore, it appears that the quantile model is suitable method for the dataset 
(longitudinal data) of the current study because it will help to obtain a more 
comprehensive analysis of the relationships among variables. In addition, it is 
appropriate to deal with a dataset, which suffers from outliers, skewed tails and 
unequal variance (heteroscedasticity), such as the dataset of the current study.  
In order to investigate the relationship between LVD and explanatory variables (CG 
mechanisms, Ownership structure and Firm characteristics) further, LVD is subjected 
to testing of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 quantiles in this study. 
25% Quantiles model 
Table 8.20 shows the results of the 25% quantile regression. Some independent 
variables of the CG mechanisms were found to be positively significant associated 
with LVD and others were found to be negatively significant associated with LVD, 
except Board size that was not associated with LVD. The two variables NEDs and 
Audit firm were found be positively associated significant with LVD at the 1% level, 
while Role duality was found be negatively significant associated with LVD at the 
1% level. However, Audit committee were found be positively associated significant 
with LVD at the 5% level. 
Table 8 .14 Results of 25% Quantile regression analyses 
Raw sum of deviations = 35.808 (about 1.6359) No of Obs.620 
Pseudo R2= 0.3790             Min sum of deviations  =  22.23891 
LVD Coef. t P>t 
NEDs .150636 7.96 0.000 
Board Size -.225711 -0.84 0.399 
Role Duality -.054445 -8.04 0.000 
Audit Committee .013363 2.21 0.028 
Audit Firm .060812 9.21 0.000 
Ownership .016252 2.35 0.019 
Firm size .119397 5.03 0.000 
Firm Age .000186 0.8 0.421 
Liquidity .040745 1.01 0.313 
Gearing .117552 2.09 0.037 
Profitability -.007034 -0.51 0.607 
Constant 1.687086 2 0.046 
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Regarding Ownership structure, it was found to be positively significant associated 
with LVD at the 5% level. However, with respect to Firm characteristics all 
independent variables were mixed, as found in all regression models used in this 
study. Firm size and was found to be positively significant associated with LVD at 
the 1% level, while Gearing was found to be positively significant associated with 
LVD at the 5% level. Other variables, Firm age, Liquidity and Profitability were 
found to be insignificant associated with LVD, Firm age, Liquidity were found to be 
positively insignificant associated with LVD, while Profitability was found to be 
negatively insignificant associated with LVD. 
50% Quantiles model (median regression) 
Table 8.21 shows the results of median regression. It be noted that the CG 
mechanisms were found to be significant with LVD at the 1% and 10% levels, except 
Audit committee was found to be positively insignificant associated with LVD. 
NEDs and Audit firm were found be positively significant associated with LVD at 
the 1% level, while Board size and Role duality were found be negatively associated 
significant with LVD at the 10% and 1% levels respectively.  
Table 8 .15 Results of 50% Quantile regression analyses 
Raw sum of deviations = 44.9874 (about 1.6961) No. of Obs=620                  
Pseudo R2= 0.3764             Min sum of deviations = 28.05628 
LVD Coef. t P>t 
NEDs .155912 7.52 0.000 
Board Size -.477169 -1.67 0.095 
Role Duality -.042904 -5.84 0.000 
Audit Committee .009992 1.54 0.124 
Audit Firm .054642 7.41 0.000 
Ownership .007963 1.06 0.289 
Firm size .12828 4.71 0.000 
Firm Age .000302 1.23 0.219 
Liquidity .092587 2.03 0.043 
Gearing .115978 1.71 0.088 
Profitability -.00484 -0.33 0.743 
Constant 2.379857 2.66 0.008 
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However, Ownership structure was found to be positively insignificant associated with 
LVD. Regarding Firm characteristics, all independent variables were mixed. Firm size 
was found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% level, while 
Liquidity and Gearing were found to be positively significant associated with LVD at 
the 5% level. On other hand, Firm age and Profitability were found to be insignificant 
associated with LVD. 
75% Quantiles model  
Table 8.22 shows the results of the 75% quantile regression. Based on the statistical 
results, the CG mechanisms were found to be significant with LVD at the 1%, except 
board size was found to be insignificant with LVD. However, NEDs, Audit 
committee and Audit firm were found be positively associated significant with LVD 
at the 1% level, while Role duality was found be negatively associated significant 
with LVD at the 1% level. 
As indicated in table 8.22, Ownership structure was found to be positively  
insignificant associated with LVD. Concerning Firm characteristics, all independent 
variables were found mixed. Firm size and Liquidity were found to be positively 
significant associated with LVD at the 1%, and 5% levels respectively, while 
Profitability was found to be negatively significant associated with LVD at the 1% 
level. However, Firm age and Gearing were found to be positively insignificant 
associated with LVD. 
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Table 8 .16 Results of 75% Quantile regression analyses 
Raw sum of deviations 35.5375 (about 1.7625)      No of Obs=620                      
Pseudo R2= 0.3933                     Min sum of deviations=21.55898 
LVD Coef. t P>t 
NEDs .180138 9.82 0.000 
Board Size -.003187 -0.01 0.990 
Role Duality -.034797 -5.23 0.000 
Audit Committee .018658 3.34 0.001 
Audit Firm .051392 7.97 0.000 
Ownership .008463 1.31 0.191 
Firm size .082608 3.03 0.003 
Firm Age .000143 0.65 0.515 
Liquidity .105887 2.5 0.013 
Gearing .038641 0.58 0.564 
Profitability -.037448 -2.85 0.004 
Constant 1.195337 1.49 0.137 
 
Summary of the results of quantile model 
Table 8.17 shows summary of the results of the quantiles model, which employed 
25%, 50% and 75% quantiles in this study. The results of CG mechanisms were in 
disagreement with LVD in the quantiles models. NEDs was found to be positively 
significant associated with LVD at the 1% level in all quantile models (25%, 50% 
and 75%); thus, based on the finding of all quantile models, NEDs was positively 
associated with LVD at the 1% level. Board size was found to be negatively 
insignificant associated with LVD in the 25% and 75% quantile models, while it was 
found to be negatively associated with LVD at 10% in median quantile models. 
Based on previous results, Board size was found to be negatively insignificant 
associated with LVD. There is agreement between the results of all quantile models 
about the relationship of Role duality and LVD; it was found to be negatively 
significant associated with LVD at the 1% level in all quantile models. There is 
disagreement between the results of all quantile models about the relationship of 
Audit committee and LVD; it was found to be positively significant associated with 
LVD at the 5% and 1%  level in 25% quantile model and 75% quantile model 
respectively, while it was positive insignificant in the median quantile model. Thus, 
based on the results of all quantile models, Audit committee was found to be positive 
significant with LVD at the 5% level. Audit firm was found to be positively 
significant associated with LVD at the 1% level in all quantile models. 
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Concerning Ownership structure, it was found to be positively significant associated 
with LVD at the 5% level in the 25% quantile model, while it was found to be  
positively insignificant associated in the 50% and 75% quantile models. Thus, based 
on the results, Ownership structure was found to be positively insignificant 
associated with LVD. 
However, with regard to Firm characteristics, there are mixed results, Firm size was 
found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% level in the all 
quantile models, Thus, based on these results Firm size was found to be positive 
significant associated with LVD at the 1% level. Firm age was found to be positively 
insignificant associated with LVD in all quantile models. So based on these results 
Firm age was found to be positively insignificant associated with LVD. Liquidity 
was found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 5% level in the 
50% and 75 % quantile models, while it was positive insignificant with LVD in 25% 
quantile model. Thus, based on the finding of all quantile models, Liquidity was 
found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 5% level. Gearing was 
found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the level 5% and 10% in 
the 25% and 50 % quantile models respectively, while it was found to be positively 
insignificant associated with LVD in 75% quantile model. Thus, based on the finding 
of all quantile models, Gearing was found to be positively significant associated with 
LVD at the level 10%. Profitability was found to be negatively insignificant with 
LVD in the 25% and 50% quantile models, while it was negatively significant with 
LVD at the level 1% in the 75% quantile model. Thus, based on the results of all 
quantile models, Profitability was found negative significant associated at the 10% 
level with LVD.  
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Table 8 .17 summary of Quantiles model 
LVD  25 50 75 cumulative results 
NEDs  +*** +*** +*** +*** 
Board Size  - -* - - 
Role Duality  -*** -*** -*** -*** 
Audit Committee  +** + +*** +** 
Audit Firm  +*** +*** +*** +*** 
Ownership  +** + + + 
Firm size  +*** +*** +*** +*** 
Firm Age  + + + + 
Liquidity  + +** +** +** 
Gearing +** +* + +* 
Profitability  - - -*** -* 
 
 
8.5.5 Summary of the results of all regression models 
From the results of the different regression models, it can be noticed that there is 
some agreement between the results of the different regression models about the 
significant variables related to LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies.  
It can be noted from the results of the CG mechanisms, almost variables are 
consistent in level of significance through all regression models. NEDs and Audit 
firm which were found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% 
level in all regression models, while Role duality was found to be negatively 
significant associated with LVD at the 1% level in all regression models. However, 
Audit committee was found to be positively significant associated with LVD at the 
1% level in all regression models, except in the quantile models; the cumulative 
result of the quantile models indicate Audit committee was found to be positively 
significant associated at the 5% level. Board size was found to be negatively 
insignificant associated with LVD in all regression models.  
Regarding Ownership structure, it was found to be positively insignificant associated 
with LVD in all regression models, In respect of Firm characteristics, the results 
were found to be different through all regression models. Firm size was found to be 
positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% level in all regression models. 
Firm age was found to be positively insignificant associated with LVD in all 
regression models, except in normal score model it was found to be positively 
significant associated with LVD at 5% level. Regarding Liquidity, there was 
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agreement among the results in all regression models, where it was found to be 
positive significant at the 5% level. Gearing was found was found to be positively 
insignificant associated with LVD in all regression models, except the cumulative 
results of the quantile models it was  found to be positively insignificant associated 
with LVD at 10%. For Profitability, there was agreement among the results in all 
regression models, except the quantile model. Profitability was found to be 
negatively insignificant associated with LVD all regression models, except the 
cumulative results of the quantile models it was found to be negatively insignificant 
associated with LVD at 10%. 
In the light of above discussion, it be noticed that, after following the fourth 
approach of Draper (1988), the results of the different regression models employed in 
the present study (GLS model, Tobit model and Quantile model) support almost all 
of the results of the OLS model (transformation) for the significant variables related 
to the CG mechanisms and Ownership structure. They also support almost all the 
significant variables related to the Firm characteristics variables. The normal score 
model support all results of the OLS model. 
8.6 Summary of the Regression Results related to the Categories of 
LVD  
As previously mentioned in chapter 4, many scholars started to analyse the categories 
of index disclosure based on the model developed by Meek et al. (1995), who 
examined factors influencing voluntary disclosure of three types of information 
(strategic, non-financial, financial) contained in the annual reports of MNCs from the 
US, UK and continental Europe. Ferguson et al. (2002), examined the impact of 
international capital market pressures on voluntary disclosure of three types of 
information (strategic, financial, and non-financial) in the annual reports of Republic 
of China (PRC) enterprises, listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). 
Adjusted R-squareds of the different categories ranged from 14.7% for the non-
financial information category to 33% for the financial information category. 
Leventis and Weetman (2004) divided voluntary disclosure of companies listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) into three categories, namely, corporate 
environment, social responsibility and finance-related disclosures. Adjusted R-
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squareds of the different categories ranged from 15.4% for the social responsibility 
category to 29.3% for the financial information category. Lim et al. (2007) examined 
the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Australian companies by dividing voluntary disclosure into four 
categories, namely, forward looking quantitative, strategic, non-financial and 
historical financial; they found the adjusted R-squareds were 20.69%, 6.01%, 
21.25% and 34.37%, respectively.  
Al-Shammari (2008), in Kuwait, divided voluntary disclosure into three categories 
(corporate environment, social responsibility, and financial information). The 
adjusted R-squareds of the different categories were 39.5% for the corporate 
environment category, 12.1% for the social responsibility category and 11.5% for the 
financial information category. From previous studies, one can obtain more 
information about the categories and the extent of their impact on the overall LVD. 
The OLS model was employed to investigate the relation between each category of 
voluntary disclosure and the independent variables. In this study, LVD is categorised 
into six main categories, i.e. (GCI), (BDM), (SCS), (EI), (CSD) and (O) categories 
(see table 4.3). Therefore, six models were employed for OLS regression and GLS 
regression as well. 
Table 8.24 presents the results of the OLS regression between each category of 
voluntary disclosure and the independent variables. The first ranked adjusted R-
squared was the (CGI) category at 39.75%, and the last ranked adjusted R-squared 
was for the (O) category at 24.23%. The second ranked adjusted R-squared was the 
(CSD) category at 37.57%, followed by the (SCS), (EI) and (BDM) categories at 
32.41%, 27.21% and 26.94%, respectively.  
Regarding CG mechanisms, the findings of all models show that NEDs was found to 
be significant associated at the 1% level with all categories; it was positively 
associated with the (SCS), (EI), (CSD) and (O) categories, while it was negatively 
associated with other categories. Board size was found to be negatively significant 
associated with just the (SCS) at the 5% level. Role duality was found to be 
positively significant associated with just the (GCI) and (BDM) categories at the 1% 
level, while it was negatively positively significant associated with the (SCS) and 
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(CSD) categories at the 1% level. Audit committee was found to be negatively 
significant associated at the 1% level just with the (CGI) category, while it was   
positively significant with the (CSD) and (o) categories. Audit firm was found to be   
negatively significant associated at the 1% level just with the (CGI) and (BMD) 
categories at the 1% level, while it was positively significant with the others 
categories at the 1% level. 
Concerning Ownership structure, it was found to be positively significant associated 
at the 5% level with the (O) category, while it was insignificant with other 
categories. In respect of Firm characteristics, Firm size was found to be positively 
significant associated at the 1% level with the (SCS), (EI), (CSD) and (O) categories, 
while it was found to be negatively significant associated at the 1% level with the 
(BMD) category. Firm age was found to be positively significant associated with the 
(EI) category at the 10% level. However, Liquidity was found to be positively 
significant associated at the 1% level with the (O) category. Gearing was found to be 
insignificant associated with all categories. Profitability was found to be positively 
significant associated at the 5% level with the (BDM) category, while it was found to 
be positively significant associated at the 10% level with the (CGI) category. 
 
 
242 
 
Table 8 .18 Results of regression analyses related to the categories 
Variable CGI BMD SCS EI CSD O 
LVD  Coef p>t Coef p>t Cof. p>t Cof. p>t Cof. p>t Cof. p>t 
NEDs  -.16010 0.000 -.0684 0.000 .26678 0.000 .710349 0.004 .878253 0.005 .19094 0.000 
Board Size  -.217057 0.577 .09783 0.638 -1.4968 0.033 -3.9097 0.252 5.39862 0.209 -.84466 0.205 
Role Duality  .063499 0.000 028325 0.000 -.05557 0.002 -.03231 0.712 -.47533 0.000 .00156 0.927 
Audit Committee  -.0219264 0.013 -.00095 0.839 .01720 0.277 .054265 0.481 .33350 0.001 .05450 0.000 
Audit Firm  -.0683395 0.000 -.0209 0.000 .11414 0.000 .56576 0.000 .541617 0.000 .09685 0.000 
Ownership -.0078204 0.443 -.00521 0.339 -0.0199 0.276 .081436 0.362 -.02513 0.823 0.0441 0.012 
Firm size  -.0503693 0.174 -.05228 0.008 .426373 0.000 1.93365 0.000 2.9792 0.000 .19007 0.003 
Firm Age  -.0000676 0.839 -.00016 0.379 -.00017 0.780 .005717 0.051 .00581 0.114 -.00547 0.990 
Liquidity  -.0602802 0.329 -.02973 0.367 .111875 0.314 -.57206 0.290 .459228 0.499 .31019 0.003 
Gearing .0255581 0.780 .017368 0.722 .221136 0.180 -.62247 0.438 1.25651 0.213 .18211 0.245 
Profitability  .0356427 0.074 .021491 0.043 -.04570 0.202 -.11247 0.519 -.16777 0.444 .015466 0.650 
Constant 2.182357 0.074 2.23374 0.001 4.31817 0.050 9.98976 0.351 -5.9627 0.054 1.56686 0.454 
Adjusted R- squared 0.3975 0.2694 0.3241 0.2721 0.3757 0.2423 
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8.7 Summary of the Regression Results of LVD related to Industrial 
Type 
As mentioned in section 8.3.3, with regard to the variable Industrial type, there are 
51 financial companies and 104 non-financial companies. The results of both 
parametric and non-parametric tests for Industrial type show there is a significant 
relationship between LVD of Kuwaiti listed companies. 
Industrial type has been addressed in several previous studies to investigate whether 
it has an impact on disclosure. While some studies found significant relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and industry type (Wallace et al., 1994; Patton and 
Zelenka, 1997; Al-Janadi et al., 2013), other studies found insignificant relationship 
between them (Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Akhtaruddin, 2005). However, Craig and Diga (1998) 
found a negative relationship between industry membership and voluntary 
disclosure.  
Table 8.24 shows the results of OLS regression for financial companies. The 
independent variables explained around 69.58% of the OLS regression of LVD 
measured with adjusted R-squared with an F-ratio of 43.22. This is significant with a 
probability less than .001. All independent variables of the CG mechanisms were 
found to be significant associated at the 1% and 5% levels with LVD, except Board 
size that was found to be insignificant associated with LVD. NEDs and Audit firm 
were found be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% level, while 
Audit committee was found be positively significant associated with LVD at the 10% 
level. On the other hand, Role duality was found be negatively significant associated 
with LVD at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 .19 Results OLS regression of LVD by financial type 
LVD Coef. t P>t 
NEDs .2316499 7.81 0.000 
Board Size -.3833384 -0.91 0.366 
Role Duality -.0257697 -2.85 0.005 
Audit Committee .0173543 1.97 0.050 
Audit Firm .047171 4.63 0.000 
Ownership -.0018446 -0.15 0.877 
Firm size .1216161 3.36 0.001 
Firm Age .0001919 0.62 0.539 
Liquidity .1042378 1.99 0.048 
Gearing -.0354898 -0.47 0.638 
Profitability -.0361922 -2.16 0.032 
Constant 2.262101 1.71 0.088 
F 43.22 
Prob. > F 0.000 
R- squared 0.7123 
Adjusted R- squared 0.6958 
 
 
As indicated in table 8.24, Ownership structure was found to be negatively 
insignificant associated with LVD. Concerning Firm characteristics, all independent 
variables were found mixed. Firm size was found to be positively significant 
associated with LVD at the 1% level, while Liquidity was found to be positively 
significant associated with LVD at the 5% level. On the other hand, Profitability was 
found to be negatively significant associated with LVD at the 5% level, while Firm 
age and Gearing were found to be insignificant associated with LVD. 
Table 8.25 shows the results of OLS regression for non-financial companies. The 
independent variables explained around 54.46% of the OLS regression of LVD, 
measured by adjusted R-squared with an F-ratio of 46.13, which is significant with a 
probability less than .001. All independent variables of the CG mechanisms were 
found to be significant associated at the 1% and 5% levels with LVD, except Board 
size that was found to be insignificant associated with LVD. NEDs and Audit firm 
were found be positively significant associated with LVD at the 1% level, while 
Audit committee was found be positively significant associated with LVD at the 5% 
level. On the other hand, Role duality was found be negatively significant associated 
with LVD at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 .20 Results OLS regression of LVD by Non-financial type 
LVD Coef. t P>t 
NEDs .1445774 7.68 0.000 
Board Size -.3915204 -1.57 0.118 
Role Duality -.0563903 -8.41 0.000 
Audit Committee .0132533 2.30 0.022 
Audit Firm .0428427 6.25 0.000 
Ownership .0028889 0.45 0.651 
Firm size .0625219 2.50 0.013 
Firm Age .0002173 0.95 0.340 
Liquidity .0303918 0.67 0.502 
Gearing .1380967 2.08 0.038 
Profitability -.0017765 -0.12 0.902 
Constant 2.389883 3.05 0.002 
F 46.13 
Prob. > F 0.000 
R- squared 0.5567 
Adjusted R- squared 0.5446 
 
 
As indicated in table 8.25, Ownership structure was found to be positively 
insignificant associated with LVD. Concerning Firm characteristics, all independent 
variables were found mixed. Firm size and Gearing were found to be positively 
significant associated with LVD at the 5% level, while Firm age, Liquidity and 
Profitability were found to be insignificant associated with LVD. 
As seen in the results of tables 8.24 and 8.25, there are disagreements in results 
between financial companies and non-financial companies regarding the relationship 
between the dependent variable (LVD) and independent variables of the present 
study. Concerning the CG mechanisms, NEDs, Board size, Role duality and Audit 
firm have same result in both Industrial types, while Audit committee was found to 
be positive significant at the 10% level in the financial type and at the 5% level in the 
non-financial type. Regarding ownership structure, it was negative insignificant in 
the financial type, while it was found to be positive insignificant in the non-financial 
type. 
In respect of Firm characteristics, the results were found to be different in the two 
regression models. Firm size was found to be positive significant at the 1% level in 
the financial type, while it was found to be positive significant at the 5% level in the 
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non-financial type. Firm age has the same result in both types. Liquidity was found 
to be positive significant at the 5% level in the financial type, while it was found to 
be insignificant in the non-financial type. Gearing was found to be negative 
insignificant in the financial type, but it was found to be positively significant 
associated with LVD at the 5% level in the non-financial type. Profitability was 
found to be negatively significant associated with LVD at the 5% level in the 
financial type, while it was negatively insignificant in the non-financial type. 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter is the second part of the empirical work; the purpose of this chapter is to 
identify the determinants of LVD practices in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. It starts with a description of the continuous independent variables, then 
quantitatively investigates the relationship between LVD as dependent variable and 
the independent variables (CG mechanisms, Ownership structure and Firm 
characteristics) over the four years. 
A variety of statistical tests and analyses were employed to analyse the dataset in the 
current study, including two types of analysis, bivariate and multivariate. In the 
bivariate analysis, five different tests were employed: Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients, as parametric and non-parametric tests, were used to 
examine the correlation between LVD and each of the continuous variables, i.e. 
NEDs, Board size, Firm size, Firm age, Liquidity, Gearing and Profitability. Mann-
Whitney tests and T-tests, as parametric and non-parametric tests, were employed to 
test the correlation between LVD and each of the nominal independent variables, i.e. 
Role duality, Audit committee, Audit firm, Ownership structure and Industrial type. 
The results of the bivariate analysis of LVD in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed 
companies were reported for 155 companies in the Kuwait Stock Exchange; these 
results revealed a significant association between the dependent variable, LVD, and 
some of the independent variables. 
In the multivariate analysis, a regression analysis was undertaken in order to examine 
the research hypotheses in this study. Deciding on an appropriate statistical method, 
the data was checked to validate the assumptions of the Ordinary Least Squares 
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Regression; the results showed the assumptions for the Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression were violated by the data in the current study. Several approaches to deal 
with this violation were therefore used. 
Transformation was undertaken in order to meet the assumptions of the Ordinary 
Least Squares Regression; normal scores was therefore used. Sensitivity analysis to 
check the robustness of the regression analysis was run using the GLS regression, 
Tobit regression and Quantile regression models. The results of all regression models 
analyses of the association between the dependant variable, LVD, and independent 
variables were presented. 
The OLS model (transformed) was used to investigate the relation between each 
category of LVD and the independent variables; also, the OLS model (transformed) 
was used to investigate LVD based on the different Industrial types. Therefore, the 
following chapter (chapter 9) discusses the results from this chapter, and analyses 
them in terms of the theoretical framework adopted and linked with previous studies. 
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Chapter 9: Findings 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to report the results of the level of voluntary disclosure 
and its categories for Kuwaiti companies listed in the Kuwait stock market. Also, 
report the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structures and firm 
characteristics in determining the level of voluntary disclosure. In this study, many 
statistical analyses were employed, such as Univariate and Multivariate Analysis. 
Univariate analysis is used to assess the association between LVD and each 
independent variable. For continuous variables (i.e. NEDs, Board size, Firm size, 
Firm age, Liquidity, Gearing, Profitability) correlation coefficients were used. 
Pearson correlation, as parametric test, was used when the normality assumption was 
satisfied, while Spearman rank correlation, as non-parametric tests, was used if the 
assumption of normality was violated. On the other hand, multivariate analysis is 
applied to several explanatory variables simultaneously. 
This chapter is organised as follows: evaluation of the disclosure index in section 
9.1: the results of hypotheses related to the CG mechanisms in section 9.2; Non-
executive directors in subsection 9.2.1; Board size in subsection 9.2.2; Role duality 
in subsection 9.2.3; Audit committee in subsection 9.2.4; and Audit firm in 
subsection 9.2.5. The result of the hypothesis related to Ownership structure is in 
section 9.3. The results of the hypotheses related to Firm characteristics is in section 
9.4; Firm size in subsection 9.4.1; Firm age in subsection 9.4.2; Liquidity in 
subsection 9.4.3; Gearing in subsection 9.4.4; Profitability in subsection 9.4.5. 
Finally, the summary is presented in section 9.5. 
9.1 Evaluation of the disclosure index 
 
Kuwaiti companies show a low overall level of voluntary disclosure. The average of 
LVD over four years is 25.80%. In 2007, the mean was 10.48; in 2008 and 2009, the 
mean grew steadily to around 13.70; but in 2010, it increased dramatically to around 
16.86 with a range of 7 to 40 items. Even though this suggests that there has been 
some improvement in LVD, still the average LVD is lower than in other studies. In 
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addition, this supports this researcher’s decision to focus in the current study on 
investigating which factors will enhance LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies. 
Although the average of LVD is low, there is an increasing extent of LVD over the 
period of study, as indicated in Figure 7.1: 20.69% in year 2007 then 21.10% in 
2008,  increasing dramatically in 2009 to 27.41%, and continuing to increase 
dramatically also in 2010 to reach 33.72%. The average of LVD over four year is 
25.80%. There is a wide distinction in the level of voluntary disclosure between 
different empirical studies. Despite this it would be especially interesting to compare 
disclosure scores among many studies.  
Suwaidan (1997) states an average of 39% score for voluntary disclosure by listed 
Jordanian companies (measured by a 75-item disclosure index). In Hong Kong, Ho 
and Wong (2001) report an average of 29% score for voluntary disclosure. Leventis 
and Weetman (2004) state an average of 39% score for voluntary disclosure by listed 
Greek companies (measured by a 72-item disclosure index divided into four 
categories). Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find an average of 31.4% score for 
voluntary disclosure by listed Malaysia companies (measured by a 53-item 
disclosure index). This shows that the LVD by Kuwaiti listed companies is low. 
However, one must pay attention to differences of economic environment, sample 
size, components of the index disclosure and the time of the study when making 
comparisons with previous studies.  
Regarding the contribution of the different components of LVD to the LVD score 
over the period of study (2007-2010), the items of (GCI) have the largest 
contribution to LVD with average score 37.20% over the four-year period. It is 
without doubt that these items are deemed to be of a degree of importance to 
investors because it is a principal entrance to investing in listed companies. In 
addition, the second largest contribution comes from items of (BDM) with average 
score 22.40%, items about (O) with average score 15.40%. Then come in descending 
order each of (SCS) and (CSD) with averages scores 12.55% and 8.26%, 
respectively. (EI) has the lowest proportion in the total voluntary index with average 
score 4.19%. The low level of (EI) is considered reasonable because Kuwaiti listed 
companies consider this information useless for investors. Although this detailed 
information about employees, such as geographical distribution of employee, 
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categories of employees by gender, and others mentioned in the section on employee 
information in voluntary disclosure is necessary for government agencies, it can be 
obtained by other means. 
9.2 Results for Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
Five variables related to CG mechanisms, namely, Non-executive Directors, Board 
size, Role duality, Audit Committee and Audit firm, have been investigated in the 
present study. Using bivariate and multivariate analyses (five models), Table 9.1 
shows the results of the different statistical analyses. These findings are analysed and 
discussed based on the theoretical framework and conclusions are drawn from the 
statistical results. 
Table 9.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms: results summary 
CG 
Mechanisms 
Bivariate OLS GLS Tobit Cumulative 
of Quantile 1 2 
NEDs  +** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
Board Size  +** - - - - - 
Role Duality  -** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** 
Audit 
Committee  
+** +*** +*** +*** +*** +** 
Audit Firm   +** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
 
 
9.2.1 NEDs 
As indicated in Table 9.1, the findings of the bivariate analysis and the multivariate 
analysis agreed about the positively significant association of Non-executive 
directors with LVD in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies. The findings 
of this variable were found to be significant at the 1% level in all the different 
statistical methods employed in the present study. This result is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies, e.g. Chen and Jaggi (2000), Leung and Horwitz (2004), 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Lim et al. (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Uyar et al. (2013). They found 
a positively significant relation between Non-executive directors of the board and 
LVD. However, this is in contrast to the findings of Eng and Mak (2003), Barako et 
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al. (2006), Rouf (2011), and Damagum and Chima (2013), who provide evidence of 
negatively significant association of Non-executive directors of the board and 
voluntary disclosure in Singapore, Kenya, Bangladesh and Nigeria, respectively. 
This is also in contrast with Mohamad and Sulong, (2010), in Malaysia, who found 
no association; Haniffa and Cooke (2002), in Malaysia, who found negative 
association between Non-executive directors of the board and voluntary disclosure 
but it was insignificant association. Hasan et al. (2013), in Bangladesh, did not find 
any significant association between board independence and level of disclosure. In 
addition, Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013) examined the determinants of voluntary 
disclosures of listed banks in Tunisia, but they did not find any significant 
association between board independence and the level of disclosure of banks in 
Tunisia. Note that they have different results due to the difference in the role played 
by non-executive directors in accordance with their countries’ different cultures. 
As mentioned in Chapter 8, from Table 8.1, the average of Non-executive directors 
was 0.7810, while Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) found the average of non-
executive directors was 0.82, but their sample was 170 companies. That percentage 
shows that the Kuwaiti companies listed are interested in appointing non-executive 
directors on their boards of directors, which finding is in line with the evidence from 
previous studies that non-executive directors increasingly affect LVD. Therefore, 
shareholders and investors will expect to have more disclosure and transparency 
from companies that have non-executive directors on their boards of directors. This 
suggests that companies with a larger proportion of non-executive directors disclose 
more information voluntarily in their annual reports and it will be to minimising of 
managerial opportunism. Based on the findings of the present study, we accept 
hypothesis H1: There is a positive association between the non-executive directors 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the Kuwaiti companies.  
9.2.2 Board size  
There is a significant relationship between the board size and LVD in parametric and 
non-parametric tests in the bivariate analysis. But in all statistical methods employed 
in the multivariate analysis there is an insignificant relationship between the board 
size and LVD. From Table 9.1, the results of Board size indicate there is a positively 
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significant relationship between Board size and LVD in the annual reports of the 
Kuwaiti companies LVD in parametric and non-parametric tests in the bivariate 
analysis. All in all, the multivariate analysis found a negatively insignificant 
association between the board size and LVD. 
However, the results of the multivariate analysis are consistent with previous 
empirical findings, which found insignificant association between board size and 
LVD (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; Abeysekera, 2010; Hasan et al., 2013; and Uyar et al., 2013). In 
addition, some others found negative association, such as Parsa et al. (2007), Dhouibi 
and Mamoghli (2013) and Damagum and Chima (2013), while some studies found a 
positive association between board size and voluntary disclosure, for example, 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011), Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Zaheer (2013).  
However, from descriptive continuous variables in Table 8.1, the mean Board size 
over the four years is about 6.30 members, with minimum 3 and maximum 11 
members. Board size is different from country to country, which depends on laws 
and legislation specific to each country. It can be seen from Table 9.1 that board size 
has a negative insignificant association with LVD Thus, we reject hypothesis H2: 
There is a negative association between the board size and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.2.3 Role duality  
This variable is considered one of the strongest variables to explain LVD in the 
annual reports of Kuwait listed companies. The findings of all the statistical methods 
employed in the multivariate analysis confirm the results of the bivariate analysis. 
Role duality was found to be negatively associated with the total of voluntary 
disclosure at the 1% level; the result of this variable is consistent with the result of 
the first variable (NEDs), but it was positively significant. 
This result is consistent with previous studies, such as Forker (1992), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Gul and Leung (2004), Xiao and Yuan (2007), Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008), Laksmana (2008), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010), and Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013), who provide evidence of the negatively significant association of Role 
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duality and voluntary disclosure. However, it contradicts the evidence presented by 
Abed et al. (2011) and Rouf (2011) who found that the extent of forecast disclosures 
is positively significant related to dual leadership structure, while some studies 
indicate that there is no significant association of Role duality with LVD, for 
example, Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Barako et al. (2006), Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Zaheer (2013), Hasan et al. (2013) and 
Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013). From Table 8.3, it may be noted that 368 companies 
have role duality. As mentioned in the literature review, there are two points of view 
about what the best situation is to launch more disclosure. Recalling that the role 
duality is where one person holds the roles of chairman and CEO. Based on the 
empirical results from Table 9.1, we reject hypothesis H3: There is a positive 
association between the role duality and the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.2.4 Audit committee 
It can be seen from Table 9.1 that both bivariate and multivariate analyses provided 
identical results about the direction and the significance of Audit committee and 
LVD in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies. Audit committee was found 
to have positively significant association at the 1% level in all multivariate analyses, 
while in the quantile model it was positively significant at the 5% level with LVD. 
From Table 8.3 there are 79 companies from 155 companies that have an audit 
committee. The role of the audit committee is to deal with external auditors who 
review financial statements and internal control, and thus ensure the provision of 
high quality financial information to stakeholders. The presence of an audit 
committee is related with confident financial statements, for example, reduced rate of 
errors, irregularities and the confirmation function of external financial reporting 
(Rouf, 1041). The findings here on Audit committee are consistent with previous 
studies, such as Wright (1996), McMullen (1996), Ho and Wong (2001), Bliss and 
Balachandran (2003), Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Barako et al. (2006), Kent and 
Stewart (2008), Wang et al. (2008), Samah (2010) and Rouf (2011). On the other 
hand, some studies found no significant relation between the Audit committee and 
LVD, such as Forker (1992) and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), while Abbott et al. 
(2004) found a negative relation between audit committee independence on the board 
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and financial reporting statements. Based on the statistical results, we accept 
hypothesis H4: There is a positive association between the Audit committee and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.2.5 Audit firm 
The findings in Table 9.1 show agreement between the bivariate analysis and the 
multivariate analysis about the positively significant association of Audit firm with 
LVD in the annual reports of the investigated companies. The findings of the 
bivariate analysis indicate that it was found to be positively significant associated at 
the 1% level; also, the different statistical techniques employed in the multivariate 
analysis show the positively significant association of Audit firm with LVD in the 
annual reports at a 1% level. 
58 companies out of 155 companies were audited by one of the Big Four audit firms 
during 2007-2010. The result here is consistent with previous studies, which found a 
positively significant association between audit firms and LVD. For example, 
Craswell and Taylor (1992), Raffournier (1995), Inchausti (1997), Patton and 
Zelenka (1997), Bonsón and Escobar (2006), Bassett et al. (2007), Uyar (2011), Al-
Janadi et al. (2013), Uyar et al. (2013) and Hasan et al. (2013). However, other 
studies found insignificant association, such as Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al. 
(1994) Hossain et al. (1995), Al-Saeed (2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Chau 
and Gray (2010), Soliman (2013) and Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013). Based on the 
statistical results of bivariate and multivariate analyses, we accept hypothesis H5: 
There is a positive association between the audit firm and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
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9.3 Results for Ownership Structure 
Table 9.2 shows the results related to Ownership structure investigated in the present 
study. As can be seen from the table, the results indicate a weak association between 
Ownership structure and LVD.  
Table 9.2: Ownership structure results summary 
 Bivariate OLS GLS Tobit Quantile 
1 2 
Ownership 
structure  
+ + + + + + 
It can be seen from Table 9.2 that both bivariate and multivariate analyses provided 
identical results about the direction and the significance of Ownership structure and 
LVD in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies. Ownership structure was 
found to have a positively insignificant association in bivariate tests and in all 
multivariate analyses. 
The approach of La Porta et al. (1999) was adopted in this study to determine the 
ownership structure: if an investor owns (directly or indirectly) more than 20% of the 
company’s shares, the company has concentrated ownership. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, Table 8.3 shows 122 companies belong to ownership 
concentration, and the rest belong to ownership diffusion. 
Hasan et al. (2013), who examined the relationship between concentrated ownership 
and LVD in Bangladesh, found concentrated ownership has the power to influence 
LVD, while White et al. (2007) found insignificant association between disclosure 
practice and ownership concentration in Australian biotechnology companies. In 
addition, Bozzolan et al. (2006) and Woodcock and Whiting (2009) failed to find any 
proof of ownership concentration affecting LVD. On the other hand, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) found that ownership diffusion is positively significant associated with 
LVD. In addition, Gelb (2000) reported there was positively significant association 
between the quality of annual reports and ownership diffusion. We reject hypothesis 
H6: There is a positive association between the ownership concentration and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in annual the reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
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9.4 Results for Firm Characteristics 
As indicated in Chapter 2, firm characteristics represent the main investigated 
determinants of voluntary disclosure in the previous studies. This section discusses 
the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses related to the Firm 
characteristics variables. Table 8.17 summarises the statistical results of all statistical 
methods employed in the current study on Firm characteristics. 
Table 9.3 Firm Characteristics: results summary 
Firm Characteristics Bivariate OLS GLS Tobit Quantile 
  1 2    
Firm size +** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
Firm age +** + +** + + + 
Liquidity -** +** +** +** +** +** 
Gearing +** + + + + + 
Profitability - - - - - -* 
 
9.4.1 Firm size 
As indicated in Table 9.3, the findings of the bivariate analysis and the multivariate 
analysis agreed about the positive significant association of Firm size with LVD in 
the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies. The findings of this variable were 
found to be significant at the 1% level in all the different statistical methods 
employed in the present study. That means the larger companies (total assets) are 
more willing to disclose more information voluntarily in their annual reports than the 
small companies. McNally et al. (1982) concluded that size was a dominant 
corporate characteristic in establishing the leaders in voluntary disclosure practice. 
A number of previous disclosure studies have investigated various determinants of 
companies’ voluntary disclosure practices. A positively significant association 
between firm size and LVD has been documented in many studies. For example; 
Cooke (1992, 1993), Wallace et al. (1994), Hossain et al. (1995), Inchausti (1997), 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), 
Barako et al. (2006), Al-Saeed (2006), Hossain and Hammami (2009), Al-Janadi et 
al. (2013), Soliman (2013), Ullah (2013), Dhouibi and Mamoghli (2013), Uyar et al. 
(2013) and Wijana et al. (2013). While some studies found insignificant association 
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between firm size and disclosure, such as Aljifri and Hussainey (2007), they found 
firm size has insignificant association with the level of forward-looking information 
disclosed in UAE annual reports. In addition, Hasan et al. (2013) in Bangladesh 
concluded there was an insignificant association between size and disclosure. Based 
on the results of the current study, we accept hypothesis H7: There is a positive 
association between the firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.4.2 Firm age  
The findings in Table 9.1 show a disagreement between the results of bivariate and 
multivariate analyses about the direction and the significance of the firm age variable 
with LVD in the annual reports of the investigated companies. The findings of the 
bivariate analysis indicate that Firm age was found to be positively significant 
associated at the 1% level. On the other hand, the different statistical techniques 
employed in the multivariate analysis show a positively insignificant relationship 
between firm age and LVD in the annual reports. But the normal score model 
indicates that Firm age was found to be positively significant associated at the 5% 
level with LVD in the annual reports. 
The age of the company is considered one of the modern variables that has been 
discussed recently (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). Most of the disclosure studies 
found insignificant association between the age of the company and disclosure; for 
example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Hossain and Reaz (2007), Uyar et al. (2013), 
Wijana et al. (2013) and Soliman (2013). However, some studies found positively 
significant association between the age of the company and disclosure, such as Carlin 
et al. (2006) in Hong Kong, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) in British and Dutch 
companies, and Hossain and Hammami (2009) in Qatar. In Saudi companies, Al-
Saeed (2006) found a positively significant association, but after deleting highly-
ranked companies. 
However, Table 8.2 shows the Firm age of the Kuwaiti listed companies ranges from 
1 year to 58 years. Many studies indicate that the older companies are ready to 
disclose more information voluntarily in their annual reports. That indicates the older 
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companies have business experience and customer loyalty; also, they know how to 
increase customer satisfaction by determining relevant information sufficiency. 
Therefore, older companies seek to disclose more information to their clients. But in 
this study, the different statistical techniques employed in the multivariate analysis 
found a positively insignificant relationship between firm age and LVD in the annual 
reports. Based on the results of the current study, we accept hypothesis H8: There is 
no association between the firm age and the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.4.3 Liquidity 
As shown in Table 8.15, the bivariate and multivariate analyses provide different 
results regarding the significance of the relationship between Liquidity and LVD. 
While the results of the bivariate analysis indicate that it was found to be negatively 
significant at the 1% level with LVD, the multivariate analysis indicated significance 
of Liquidity with LVD. It was positively significant at the 5% level in all regression 
models. This result suggests that Liquidity has an effect on LVD. 
The result of the present study is consistent with Cooke (1989), Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002), Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), Nandi and Ghosh (2012) and 
Mathuva (2012), who found a positive relationship between liquidity and disclosure. 
However, this is in contrast to the results of Wallace et al. (1994), Naser et al. (2002), 
and Mangena and Pike (2005), who found a negative relationship between liquidity 
and disclosure. In addition, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Barako et al. (2006) and 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) did not find any significant association between 
disclosure and liquidity. Based on the results of the current study, we reject 
hypothesis H9: There is no association between the liquidity and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.4.4 Gearing 
Both bivariate and multivariate analyses provide different results regarding the 
significance of the relationship between Gearing and LVD, as shown in Table 9.3. 
While the results of the bivariate analysis indicate that Gearing was found to be 
positively significant associated with LVD, the different statistical methods 
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employed in the multivariate analysis indicate positively insignificant association of 
Gearing with LVD. This result suggests that gearing does not have a significant 
influence on LVD in the annual reports of the Kuwaiti listed companies. 
The finding of the current study is consistent with the findings of previous studies. 
For example, Chow and Wong- Boren (1987), Wallace et al. (1994), Raffournier 
(1995), Wallace and Naser (1995), Ahmed (1996), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Depoers 
(2000), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), Chau and Gray (2010), Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) and Hasan et 
al. (2013) documented evidence of insignificant association of gearing with LVD. 
However, this contradicts the results of other studies that concluded positively 
significant association between gearing and LVD, e.g. Malone et al. (1993), Hossain 
et al. (1995), Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Naser et al. (2002) and Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002). In addition, the result here is in contrast with Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Uyar et al. (2013), who found negatively significant association between gearing and 
LVD. Thus, we accept hypothesis H10: There is no association between the gearing 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.4.5 Profitability 
As indicated in Table 9-3, there was an agreement between bivariate analysis and the 
multivariate analysis of the significant negative relationship between profitability 
with the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of investigated 
companies, except for the quantile model where it was negative association at the 
level of 10%. This result suggests that companies with higher Profitability disclose 
less information voluntarily in their annual reports. 
This finding is consistent with the results of Wallace et al. (1994), Raffounier (1995), 
Meek et al. (1995), Hackston and Milne (1996), Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Hasan et 
al. (2013) who found insignificant association between profitability and disclosure. 
In addition, other studies provide evidence of a negatively significant relationship 
between profitability and disclosure levels, such as Wallace and Naser (1995), 
Owusu-Ansah (1998), Inchausti (1997), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Barako et al. (2006) 
and Vandemele et al. (2009). On the other hand, this contradicts the findings of other 
studies that concluded positively significant association between profitability and 
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LVD, e.g. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Agca and Onder 
(2007), Soliman (2013) and Damagum and Chima (2013). Thus, we reject hypothesis 
H11: There is a positive association between the profitability and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
9.5 Summary 
This chapter aimed to identify the determinants of voluntary disclosure practices in 
the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies. It reports the empirical findings of 
the relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports over 
the four years (from 2007 to 2010), and each of the corporate governance 
mechanisms, ownership structure and firm characteristics. 
It was found that most corporate governance mechanisms have a significant 
relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure. Non-executive Directors, Audit 
Committee, and Audit firm have a positively significant association with voluntary 
disclosure; while Role duality has a negatively significant association with voluntary 
disclosure. On the other hand, Board size has a negatively insignificant association 
with voluntary disclosure. 
However, Ownership structure has a positively insignificant association with LVD. 
Regarding Firm characteristics, Firm Size and Liquidity have positively significant 
association with voluntary disclosure, while Firm age and Gearing have a positively 
insignificant association with voluntary disclosure. However, Profitability has a 
negatively insignificant association with voluntary disclosure. 
The next chapter presents the conclusions of this study. The chapter highlights a 
summary of the findings of the study, as well as the contribution of this study. The 
limitations of the study and where possible how to overcome these limitations are 
addressed. Also, suggestions are provided for further research. 
 
 
261 
 
Chapter 10: Conclusions, Contributions, Limitations 
and Future Research 
10.1 Introduction 
The thesis is expected to contribute to accounting knowledge in different 
perspectives. First, the thesis provides a comprehensive view of the previous studies 
that have discussed the level of voluntary disclosure, and the different recommended 
methods that are believed to use in measure the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Second, it evaluates the level of disclosure through overall disclosure and its 
categories in Kuwait’s business environment. Third, it provides a conceptual 
framework to show the relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and its 
categories with the corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics, to find whether there are statistically significant relationships. 
Finally, it reviews the different theories that could offer the scientific basis to provide 
a full explanation of the study results. 
The chapter will start with a brief reminder of the research objectives and research 
questions in section 10.2. Section 10.3 presents a summary of the research 
methodology which was applied to achieve the research objectives. The results and 
conclusions of the research are discussed in section 10.4. The contribution of this 
research to knowledge is presented in section 10.5. The limitations of the research 
are discussed in section 10.6. Finally, section 10.7 provides suggestions for future 
research. 
 
10.2 The Research Objectives, Research Questions  
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate and measure voluntary disclosure practices in the 
annual reports issued by Kuwaiti listed companies over four years (2007-2010). 
Also, the aim is to investigate the effect of corporate governance characteristics, 
ownership structure and firm characteristics on the voluntary disclosure of financial 
reporting, and improve LVD in Kuwait based on the results of this study. This study 
comes especially after three years of existence of CG principles for banks and 
financial companies issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait in 2004. 
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To reach this overall aim, the following specific objectives have been established: 
1. Provide a full explanation of what voluntary disclosure means to Kuwaiti 
customers and to the firms’ managers. 
2. To evaluate voluntary disclosure through overall disclosure and its categories 
during the study period. 
3. To find whether there are statistically significant relationships between LVD 
and its categories with the CG mechanisms, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics.  
4. To compare the extent of LVD in both sectors (the financial sector and the 
non-financial sector). 
5. To link the empirical results with the different theories to provide a clear 
meaning to results.  
As mentioned before, this thesis seeks to investigate voluntary disclosure practices in 
Kuwaiti listed companies evolving during the period 2007-2010. Besides, it aims to 
examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structures and 
firm characteristics in determining the level of voluntary disclosure. To achieve that, 
the empirical research questions of this study are as follows 
1. What is the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti 
listed companies? 
2. To what extent did voluntary disclosures of Kuwaiti listed companies and its 
categories change over the period 2007-2010? 
3. What are the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti listed companies? 
4. Is there any difference between the financial sector and non-financial sector? 
10.3 Summary of the Research Methodology 
The researcher adopted a multi-paradigm approach to achieve the research 
objectives. This design incorporated both mix the interpretivist and functionalist 
approaches. To achieve the first empirical objective, “explanation of what voluntary 
disclosure means”, the researcher reviewed the previous research to provide the 
definitions of voluntary disclosure. In addition, to highlight the factors determining 
LVD in both developed and developing countries (Chapters 2 and 3). In order to 
achieve the second empirical objective, a disclosure index of 50 items was 
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constructed (see Appendix 1). The index encompassed six categories of information: 
general corporate information; board of directors and management; specific 
corporate strategy; employee information; corporate social disclosure and others. The 
items in the disclosure index were un-weighted using a dichotomous approach, in 
which an item was one if it is disclosed, zero if it is not disclosed. This method has 
been used in many previous studies (see Chapter 6, Table 6.5). Statistical tests, the 
validity and reliability of the index, were used to minimise subjectivity (see Chapter 
7). The level of voluntary disclosure was calculated by dividing the actual disclosure 
awarded by the total possible disclosure appropriate for the company. The final 
sample is 155 Kuwaiti listed companies with 620 firm–year observations. 
Descriptive Statistics were used to evaluate the extent of LVD and its categories over 
the study period (from section 7.4 to section 7.7). In order to achieve the third 
empirical objective, both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis were used. In 
bivariate analysis, five different tests were employed, namely: correlation 
coefficients, Pearson and Spearman (as parametric and non-parametric tests). Mann-
Whitney and T-test (as parametric and non-parametric tests) were employed to 
examine the correlation between level of voluntary disclosure and each of the 
independent variables. A robust standard error is applied to overcome the data is not 
normally distributed (after regression diagnostic). Five separate regression models 
were run based on different transformations of the dependent and explanatory 
variables: OLS regression (untransformed), Normal scores of both dependent 
variable and continuous explanatory variables, GLS regression, Tobit regression and 
Quantile regression. Furthermore, 11 hypotheses were formulated in order to 
examine the association between the level of voluntary disclosure (dependent 
variable) and corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics (independent variables). In order to achieve the fourth empirical 
objective, in section 8.7 OLS regression was used in both the financial and non-
financial sectors to provide evidence whether there are any differences between the 
financial sector and non-financial sector. Many theories were used to provide a clear 
explanation for determinants of LVD in Kuwaiti listed companies. These theories are 
agency theory, stewardship theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory and political cost theory, which achieve the fifth empirical objective. 
 
 
264 
 
10.4 The results and conclusions of the research 
The empirical study of the thesis is divided into two parts. First, the examination of 
the level and trend of voluntary disclosure in Kuwait listed companies during years 
2007-2010. Second, investigate whether there are statistically significant 
relationships between LVD and its categories with the CG mechanisms, ownership 
structure and firm characteristics. 
The first part of the empirical study aims at quantitatively investigating LVD in 
practices in Kuwaiti listed companies’ annual reports. A variety of analyses and 
statistical tests, including assessment reliability and validity, the checklist of 
voluntary disclosure items, item to sub-total (group score) correlations and 
descriptive statistics are undertaken in order to measure the extent and trend of 
voluntary disclosure.  
The findings of this part indicate the overall of LVD in annual reports of Kuwaiti 
listed companies in the four financial years from 2007 to 2010 ranged from 20.69%  
to 33.72% with a mean of 25.80%. By examining the annual reports of 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2010, the findings show a significant improvement in the voluntary 
disclosure of Kuwaiti listed companies during these four years. LVD 2007 ranged 
from 8% to 78% with a mean of 20.96%. LVD 2008 ranged from 6% to 78% with an 
average of 21.10%. LVD 2009 ranged from 10% to 80% with a mean of 27.41%, and 
LVD 2010 ranged from 6% to 80% with an average of 33.72%. The statistical results 
indicate a significant difference between LVD 2008 and LVD 2009 and between 
LVD 2009 and LVD 2010. 
The contributions of the different components (categories) of the voluntary 
disclosure index to the level of the voluntary disclosure score were examined. The 
items of (GCI) category have the largest contribution to LVD over the four-year 
period with an average score of 37.20%; the minimum was 39.1% in 2008, and the 
maximum was 63.1% in 2010. The second largest contribution comes from items of 
about (BDM) category over the four-year period with an average score 22.40%; the 
minimum was 21.94% in 2008, and the maximum was 34.66% in 2010. These are 
followed by items about the (O) category with an average score of 15.40%; the 
minimum was 23.78% in 2008, and the maximum was 33% in 2010. Then, in 
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descending order, come the (SCS) and (CSD) categories: (SCS) category with 
average score of 12.55%; the minimum was 13.33% in 2008, and the maximum was 
24.66% in 2010; while (CSD) category with average score of 8.26%; the minimum 
was 8.71% in 2007, and the maximum was 26.34% in 2010. (EI) the category has the 
lowest proportion in LVD with an average score 4.19%; the minimum was 6.45% in 
2007, and the maximum was 9.03% in 2010. 
Findings of the items of LVD to LVD score over the study period (2007-2010) 
indicate the top five items are brief narrative history of company, information on ISO 
certification, description of organisational structure, name of the directors and 
pictures of all directors/board of directors they scored averages of 99.84%, 99.52%, 
92.26%, 73.39% and 59.19%, respectively. However, the lowest five items are 
identification of senior management and their functions, age of the directors, type of 
shareholders (for example, institutions and individuals), majority shareholders 
information and number or percentage of Kuwaiti employees, which scored averages 
of 0.16%, 0.16%, 0.65%, 1.77% and 1.77%, respectively. 
The second part of the empirical work aims at quantitatively investigating whether 
there are statistically significant relationships between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and its categories with the corporate governance mechanisms, ownership 
structure and firm characteristics. All the variables that have been theoretically 
hypothesised to be associated with the level of voluntary disclosure were entered into 
the regression equation. The various regression models, which are employed in this 
study, yield slightly different results in terms of both the significance of variables 
and the adjusted R2. In the OLS regression (untransformed) the independent 
variables explain around 59.88% of LVD, measured by adjusted R-squared with an 
F-ratio of 85, which is significant p < .001. In the normal scores regression the 
independent variables explained around 59.88% of LVD, measured by adjusted R-
squared with an F-ratio of 83.61. In Tobit regression the independent variables 
explain around 47.62% of LVD, measured by Pseudo R2 with Prob > chi2 = 0.000. 
In 25% Quantiles model the independent variables explained around 37.9% of LVD, 
while 50% Quantiles model the independent variables explained around 37.64% of 
LVD. However, in 75% Quantiles model the independent variables explained around 
39.33% of LVD.  
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A summary of the findings of the regression analysis between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms was provided in Table 9.1. 
According to the findings, most of the corporate governance mechanisms revealed a 
significant association with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
We accept hypothesis H1: There is a positive association between the non-executive 
directors and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti 
companies. Agency theory states there may be problems in the relationship between 
two parties, say, a shareholder (principal) and a corporate manager (agent) who 
represents the shareholders (principal) in transactions with a third party, as a result of 
their separation. Many problems arise when the two parties have different interests, 
which may lead to conflict of interest between the two parties, because corporate 
management (agent) has the opportunity to make decisions based upon their own 
goals at the expense of the shareholders’ goals (principal) (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Also, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) reported that management (agent) pursue 
their own interests instead of the shareholders’ interests (ownership). 
When management (agent) possess more information than shareholders (principal), 
this leads to the existence of a conflict of interest between shareholders (principal) 
and management companies (agent) in information asymmetry which is central in 
agency theory and the behaviour of the managers. Opportunistic behaviour means 
that managers exploit their positions in order to pursue their own interests by failing 
to disclose some information to the other parties. This would occur if managers have 
information about the company and they deliberately withheld it from the 
shareholders, in the knowledge that such information would affect the shareholders’ 
decisions about their investment (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Salmon, 
1993). 
Consequently, in order to assist in more objective management evaluation, the 
presence of non-executive directors on the board of directors is considered to play an 
important and influential role in helping to monitor and control the opportunistic 
behaviour of management. Also, the presence of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors is considered a method to help the shareholders (principal) to 
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observe managers (agent) to ensure that the managers (agent) are always acting in the 
best interest of shareholders (principal) (Brickley and James, 1987). 
In this respect, many scholars have used agency theory in order to explain why 
directors on the board decide to disclose voluntary information in the annual reports, 
such as Leftwich et al. (1981), Cooke (1989), Depoers (2000) and Watson et al. 
(2002). Also, many scholars provide arguments for the need to control and monitor 
the behaviour and actions of the board due to their opportunistic behaviour, whether 
to avoid or reduce it (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Andres et al., 2005). 
The presence of non-executive directors on any board is considered a method to 
enhance the effectiveness of boards (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Salmon, 1993). 
Furthermore, Fama and Jensen (1983) see non-executive directors as decision 
experts, while Tricker (1984) reported that the existence of non-executive directors 
provides ‘additional windows on the world’ (p. 171). In other words, non-executive 
directors are considered a major factor influencing corporate voluntary disclosure 
(Barako et al., 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001). Financial reporting and disclosures are 
considered a method to facilitate credible disclosure between managers and 
shareholders in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency conflicts (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). 
We accept hypothesis H2: There is a negative association between the board size 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
Many studies have focused on board size as one of many factors which may 
influence voluntary disclosure as a strategic decision taken by the board. Despite 
this, there is no special theory to explain the optimal size for a board; also, there is no 
empirical evidence to suggest the optimal size for a board. In any case, the empirical 
findings of the relationship between Board size and LVD were mixed. 
In this regard, the value of a company may be affected by its board size, through the 
role played by the board in the monitoring and observation of the firm’s activities, 
besides the role of the board to monitor managerial performance, reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and enhance financial disclosures. Hussainey and Wang 
(2011) reported companies with large boards are less likely to be dominated by the 
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board. John and Senbet (1998) and Zahra and Pearce II (1989) reported that a 
company which has a large size will be more able to monitor managerial behaviour. 
In addition, Kim and Nofsinger (2007) reported that a company with small size 
might have a better board. Jensen (1993) reported that small sized boards are more 
useful to monitor manipulation by the CEO, and that will increase the high degree of 
coordination and communication between the board and managers. On the other 
hand, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) concluded that larger size companies need larger 
boards to control and monitor management’s performance. Samaha et al. (2012) 
stated that the larger sized boards provide greater corporate internal reporting, while 
Abeysekera (2010) found that board size had no affect on strategic external capital 
disclosure. However, board size is different from country to country, which depends 
on laws and legislation specific to each country. Agency theory predicts that large 
board size can play an important and influential role in monitoring by the board, 
make decisions useful and reduce agency cost. 
We reject hypothesis H3: There is a positive association between the role duality 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
Many scholars have pointed to the importance of separation between the chairman 
and CEO because it will lead to increasing the effective for the company, as well as 
helping to reduce the dominance of the administration on the board (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Khodadadi et al., 
2010). In addition, the OECD Principles of CG (2004), which suggest separation 
between chairman and CEO, reported that: 
“Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can help to 
achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and improve 
the board’s capacity for decision making independent of management” (p. 63). 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Table 8.3 shows that about 60 percent of the 
companies have role duality, which means the positions of chairman and managing 
CEO are occupied by the one person, while Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) 
found 57% of the Kuwaiti listed companies in 2007 have role duality. It is important 
to note that Kuwaiti company law did not prevent duality in Kuwaiti companies 
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before 2013, which encouraged Kuwaiti companies to combine the two positions, 
chairman and CEO, in one person.  
This result supports agency theory, which considers separation of the positions of 
chairman and CEO would help to enhance board independence, increase 
accountability and reduce domination by management of the board. 
We accept hypothesis H4: There is a positive association between the Audit 
committee and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti 
companies. Munro and Buckby (2008) argued that “audit committees are commonly 
viewed as monitoring mechanisms that enhance the audit attestation function of 
external financial reporting” (p. 2). In addition, an audit committee has the influence 
to reduce information asymmetry and increase trust of the annual report. The board 
authorises audit committee to supervision and review of the company’s processes of 
financial reporting in order to produce and improve the quality of financial reporting 
(DeZoort, 1998). The existence of an audit committee on the board appears to 
present a more positive image of the directors, which supports stewardship theory. A 
steward is defined as a “person entrusted with management of another’s property…a 
paid manager” (Sykes, 1982, p. 1043). The directors, under this theory, essentially 
want to improve their image and provide the impression to shareholders that they 
undertake their duties in the correct manner, which motivates managers to disclose 
more information.  
We accept hypothesis H5: There is a positive association between the Audit firm 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
According to the disclosure literature, the type of auditor plays a role in influencing 
the kind and contents of the annual reports. The larger, Big Four auditors have 
experience that they have gained through their work with other companies. That 
perhaps incentivises the company to disclose more information in their annual report. 
Firth (1979a) argued that Big Four auditors provide better reporting practices and 
may therefore add a positive effect to disclosure. The smaller auditing firms may 
succumb to client demands to avoid loss of a client, while the larger auditing firms 
may dare to refuse the client’s adverse demands (Malone et al., 1993). 
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Considering the auditing by large Big Four auditors as a signal for shareholders that 
company disclosure is more reliable, the results here indicate the support of 
signalling theory. That means the financial statements of a company that are audited 
by one of the Big Four audit firms signal to the stakeholder the apparent credibility 
and reliability of their reports; thus, the large audit firm may encourage the company 
to disclose more information in their annual report.  
A summary of the findings of the regression analysis between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and ownership structure was provided in Table 9.2. The result of 
ownership concentration indicates no significant association with the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
We reject hypothesis H6: There is a positive association between the ownership 
concentration and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti 
companies. The approach of La Porta et al. (1999) was adopted in this study to 
determine the ownership structure: if an investor owned (directly or indirectly) more 
than 20% of the company’s shares, the company had concentrated ownership. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, Table 8.3 shows 122 companies belong to 
ownership concentration, and the rest belong to ownership diffusion. According to 
Hasan et al. (2013), who examined the relationship between the concentrated 
ownership and LVD in Bangladesh, they found concentrated ownership has the 
power to influence LVD, while White et al. (2007) found insignificant association 
between disclosure practice and ownership concentration in Australian 
biotechnology companies. In addition, Bozzolan et al. (2006) and Woodcock and 
Whiting (2009) failed to find any proof of ownership concentration affecting LVD. 
On the other hand, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that ownership diffusion is 
positively significant associated with LVD. In addition, Gelb (2000) reported there is 
positively significant association between the quality of annual reports and 
ownership diffusion. Legitimacy theory predicts that companies with widely held 
shares will disclose more information in response to the social pressures (Cormier 
and Gordon, 2001). Nevertheless, the results here are consistent with this theory.  
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A summary of the findings of the regression analysis between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and firm characteristics was provided in Table 9.3. The results indicate a 
significant association between the level of voluntary disclosure and some of the firm 
characteristics. 
We accept hypothesis H7: There is a positive association between the firm size and 
the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. Elzahar 
and Hussainey (2012) reported, “Those companies have enough resources to afford 
the cost of additional disclosure production” (p. 139). Also, Watson et al. (2002) 
reported that large companies can obtain greater benefits through undertaking more 
disclosure because it can reduce the information asymmetry problem. Marston and 
Polei (2004) asserted that the agency cost would decrease with a high level of 
disclosure. In addition, agency theory provides support for this finding since large 
Kuwaiti listed companies are willing to release more information in order to reduce 
agency costs.    
We accept hypothesis H8: There is no association between the firm age and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. From Table 
8.1, Firm age ranges from 1 year to 58 years, with an average of 23.45 years; about 
50% of the companies have been listed for 24 years. From Table 9.3 it seems that 
firm age does not explain the variation of disclosure levels among the Kuwaiti listed 
companies while the age variable is not significant, but the coefficients are positive. 
This finding lends non-support to Hypothesis 8. However, that does not make an 
older firm safer from the effects of competition through early disclosure of financial 
information in a business environment, while younger firms do not suffer 
competition, because younger firms do not tend to release more information in order 
to avoid the additional costs of disclosure (Sejjaaka, 2003). Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
pointed out that the additional cost of disclosure is considered as an influential factor, 
which prevents the younger firm from disclosing more information. Kakani et al. 
(2001) argued that younger firms have a lack of reputation and capital, unlike older 
firms that release more information in the annual report, so the extent of a company’s 
disclosure may be influenced by its age. 
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We reject hypothesis H9: There is no association between the liquidity and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. The results in 
Table 9.3 find a statistically significant association between liquidity and the 
voluntary disclosure index, also the coefficients are positive. However, Attig et al. 
(2006) linked liquidity and information asymmetry in the stock market, implying that 
if there is high liquidity that it will reduce information asymmetry. Laidroo (2008) 
reported that if a company has high liquidity ratios, they should disclose more to 
show confidence to stakeholders. Liquidity is considered as an indicator of a 
company’s strength, which means it is still in the market; some companies use 
liquidity as a signal to their customers in order to increase confidence in their 
financial position in the market. Also, liquidity is considered as a tool of control and 
supervision about the firm’s activities, which will encourage companies to disclose 
more information to appear they have the ability to manage their business properly 
(Wallace et al., 1994). In addition, signalling theory provides support for the results 
here about liquidity, since the managers of Kuwaiti listed companies send signals to 
stakeholders about their business, which requires more disclosure.  
We accept hypothesis H10: There is no association between the gearing and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. One could 
describe a company’s financial structure by gearing, and predict the long-term risks 
which face that structure (Watson et al., 2002). Creditors need reliable information 
about their borrowers, which is why companies provide more information in their 
annual reports to meet creditors’ needs (Hasan et al., 2013). In other words, highly 
leveraged firms suffer from agency costs (Al-Saeed, 2006), so firms have to disclose 
more information to reduce agency costs. From the results here, there is no 
association between gearing and LVD, which can be explained by creditors being 
able to obtain more information about the company’s position in private ways, other 
than the annual reports. 
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We reject hypothesis H11: There is a positive association between the profitability 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies. 
From Table 9.3 the results do not find a statistically significant association between 
profitability and the voluntary disclosure index. Also, the coefficients are negative. 
This finding lends non-support to Hypothesis. According to agency theory, the 
company should release more information to stakeholders in order to reduce agency 
costs. In addition, according to signalling theory, managers of highly profitable 
companies tend to release more information in their annual report for the public in 
order to increase investors’ confidence, support management continuation of their 
positions and compensation, and raise capital at the lowest cost. 
From the results here, profitability was found to have negative association with LVD. 
Abd-Elsalam (1999) reported that bad news might persuade the firm to release it on 
time in order to keep away from legal liability and to preserve their reputation. The 
company with low profitability will disclose more information about the risks they 
face (Vandemele et al., 2009). However, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) stated:  
“Therefore, it is not safe to conclude that less profitable firms are more likely 
to produce higher levels of future-oriented information than profitable firms” 
(p. 17). 
From the above, there is no agreement about a particular theoretical expectation of 
the impact of profitability on the level of voluntary disclosure. Thus, Kuwaiti listed 
companies may prefer to use profitability as a signal to inform their stakeholders 
about their financial position in order to avoid legal liability. 
10.5 Contribution of this Research to Knowledge 
The study makes a number of contributions to the literature in the following aspects: 
1 The major contribution or originality of the present study is that it is the first 
empirical longitudinal study in Kuwait concerning the level of voluntary disclosure 
and its relationship with corporate governance mechanism, ownership structure and 
firm characteristics, as far as the researcher is aware. The study outlines Kuwaiti 
listed companies’ behaviour in voluntary disclosure. It provides a comprehensive 
vision of voluntary disclosure for Kuwaiti listed companies after the Central Bank of 
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Kuwait issued the corporate governance for the financial sector. Therefore, this study 
adds a significant contribution to understanding the Kuwaiti business environment. It 
also provides the great benefit of knowledge to regulators of the accounting 
profession in Kuwait to develop laws and regulations, to increase disclosure and 
transparency for Kuwaiti listed companies, which consequently lead to higher 
corporate value. 
2 The findings of this study indicate increasing LVD during the period of study 
(2007-2010). In addition, the findings provide evidence of significant differences 
among the four years. Especially after the Central Bank of Kuwait issued the 
principles of CG for the financial sector, the findings indicate LVD for the financial 
sector is greater than LVD for the non-financial sector. That asserts the importance 
of this study in order to show the effect of CG mechanisms since issuance by the 
Central Kuwait Bank in 2004. 
3 This study has employed many quantitative methods to investigate the effects of 
corporate governance mechanism, ownership structure and firm characteristics on 
voluntary disclosure of Kuwaiti listed companies, such as OSL regression, Normal 
score, GLS regression, Tobit regression and quantile regression to extend the 
econometric robustness of the analysis. One of the significant features in this study is 
that it is believed to be the first study of voluntary disclosure employing quantile 
regression (divided into 25%, 50% and 75%) in order to identify the factors, which 
affect LVD. 
4 This study used the disclosure index, modified from previous studies, for use in 
the Kuwaiti environment context. The researcher considers the disclosure index to be 
suitable for other Arab Gulf countries that are similar in business environment and 
experiencing the same economic changes. 
5 This study has employed disclosure theories originating from developed and 
mature markets to explain voluntary disclosure practice in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti listed companies as an emerging economy. That provides evidence of the 
possibility of employing the disclosure theories derived from developed countries in 
emerging countries, in order to provide explanation of voluntary disclosure practice, 
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as it is considered a channel through which corporate information is passed on to 
investors in the stock market. 
6 This study covers almost all Kuwaiti listed companies except for a few companies 
of which the researcher was unable to collect financial reports, for those suspended 
from trading by the Kuwaiti stock market. This is unlike many previous studies, as 
shown, that relied on relatively small samples to study voluntary disclosure. 
Therefore, it is possible to generalise the results of the disclosure index to other 
companies not investigated in this study, according to the independent variables used 
in this study. 
10.6 Limitations of the Research 
Like all studies, there are some limitations to this study that need to be taken into 
consideration when assessing the results of the thesis. 
1 The study employed a quantitative approach – although this has been criticised by 
scholars due to weak validity compared to a qualitative approach – because the major 
aim of this study was to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Kuwaiti listed companies and to identify the effects of its determinants on 
levels of disclosure. Attention is drawn here to the fact that the quantitative approach 
has been taken in a large number of previous disclosure studies. 
2 As mentioned in section 1.1 (Background to the study), there are many channels 
for companies to release information to the public, such as annual reports, 
conferences, analyst lists, investor relations, interim reports, prospectuses, press 
releases and the Internet. Nevertheless, this study relied on the annual reports of 
Kuwait listed companies to score for LVD. However, the annual report was found to 
be a very important disclosure source for information to stakeholders in many studies 
(e.g. Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1996; Hope, 2003). Thus, the findings of the study 
cannot be generalised to absolute scores for LVD of companies. 
3 Although the construction of a disclosure index is the dominant method to 
measure the extent of corporate disclosure (Gruning, 2007), it has been described as 
a difficult process because it faces serious criticisms of limited validity (e.g. 
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subjective criteria, subjective weighting) and limited reliability (e.g. subjective 
coding) (Marston and Shrives, 1991). The researcher followed a number of steps to 
mitigate subjectivity in choosing the information items that should be included in the 
checklist. In addition, the researcher employed an un-weighted approach to measure 
the disclosure level of annual financial reports, because it eliminates the subjectivity 
of the user in evaluating the relative importance of each disclosure item across all 
user groups (Ferguson et al. 2002); and also, all information items on the checklist 
are of the same importance (Cooke, 1989; Hodgdon, 2004). Despite previous steps to 
mitigate subjectivity in the construction of a disclosure index, the researcher 
acknowledges the presence of subjectivity. 
4 There remain several untested CG mechanisms in this study due to shortage of 
data, such as personal characteristics of directors (e.g. qualifications of directors), 
and other kinds of board committee (e.g. remuneration committee, compensation 
committee and finance committee). Thus, the findings on the effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the level of voluntary disclosure cannot be generalised in 
this study. 
5 This study focuses on Kuwaiti listed companies; it does not cover unlisted 
companies, and consequently, the findings of this study may not be applicable or 
generalised to other types of company. 
10.7 Suggestions for Future Research 
The results and the limitations of this research recommend some research 
opportunities related to disclosure literature. The following paragraphs present some 
potential areas that may be undertaken for future research regarding the voluntary 
disclosure in Kuwaiti. 
First, this study relied on the annual reports of the Kuwaiti listed companies as one 
source of collection of voluntary corporate information to evaluate LVD. However, 
there are many channels through which companies provide voluntary information to 
the public, such as conferences, analyst lists, investor relations, interim reports, 
prospectuses, press releases and the Internet. Focusing on these sources could 
provide more explanations of disclosure policies in the Kuwait environment 
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Second, this study aims to evaluate and measure LVD practices in the annual reports 
issued by Kuwaiti listed companies over four years (2007-2010). It would be 
interesting to replicate the study following the issuing of the Corporate Governance 
Code – Kuwait, April 2010/7 Principles & Recommended Best Practices for Public 
Companies, to see whether there are any improvements to LVD. 
Third, transparency, responsibility, accountability and fairness are four key 
principles of good corporate governance, as mentioned by previous studies. Rezaee 
(2009) describes corporate governance as “managed, monitored and held accountable 
to stakeholders for its actions” (p. 29). Further additions to the literature in the 
Kuwaiti business environment could consider other types of disclosure, such as 
corporate social responsibility, corporate environmental disclosure, risk management 
and forward looking information.  
Fourth, the study relied on quantitative approaches to collect data. Future research 
might be extended to using qualitative approaches to investigate the relationship 
between LVD and its determinants, such as interviews with the directors of Kuwaiti 
companies, debt providers, financial analysts and wider shareholders to provide 
further insights into these relationships, which may enhance the explanatory power 
of these relationships. 
Fifth, this study covers almost all Kuwaiti listed companies. It is possible to conduct 
this study in the future in medium and small-sized companies or in each of the 
thirteen sectors that constitute the Kuwait stock market. This may provide a better 
understanding of the extent of voluntary disclosure, in particular in each sector. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Disclosure Index 
No Information item 
A General Corporate Information Category 
1 Brief narrative history of company 
2 Date of establishment of the company 
3 Description of organisational structure 
4 General descriptions of business activities 
5 Majority shareholders information 
6 Information about products (services) 
7 Dividend policies 
8 Statement of corporate general objective 
9 Official address/registered address/address for correspondence 
10 Web address of the bank/email address 
B Board Of Directors and Management  Category  
11 Name of the directors 
12 Age of the directors 
13 Picture of chairman 
14 Picture of all directors/board of directors 
15 List of senior managers (not on the board of directors)/senior management 
structure 
16 Composition of Board of Directors 
17 Number of BOD meetings held and date 
18 Information about board of directors 
19 Educational qualifications (academic and professional) 
20 Background Information about member of the audit committees 
21 Directors ’ remuneration 
C Specific Corporate Strategy Category 
22 Specific statement of strategy and objectives (financial – marketing – 
social) 
23 Impact of strategy on current results 
24 Impact of strategy on future results 
25 New products (services) development 
26 Forecast of sales (revenues) 
27 Forecast of profits 
28 Forecast of cash flow 
29 Forecast earnings per share 
30 Discussion of competitive position of the company 
D Employee Information Category 
31 Geographical distributions of employees 
32 Categories of employees by gender 
33 Identification of senior management and their functions 
34 Names and salaries of senior management 
35 Number or percentage of Kuwaiti employees 
36 Policy of training and number of employees trained 
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37 Recruitment policy 
E Corporate Social Disclosure Category   
38 information on environmental protection programme 
39 Information on donations to charitable organisations 
40 Community programmes (general) 
41 Student employment 
42 Sponsoring public health, sporting and recreational projects 
43 Sponsoring educational conferences, seminars or art exhibits 
F Others Category 
44 Chairman's/MD's report/directors report 
45 Information on ISO certification 
46 Year of listing at KES  
47 Share price at the year-end 
48 Volume of shares traded trend 
49 Shareholders owned – 5 % + of shares 
50 Type of shareholders (for example, institutions, individuals) 
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Appendix 2: Sample 
 
Banks sector  
NBK National Bank Of Kuwait 
GBK Gulf Bank 
CBK Commercial Bank Of Kuwait 
ABK Al-Ahli Bank Of Kuwait 
ALMU Ahli United Bank 
KIB Kuwait International Bank 
BURG Burgan Bank 
KFH Kuwait Finance House 
BOUB Boubyan Bank 
Investment sector  
KINV Kuwait Investment Co. 
FACIL Commercial Facilities Co. 
IFA International Financial Advisors 
NINV National Investments Co. 
KPROJ Kuwait Projects Company (Holding) 
AINV Al-Ahlia Holding Co. 
COAST Coast Investment & Development Co. 
SECH The Securities House Co. 
IIC Industrial & Financial Investments Co 
SGC Securities Group Co. 
MARKAZ Kuwait Financial Centre 
AIG Aref Investment Group 
TID The Investment Dar Co. 
ALAMAN Alaman INVESTMENT CO. 
FIC First Investment Co. 
ALMAL Almal Investment Co. 
GIH Gulf Investment House 
AAYAN Aayan Leasing & Investment Co 
BAYANINV Bayan Investment Co 
GLOBAL Global Investment House 
OSOUL Osoul Investment Co 
GIC Gulfinvest International  
KFIC Kuwait Finance & Investment Co. 
KAMCO Kipco Asset Management Co. 
ILIC The International Leasting & Investment Co. 
KIH Kuwait Invest Holding Co. 
NIH National International Holding Co. 
ISKAN Housing Finance Co. 
MADAR Al-Madar Finance And Investment Co. 
ALDEERA Al-Deera Holding Co. 
ALSAFAT Alsafat Investment Co. 
ALSALAAM Alsalaam Group Holding Co. 
EKTTITAB Ekttitab Holding Co. 
QURAINHLD Al Qurain Holding Co. 
SOKOUK Sokouk Holding Co 
ALMADINA Al-Madina For Finance And Investment Co. 
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Insurance sector 
KINS Kuwait Insurance Co. 
GINS Gulf Insurance Group 
AINS Al-Ahleia Insurance Co. 
WINS Warba Insurance Co. 
FTI First Takaful Insurance Co. 
WETHAQ Wethaq Takaful Insurance Co. 
Real estate sector  
KRE Kuwait Real Estate Co. 
URC United Real Estate Co. 
NRE The National Real Estate Co. 
SRE Salhia Real Estate Co. 
PEARL Pearl Of Kuwait Real Estate Co. 
TAM Tamdeen Real Estate Co. 
AREEC Ajial Real Estate Entertainment Co. 
MASSALEH Massaleh Real Estate Co. 
ARABREC Al-Arabiy Real Estate Co. 
UREC Union Real Estate Co. 
ERESCO Al-Enma A Real Estate Co. 
MABANEE  Mabanee Company 
INJAZZAT Injazzat Real Estate Dev. Co 
JEEZAN Jeezan Holding Company 
INVESTORS Investors Holding Group Co 
IRC International Resorts Co. 
ALTIJARIA The Commercial Real Estate Co. 
SANAM Sanam Real Estate Co 
AAYANRE A Ayan Real Estate Co. 
AQAR Aqar Real Estate Investments Co. 
ALAQARIA Kuwait Real Estate Holding Co. 
MAZAYA Al-Mazaya Holding Co. 
ADNC Al-Dar National Real Estate Co. 
THEMAR Al-Themar International Holding Co 
TIJARA Tijara & Realestate Investment Co. 
TAAMEER Taameer Real Estate Investment Co. 
ARKAN Arkan Al-Kuwait Real Estate Co. 
ABYAAR Abyaar Real Estate Development Co 
Industrial sector  
NIND National Industries Group (Holding) 
PIPE Kuwait Pipes Industries & Oil Services Co 
KCEM Kuwait Cement Co. 
REFRI Refrigeration Industries And Stroge Co. 
CABLE Gulf Cable And Electrical Industries Co. 
SHIP Heavy Engineering Industrise And Ship Building Co. 
MARIN Contracting & Marine Services Co. 
PCEM Kuwait Portland Cement Co. 
PAPER Shuaiba Industrial Co. 
MRC Metal & Recycling Co. 
KFOUC Kuwait Foundry Co. 
ACICO Acico Industries Co. 
UIC United Industries Co. 
BPCC Boubyan Petrochemical Co. 
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GGMC Gulf Glass Manufacturing Co. Ltd 
HCC Hilal Cement Co. 
ALKOUT Alkout Industrial Projects Co 
KPAK Kuwait Packing Materials Manufacturing Co. 
KBMMC Kuwait Building Materials Manufacturing Co. 
NICBM National Industries Co. 
EQUIPMENT   Equipment Holding Co 
NCCI National Consumer Holding Co. 
GYPSUM Kuwait Gypsum Manufacturing & Trading Co. 
IKARUS Ikarus Petroleum Industries Co. 
Services sector  
KCIN Kuwait National Cinema 
KHOT Kuwait Hotels Company 
AGLTY Agility Public Warehousing Company 
SHOP Kuwait Commercial Complex Company 
ZAIN  Mobile Telecommunications Company 
SENERGY Safat Energy Holding Company 
EDU Educational Holding Group 
IPG Independent Petroleum Group 
CLEANING National Cleaning Co. 
SULTAN Sultan Center Food Products Group Co. 
AGHC Arabi Holding Group Co. 
CITYGROUP City Group Company 
KGL Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co. 
CABLETV Kuwait Cable Vision 
ASC Automated Systems Company 
NAPESCO National Petroleum Services Company 
KCPC 
The Kuwait Company For Process Plant Construction 
&Contracting 
KSH Kuwait Slaughter House Company 
EYAS Eyas For Higher & Technical Education 
HITSTELEC Hits Telecom Holding Co. 
ALSAFWA Alsafwa Group Holding Company 
HUMANSOFT Humansoft Holding Co 
KPPC Privatization Holding Co. 
NAFAIS Nafais Holding Company 
NSH National Slaughterhouse Co. 
AREFENRGY  Aref Energy Holding Company 
SAFWAN Safwan Trading & Contracting Co. 
GFC Gulf Franchising Holding Co. 
TAHSSILAT Credit Rating & Collection 
MAYADEEN National Ranges Company 
ABAR Burgan Co. For Well Drilling Tradhing & Maint 
IFAHR Ifa Hotels & Resorts Co. 
CGC Combined Group Contracting Co. 
JEERANH Jeeran Holding Company 
PAPCO Palms Agro Production Co 
SAFTEC Al-Safat Tec Holding Company 
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MTCC Mushrif Trading & Contracting Co. 
UPAC United Projects Co. 
ALAFCO Alafco Aviation Lease And Finance 
MHC Al-Mowasat Health Care Co. 
MASHAER Mashaer Holding Company 
OULAFUEL Oula Fuel Marketing Co. 
FUTURE Future Communications Company Global 
HAYATCOMM Hayat Communications Company 
MUBARRAD Mubarrad Transport Co 
ATC Advanced Technology Company 
YIACO Yiaco Medical Co. 
Food sector  
CATTL Livestock Transport & Trading Com. 
DANAH Danah Alsafat Foodstuff Com 
POULT Kuwait United Poultry Com. 
FOOD Kuwait Food Company (Americana) 
UFIG United Foodstuff Industries Group Co. 
